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THE UNIVERSITIES 
The 2009 AAP Conference has been jointly 
organized by the three philosophy 
departments of Monash University,  
University of Melborune and La Trobe 
University. 
La Trobe Univeristy  
School of 
Communication, Arts 
and Critical Inquiry 
La Trobe University 
opened its doors to 
students in 1967, with Brian Ellis as its 
foundation professor of philosophy. Many 
of Australia's leading philosophers either 
studied at La Trobe or taught there for part 
of their careers, including J. J. C. Smart, 
John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter and Peter 
Singer. Frank Jackson took his Ph.D. at La 
Trobe, taught there for a while and has 
recently returned as research professor. The 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy was 
edited at La Trobe for many years. Under its 
present chair, Andrew Brennan, philosophy 
at La Trobe is pluralist, with staff 
specializing in both analytic and continental 
philosophy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Melbourne 
School of Philosophy, 
Anthropology and Social 
Inquiry  
Located centrally in 
cosmopolitan Carlton, the 
Department of Philosophy at 
the University of Melbourne is an old one, with a 
wealth of history and achievements. Philosophy 
was taught at the University from its foundation 
in 1853, and the Boyce Gibson Chair of 
Philosophy, founded in 1886, is, in fact, the oldest 
chair of philosophy in Australia. Two of its 
current research strengths are in Applied Ethics (a 
major interest of Tony Coady, who succeeded 
Goddard in the Chair) and Philosophical Logic (a 
major interest of the present Chair, Graham 
Priest). 
   
Monash University  
School of Philosophy and 
Bioethics 
Deep in the South Eastern 
suburbs of Melbourne, the 
Monash philosophy department 
commands a view from the Dandenong ranges to 
Port Philip Bay from the ninth floor of the 
modernist Menzies Building. Monash was 
founded in 1961 and philosophy was there from 
the beginning. Hector Monro and Camo Jackson 
were foundation professors, followed by Peter 
Singer, Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter and John 
Bigelow. Current research and teaching strengths 
at Monash are logic and metaphysics, applied 
ethics, bioethics, moral philosophy and the history 
of philosophy.  
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MAPS 
The University of Melbourne 
Parkville, Melbourne, Victoria, 3001. 
Enter from Grattan Street, Swanston Street or Royal Parade. 
Telehone: (+61 03) 8344 4000    After hours emergencies: (+61 03) 8344 6666 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ormond 
College 
Conference buildings located in this region. See next map. 
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University of Melbourne Campus 
 
Old Arts Building: 149 
Economics and Commerce 
Building: 148 
 
Zoology Building: 147 
Babel Building: 139 
Botany Building: 122 
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INVITED SPEAKERS 
Simon Blackburn  
Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of 
Philosophy, University of Cambridge 
Distinguished Research Professor in 
Philosophy, Department of Philosophy 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Reason and Representation 
Abstract:  We talk about reasons to signal 
what is good about actual or potential 
movements of the mind. One standard of 
goodness is that the movement will either 
put us or keep is in touch with how the 
world is. But different standards are 
possible, and even the aim of keeping in 
touch with the way of the world has 
different elements, giving rise to different 
demands and different standards.  
SIMON BLACKBURN (Honorary LLD, 
University of Sunderland; Ph.D., 
Cambridge) works in philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of language, and philosophy of 
psychology. He is the author of many books, 
including, Spreading the Word (1984); Essay in 
Quasi-Realism (1993); The Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy (1994); Ruling Passions (1998); Truth 
(Co-edited with Keith Simmons, 1999); 
Think (1999); Being Good (2001); Lust (2004); 
Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed (2005); Plato's 
Republic (2006); and most recently, How to 
Read Hume (2008). He has written 
extensively on metaethics, philosophy of 
mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, 
and the history of philosophy. Some 
publications include: "The Individual Strikes 
Back," Synthese (1984); "Error and the 
Phenomenology of Value," in Ethics and 
Objectivity, ed. by Honderich (1985); "Truth, 
Realism and the Regulation of Theory," 
Midwest Studies (1988); "How To Be An 
Ethical Anti-Realist," Midwest Studies (1988); 
"Values and Attitudes," Ethics (1988); 
"Hume and Thick Connections," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research (1990); "Just 
Causes," Philosophical Studies (1991); "Hume 
on the Mezzanine Level," Hume Studies 
(1993); "Circles, Finks, Smells and 
Biconditionals," Philosophical Perspectives 
(1993); "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind (1995); 
"Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism," 
Mind (1998); "Is Objective Moral Justification 
Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation," Inquiry 
(1999); "Normativity a la Mode," Journal of Ethics 
(2001); "Realism: Deconstructing the Debate," Ratio 
(2002); “Fiction and Conviction,” Philosophical Papers 
(2003); "Knowledge, Truth, and Reliability," Studies 
in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge (2004); "Quasi-
Realism No Fictionalism" in Fictionalism in 
Metaphysics, Calderon, ed. by Eli (2005); "Antirealist 
Expressivism and Quasi-Realism" in The Oxford 
Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. by Copp (2006); 
"Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?" in 
Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, ed. by Dreier 
(2006); "The Semantics of Non-Factualism, Non-
Cognitivism, and Quasi-Realism" in The Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Language, ed. by Devitt 
(2006). He enjoys “mountaineering (declining with 
age), sailing (sprightly), black-and-white 
photography (becoming overtaken by digital), 
reading (constant), conversation (improving).” 
Ned Block  
Silver Professor of Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience, Departments of Philosophy and 
Psychology, and Center for Neuroscience,  New 
York University 
The empirical case against higher order approaches 
to consciousness 
Abstract:  The debate about higher order 
approaches to consciousness has been mainly 
focused on a priori considerations, but actually 
empirical evidence is highly relevant.  This talk will 
consider some of the evidence. 
NED BLOCK (Ph.D., Harvard) works in 
philosophy of mind and foundations of 
neuroscience and cognitive science and is currently 
writing a book on consciousness. He arrived at 
NYU in 1996 from MIT where he was Chair of the 
Philosophy Program. He is a Fellow of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, has been 
a Guggenheim Fellow, a Senior Fellow of the 
Center for the Study of Language and Information, 
a Sloan Foundation Fellow, a faculty member at 
two National Endowment for the Humanities 
Summer Institutes and two Summer Seminars, the 
recipient of fellowships from the National 
Endowment for the Humanities the American 
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Council of Learned Societies and the 
National Science Foundation; and a 
recipient of the Robert A. Muh Alumni 
Award in Humanities and Social Science 
from MIT. He is a past president of the 
Society for Philosophy and Psychology, a 
past Chair of the MIT Press Cognitive 
Science Board, and past President of the 
Association for the Scientific Study of 
Consciousness.  The Philosophers' Annual 
selected his papers as one of the "ten best" 
in 1983, 1990, 1995 and 2002. He is co-
editor of The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997). The 
first of two volumes of his collected papers, 
Functionalism, Consciousness and Representation, 
MIT Press came out in May, 2007.  There 
was a workshop “Themes from Ned Block” 
at the Australian National University in 
2003.  In 2008-2009, he will be 
Distinguished Visiting Professor, University 
of Hong Kong; Townsend Visitor, 
University of California at Berkeley; Hilgard 
Visiting Professor, Stanford; Smart Lecturer 
at Australian National University; Efron 
Symposiast, Pomona College; and 
Distinguished Visitor, University of 
Warwick.   In 2010, he will give the Josiah 
Royce Lectures at Brown University, the 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual 
Lecture, and he will give lectures to the 
Japanese Neuroscience Society and the 
National Institute for Physiological Sciences 
in Okazaki. 
Kit Fine   
Silver Professor of Philosophy and 
Mathematics, Department of Philosophy, 
New York University 
Some Puzzles Concerning Ground 
Abstract:  I will discuss some puzzles that 
arise from considering the ground for logical 
truths and will relate them to the semantic 
paradoxes.  
KIT FINE (B.A., Oxford; Ph.D., Warwick) 
specializes in Metaphysics, Logic, and 
Philosophy of Language. He is a fellow of 
the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, and a corresponding fellow of the 
British Academy. He has held fellowships 
from the Guggenheim Foundation and the 
American Council of Learned Societies and is a 
former editor of the Journal of Symbolic Logic. His 
books include: Worlds, Times and Selves (Duckworth, 
1977) with A. N. Prior; Reasoning with Arbitrary 
Objects (Blackwell, 1985); The Limits of Abstraction 
(OUP, 2002); Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers 
(OUP, 2005); Semantic Relationism (Blackwell, 
2007). In addition to his primary areas of research, 
he has written papers in ancient philosophy, 
linguistics, computer science, and economic theory. 
Rae Langton  
Professor, Department of Linguistics and 
Philosophy, MIT 
Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and 
Pornography 
Abstract: Hate speech and pornography apparently 
count as speech. Philosophers  interested in speech 
say our pragmatic framework should connect  
speech with its purposes, a paradigm purpose being 
the communication  of belief, via ‘conversational 
score’ (Lewis) or ‘common  ground’ (Stalnaker), 
exploiting mechanisms of accommodation. How 
does  this paradigm fit hate speech and 
pornography? Here, attitudes other  than belief are 
salient: for example, desire, and hate.  Can  
pragmatics shed light on what’s going on? Perhaps. 
I compare a  pragmatic approach to other models, 
including a speech act model, a  conditioning 
model, and an imitation model. I offer an 
exploratory  proposal, extending the 
accommodation of ‘common ground’ to take in  
such attitudes as desire and hate. This is part of an 
on-going effort  to bring philosophy and political 
theory into closer conversation  about what speech 
does, and why it matters.  
RAE LANGTON (Ph.D., Princeton) joined MIT 
in the Fall of 2004. Her areas of interest include the 
history of philosophy, ethics, political philosophy, 
metaphysics, and feminist philosophy. Her book on 
Kant's metaphysics and epistemology, entitled 
Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves, 
was published by Oxford in July 1998. Her most 
recent book, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on 
Pornography and Objectification, was published by 
Oxford in January 2009. Born and raised in India, 
Prof. Langton studied at Sydney University and 
Princeton University, then taught at Monash 
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University, in Melbourne, 1990 to 1996; was 
a Fellow in the Philosophy Program, 
Research School of Social Sciences, the 
Australian National University, 1997-98; 
taught at Sheffield University 1998 to 1999; 
and the University of Edinburgh 1999 to 
2004, where she was Professor of Moral 
Philosophy, a position for which David 
Hume was turned down in 1755. 
(Fortunately for her, he was no longer 
competing in 1999.) She was the first 
woman to be appointed Professor of 
Philosophy in Edinburgh, and indeed in 
Scotland. She has been a visitor and guest 
speaker on many occasions at universities in 
Australia, Canada, the USA, the UK, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Germany, 
India and Switzerland. 
Jeff Malpas  
Professor of Philosophy, Department of 
Philosophy, University of Tasmania 
What is Common to All: Davidson on 
Agreement and Understanding 
Abstract:  The essentially social nature of 
language, and not only of language, but also 
of thought, is one of the most basic ideas in 
the philosophy of Donald Davidson. It has 
not always appeared clear to all readers of 
Davidson’s work, however, just how this 
claim regarding the social nature of language 
and thought should be understood. One of 
the reasons for this is that Davidson also 
rejected what is probably the most widely 
accepted account of the nature of the 
sociality that might be thought to be at issue 
here, namely, the idea that sociality is based 
in convention—in a set of pre-existing, shared 
rules. In “A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs,” Davidson even goes so far as to 
suggest that “there is no such thing as a 
language”—at least not if by “language” one 
means a clearly defined, shared system of 
syntactic and semantic rules that exists prior 
to any particular linguistic encounter. In 
“On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 
Davidson had already presented an 
argument to a similar, if not identical, 
conclusion, through his undermining of the 
idea that there could be radical 
discontinuities in understanding of the sort 
proposed by various forms of radical relativism. In 
rejecting the idea of a common conceptual scheme 
as the basis for communication or understanding, 
Davidson also rejects the particular idea of 
subjectivity with which that idea is associated: the 
idea of an inner mental realm that is set apart from 
the world, “a concept of the mind with its private 
states and objects.” One simple way of putting the 
underlying point that is at issue here is to say that 
the notion that Davidson argues against in many of 
his later essays is the idea that understanding, whether 
or others or of the world, cannot depend on the 
existence of any form of pre-existing, determinate, 
“internalised” agreement. While Davidson does not 
deny the need for agreement of some sort, the 
agreement that he takes to be foundational to the 
possibility of understanding, and that also 
underpins the social nature of language and 
thought, cannot be specified in terms of any shared 
set of propositions, rules, concepts, behavioural 
dispositions, practices or “forms of life.” Instead, it 
is an agreement that consists in our dynamic, active 
engagement with a set of worldly events and 
entities.   
 JEFF MALPAS (Ph.D., ANU) works in 
philosophy of place, Heidegger, and Davidson. He 
is a ARC professorial fellow (2007-2011), and a 
Humboldt Research Fellow at Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität München since 1999. His books 
include: Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992);  Place and Experience: A Philosophical 
Topography (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World 
(Cambridge, Mass.:, MIT Press, 2007). His current 
research is focused around a number of projects of 
which the most important are the following. (1) 
Making Ethics Work: A New Model for Business 
and Professional Ethics (with Andrew Brennan, 
LaTrobe; funded by ARC Discovery Grant), which 
develops a new conceptual framework for 
understanding ethics in business, management and 
the professions, one that arises out of and is 
attentive to actual business, managerial and 
professional practice. (2) Ethos and Topos: A 
Philosophical Investigation of the Ethics and 
Politics of Place (funded by ARC Australian 
Professorial fellowship), which adopts an 
interdisciplinary approach within the framework of 
philosophical analysis, and aims to investigate the 
possibility of a viable ethics and politics of place 
that is not linked to violence and exclusion as often 
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perceived. (3) Consequences of 
Hermeneutics (collaborative book project 
with Santiago Zabala) explores the nature 
and significance of the hermeneutic tradition 
for contemporary, and for the future of 
philosophy, uncovering its roots in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, and its 
burgeoning in the twentieth, but also arguing 
for the sui generis character of 
hermeneutics, and the possibility that it may 
offer a new way forward for philosophy into 
the twenty-first century. (4) Engaging 
Davidson –  a volume exploring Davidson’s 
work in relation to a broad range of issues 
and traditions, connecting Davidson’s 
thinking with figures in the history of 
philosophy and with problems in both 
analytic and continental thought. Other 
projects currently underway include a 
volume of essays on cosmopolitanism in 
contemporary Australia (with Keith Jacobs), 
a volume of essays on the problem of 
landscape, and a volume on human suffering 
with Norelle Lickiss. 
Peter Menzies  
Professor of Philosophy, Department of 
Philosophy, Macquarie University 
Presidential Address 
Mental Causation in a Physical World 
Abstract: Not much of commonsense 
psychology makes sense if mental states are 
not causally efficacious. Physicalists about 
the mind who claim that mental states at the 
very least supervene or depend on physical 
states of the brain strive hard to vindicate 
mental causation. However, a simple 
argument seems to show that physicalists 
must repudiate mental causation. The 
argument is related to Jaegwon Kim’s 
famous Exclusion Argument, though it 
targets physicalism of both the reductive and 
non-reductive varieties. Like Kim’s 
argument, the new argument relies on a 
crucial exclusion assumption about 
causation: mental states cannot make a 
difference to behaviour when they 
supervene on physical states that are already 
causally sufficient to bring about the 
behaviour. This paper explores the extent to 
which this exclusion assumption is supported by 
different theories of causation. It argues that while 
a simple counterfactual theory of causation falsifies 
the assumption in its original form, it actually 
verifies a more plausible, reformulated version of 
the assumption under special conditions. The paper 
draws out some surprising consequences of this 
result. It argues that far from supporting the new 
exclusion argument against physicalism, the result 
actually vindicates the non-reductivist physicalist’s 
claim that the mental is causally autonomous from 
the physical. 
PETER MENZIES (B.A. (Hons), ANU; M.Phil., 
St Andrews University; Ph.D., Stanford University) 
works in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and 
philosophy of mind. He is co-editor with Helen 
Beebee and Christopher Hitchcock of the 
forthcoming "Oxford Handbook of 
Causation". His current research interests include 
metaphysics (causation, free will, mental causation), 
philosophy of science (probability theory, Bayesian 
networks and structural equations modelling, 
scientific models and idealization, reductionism), 
philosophy of mind (levels of explanation, status of 
folk psychology, consciousness), epistemology 
(rationality, realism and anti-realism), and the 
philosophy of logic (modality, conditionals). Before 
arriving at Macquarie in 1995, he was Tutor in the 
Department of Traditional & Modern Philosophy, 
University of Sydney, an ARC Research Fellow at 
the University of Sydney, and a Research Fellow at 
the Research School of Social Sciences at the 
Australian National University. He is an Associate 
Editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. He 
was elected as a Fellow of the Australian Academy 
of Humanities in 2007, and as the President of the 
Australasian Association of Philosophy for 2008-
2009. 
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SYMPOSIA 
 
Symposium on 
Foundations of Morality 
Wednesday 8th July, 2.00 – 3.25 pm, 
Economics & Commerce (148), Wood 
Lecture Theatre. 
Prof. Simon Blackburn  
Majesty of Reason   
There has been a lot of talk about reason 
and rationalism in the recent theory of 
ethics. Many writers envisage a kind of 
wholesale takeover of ethics by something 
different: the theory of reason. In this paper 
I argue that this is wholly chimerical, and 
that talk of reason and rationality gives us at 
best a number of notational variants of 
various kinds of endorsements we feel 
inclined to make. Writers in the firing line 
include Williams, Quinn, Parfit, and Wallace. 
Prof. Jeff Malpas 
Finding a ground for ethics in the everyday 
(together with a modest conception of reason)  
Dick Rorty has claimed that the meaning of 
basic normative terms such as ‘good’, ‘just’ 
and ‘true’ is really a problem only for 
philosophers – that we all know what these 
terms are well enough for the uses they 
serve, and do not need philosophers to 
explain their meanings. I think that there is 
something to Rorty’s point here, although it 
may be that it is not quite the same as Rorty 
intended. Rather than begin with the way in 
which the question of a possible foundation 
for ethics might be configured within 
current discussions, I want to begin from a 
perspective that seems suggested by Rorty’s 
comment, namely, that ethics already carries 
its own ‘foundation’ with it, and that it is a 
foundation given in ethical practice. The 
approach that I will sketch, and to some 
extent defend, can be viewed as an instance 
of a broadly ‘hermeneutical’ style of thinking 
that looks always to find the ground of our 
practices in the practices themselves (a move 
that is suggested by, as well as expressed in, the idea 
of hermeneutical circularity). It seems likely that 
this will involve some rethinking of what ethics 
itself might be – perhaps a more modest 
conception of ethics, in some respects, but also a 
more robust conception in others. However, since 
such a hermeneutical approach (which can be seen 
to be evident, not just in Gadamer, but also in 
Socrates) itself appears to draw on a certain 
conception of reason, I will also suggest that the 
rethinking of ethics at issue here is not such as to 
remove ethics from the ‘space’ of reason, although 
it does involve a view of reason that is similarly 
‘modest’ in character.  
 
Symposium on skilled action 
Tuesday 7th July, 2.00 – 3.25 pm, Old Arts 
Lecture Theatre B. 
Prof John Sutton, Macquarie University 
Skilled movement and embodied cognition: expertise in 
sport, music, & dance 
Theorists of embodied and collaborative cognition 
often refer in abstract terms to the flowing 
interactive online dynamics involved in jazz 
improvisation, fast team sports, or animated 
conversation. But they rarely draw in detail either 
on experts’ own accounts of their experiences, 
skills, and history, or on the heterogeneous but rich 
array of empirical studies of sport, music, or dance 
in diverse fields from cognitive psychology to 
neuroanthropology. This paper seeks to apply such 
a broader set of sources and methods to the 
specific problem of understanding how experts can 
(sometimes, fallibly) influence their own grooved 
skilled performances, an applied version of the 
mind-body problem. Many phenomenologists, 
cognitive scientists, and expert practitioners alike 
reject the intellectualist idea that skilled movement 
is governed by rich internalized motor programs 
which specify actions in advance. But many over-
react by evacuating skilled action of all cognition, 
awareness, and control: I take Mike Wheeler’s 
recent embodied-cognition-friendly reinterpretation 
of Dreyfus to exemplify this move. I discuss three 
empirical research programmes — in sport, music, 
and dance — which might seem to support the 
Dreyfus-Wheeler view that skilled movement is 
‘mindless’: I argue that in fact each suggests a more 
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complex interplay in which flowing real-time 
action remains open to certain forms of 
awareness and control. Both 
phenomenology and cognitive science offer 
reasons to resist the idea that skilled action is 
sealed off from cognition. 
Dr Wayne Christensen, Macquarie 
University 
Agency in skilled action 
Recently Pacherie (2005, 2008) has proposed 
a 3-level framework for understanding the 
intentionality of action control. Pacherie’s 
account distinguishes distal intentions from 
proximal and motor intentions, and argues 
that there is a control cascade from distal to 
proximal to motor intentions. Here I set out 
to extend Pacherie’s framework by clarifying 
the nature of motor intentions, the nature of 
relations between proximal and motor 
intentions, and the conditions under which 
higher intentional control can be effective. 
Common views of skilled performance see 
higher intentional control as only impairing 
action control. That is, skilled action is only 
skilled to the extent that it is fully 
automated. I argue to the contrary that there 
are conditions in which higher intentional 
control can make a positive contribution to 
skilled action, and I distinguish several 
forms of agentic control that may occur in 
skilled action. Since much human action 
involves skill these are important cases for 
understanding the nature and scope of 
agentic control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 Graduate Career 
Workshop 
Publishing,  Perishing and 
Procrastinating 
Tuesday 7th July, 11.00 am – 1.00 pm, Old 
Arts Lecture Theatre B. 
Mark Colyvan (University of Sydney) 
Helen Beebee (University of Birmingham) 
Rachael Briggs (University of Sydney and 
Griffith University) 
Moira Gatens (University of Sydney) 
This workshop is now a regular event at the AAP 
Conference and is devoted to providing 
information for graduate students and early-career 
academics on all aspects of academic careers. This 
year the focus will be on publishing: where to 
publish, when to publish, what to publish and how 
to avoid procrastinating. Other topics include: 
academic CVs, writing a job application, preparing 
for job interviews, where to find jobs, avoiding the 
teaching trap, landing grants, collaborative research, 
and reaching out beyond the academy. 
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ABSTRACTS  
 
Aesthetics 
Dr Luke Russell, University of 
Sydney 
Effortless Cool 
The aesthetic virtue of effortless cool is 
puzzling for two reasons. Firstly, it is not 
clear how it is possible to be effortlessly 
cool. If being cool amounts to conforming 
to a trend or meeting a shifting aesthetic 
ideal, it seems that the only way to be cool is 
to have exerted the right kind of effort. Is it 
the case, then, that effortless cool can never 
be anything more than a studied pose in 
which the cool person’s effort is artfully 
concealed? Does a cool person care deeply 
about conforming with the group or 
meeting the ideal while pretending not to 
care? Secondly, it is not clear why it is 
preferable to be effortlessly cool rather than 
studiously cool. Why do excessive self-
regard and conformism seem to be the 
hallmarks of pseudo-cool, while effortless 
cool strikes us as the real thing? In this 
paper I aim to illuminate these puzzles by 
comparing effortless cool with varieties of 
effortlessness that are required by some 
moral virtues. 
Dr. Jenny McMahon, University of 
Adelaide 
Aesthetic Autonomy and the Expression of 
Freedom: a Pragmatist Reading of Adorno 
Aesthetic Autonomy is usually associated 
with the thesis that there are ontological 
grounds for excusing the form and content 
of art from the norms and values that 
operate in other cultural domains of society.  
My objective is to discover what entitles one 
to this notion of aesthetic autonomy or what 
kind of epistemology it commits one to.  
Through an examination of relevant aspects 
of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, 
Jurgen Habbermas and Robert Brandom, 
and a consideration of contemporary 
examples of visual art (installation art and 
street art), I suggest a pragmatist reading of 
aesthetic autonomy which reconciles it with anti-
foundationalism (and the historical materialism of 
Adorno). 
Dr. Mary Buck, University of New 
England 
A Spatial Approach to Hearing Absolute Music 
Hearing classical music in the Western diatonic 
tradition is commonly regarded as a subjective, 
emotional experience for listeners. Theorists 
suggest that hearing Western classical music 
foregrounds our emotions and expectations. 
Ordinarily, we have emotions concerning an 
object. In music, the title of a musical work may 
assist the listener in discerning the object the 
composer has in mind, such as Smetana’s 
orchestral work, ‘Die Moldau’. It is also suggested 
that the music arouses in the listener memories of 
past experiences of an emotion. The composer 
provides groups of tones, themes, and structures 
that lead the listener to organise and re-organise 
his perception that becomes familiar to him over 
the course of the music. Fugues are an example of 
this method of composition.  My philosophical 
project is focussed upon the experience of hearing 
‘absolute’ music in the Western diatonic tradition. 
Absolute music is solely instrumental music, 
without reference to a narrative or drama external 
to the assembly of tones. Usually there is no title 
that offers a reference for a listener’s experience. 
As such, without a text or title to relate to, the 
listener is mistaken if he expects an emotional 
object in hearing absolute music. We may doubt 
that an experience of ‘absolute’ music is a requisite 
subject for a psychology of emotions and 
expectations.  I will consider an alternative to a 
psychology of emotion. I affirm that ordering 
space is a valuable method of perceiving absolute 
music. I support this approach by showing that an 
experience of kinematic and geometric orderings 
of space external to the listener is intrinsic to the 
musical scale. I suggest that David Marr’s study of 
the spatial parameters of vision in pursuit tracking 
enhances a spatial theory of musical perception. 
Prof. Erik Anderson, Drew University 
Sailing the Seas of Cheese 
Cheesiness abounds in popular culture. Consider a 
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few obvious examples: Celine Dion’s over 
the top big-tent Vegas act that sold out 
nightly for over three years from 2003-7; 
much of what appears on American Idol, 
the most popular show on American 
television; as well as just about anything by 
Barry Manilow, Pat Boone, Michael Bolton, 
and Kenny G, just to name a few. Other 
kinds of examples might include a pandering 
political speech, a gold chain on a hairy 
chest,  the Rock and Roll McDonald’s in 
Chicago, some Anne Geddes works, many 
Hallmark greeting cards, special effects in 
some movies, precious photos of cute little 
baby tigers wearing hats, and so on and so 
forth.    It would be difficult to understand 
many aesthetic assessments in popular 
culture these days without a good grasp of 
the concepts of cheese, cheesy and 
cheesiness. Part of the reason is that the 
high art/low art distinction upon which 
aesthetic assessments in the modern 
tradition following Hume and Kant depend 
is not operative within contemporary 
popular culture. It would be a bit too strong 
to assert that there are no sets of 
“disproportionate pairs” of artworks at all to 
serve as standards by which to orient our 
aesthetic assessments. But this is precisely 
what makes the concept of cheesiness 
useful, and that is perhaps what explains its 
ubiquity. Cheesiness is relative, and the 
conditions of application of the term are 
subjective in just the right way to make it 
useful in a sea of relativity. My hope is that 
by shedding light on the nature of 
cheesiness, we will, indirectly, shed light on 
what it is for a work to be good art in 
contemporary popular culture. 
Dr Ron Gallagher, Monash 
University 
The Recognition Moment: The Cognitive 
Dynamics of Pictorial Recognition 
The human visual system can identify the 
‘spatial envelope’ of a scene, whether in a 
picture or real-life, in less than 100 
milliseconds (one-tenth of a second). This is 
known as the ‘gist view’. In this initial 
recognition moment we roughly categorize 
what is in view, identify a few objects and 
start the pictorial interpretation process. The 
brain processes which are set in train in this 
moment are too fast and too complex to examine 
introspectively but recent breakthroughs in 
psychophysics and brain imaging technology have 
enabled researchers to dissect the recognition 
moment millisecond by millisecond. These 
techniques are providing insights into the cognitive 
dynamics which are in play in the first moment of 
looking at a picture. This recent research into ‘gist 
views’ and change-blindness eliminates the 
possibility that symbolism or resemblance is 
involved in the initial interpretation process and 
confirms a number of Flint Schier’s hypotheses 
about the cognitive dynamics of pictorial 
recognition. 
Dr Robert Sinnerbrink, Macquarie 
University 
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Film? On 
the Cognitivist-Analytic Turn i 
In response to prevailing ‘Continental’ approaches 
to film theory, there has been a significant 
paradigm-shift since the mid 1990s in the 
philosophy of film. Here one could mention the 
so-called ‘post-theory’ movement (championed by 
David Bordwell and NoÃ«l Carroll), the rise of 
cognitivist film theory (Gregory Currie and Carl 
Plantinga, for example), and prominence of 
analytic aesthetics in film philosophy (Carroll, 
Berys Gaut, Paisley Livingstone, Murray Smith, 
Malcolm Turvey). Together, this cognitivist-
analytic turn has resulted in a powerful research 
program that now increasingly dominates the 
theoretical analysis of film.      Despite the 
theoretical interest of these approaches, I shall 
argue that much recent cognitivist-analytic 
philosophy of film falls foul of Arthur Danto’s 
famous thesis on the “philosophical 
disenfranchisement of art”. Many film 
philosophers repeat this philosophical 
disenfranchisement by arguing that film 
philosophy’s primary task is to theoretically clarify 
problems of representation, belief, and perception 
in film; or to explain the reasoning processes 
underpinning film narrative interpretation; or to 
highlight the parallels between philosophical 
argumentation and varieties of cinematic 
presentation, and so on.     By contrast, many 
recent styles of film-philosophy (Stanley Cavell 
and Stephen Mulhall) challenge the prevailing 
cognitivist-analytic paradigm and argue for an 
aesthetically richer way of thinking about the film-
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philosophy relationship. What I shall call 
“romantic film-philosophy” questions the 
common tendency to privilege conceptual 
theorisation over cinematic aesthetics, and 
proposes that film should be regarded as 
engaging in a distinctively cinematic kind of 
thinking. I suggest that this romantic 
approach to film-philosophy—which takes 
film to be capable of the aesthetic disclosure 
of new aspects of experience—provides a 
salutary way of overcoming the 
philosophical disenfranchisement of cinema, 
and opens up a hermeneutically richer and 
more aesthetically sensitive way of 
philosophising on film. 
Dr Laura D’Olimpio, The University 
of Western Australia 
What Aestheticism is Really About. 
Aestheticism denies that the ethical value of 
an artwork can be taken into consideration 
when judging the work’s overall aesthetic 
value. Why is this question even of concern? 
It seems clear that at least sometimes the 
ethical component of a work of art can 
impact on its overall (aesthetic) value. The 
arguments about the aesthetic and ethical 
evaluation of artworks that are made on 
definitional and theoretical grounds only 
make sense when we examine the use and 
effect of artworks in society as people 
interact with them and are influenced and 
affected by these interactions. Some 
artworks are intended to produce an 
aesthetic effect and make a moral, social or 
political point, enhanced by the overall 
impact of the work. The autonomist, 
formalist and essentialist all object to such 
artworks or the use of art in this way as, they 
claim, the primary purpose of art is the 
aesthetic. Aestheticism should be viewed as 
largely a political or social or moral claim 
itself.  Aestheticism seeks to liberate art and 
artists in order for them to be able to 
perform such roles (i.e social commentary) 
without risk of censure or condemnation 
precisely by arguing that art is only to be 
judged by its aesthetic element(s). By 
acknowledging this, we can conclude that 
ethical evaluations of art are appropriate and 
necessary when required by the artwork in 
question. 
Applied Ethics 
Ms Luara Ferracioli, Australian National 
University 
Justice in Migration: A New Model 
My paper focuses on a particular question 
regarding rules governing the movement of people 
across territorial borders. (1) Under what 
conditions should persons acquire a valid claim to 
exit permanently the states in which they reside? I 
argue that current rules governing the migration of 
people ought to be reshaped to facilitate the 
movement of those persons who are in what I call 
a "highly distressed” condition, and to ensure that 
the claims of persons who are in such a condition 
to enter a new political communities take 
precedence over claims of people that wish to 
migrate for other reasons. People are highly 
distressed when they lack access to minimally 
adequate opportunities to pursue a good life. I 
argue that people in a highly distressed condition 
have a right to exit their former political 
communities and enter into a second political 
community that can provide them with more 
adequate opportunities if the following three 
conditions are met: (1) Their distress is traceable to 
the institutional arrangements (or lack thereof) and 
social norms prevailing in the territories in which 
they currently reside; (2) Their distress is directly 
linked to the break up of what might be called the 
citizen-state relationship (coercion exercised on 
the individual by the state is now clearly 
illegitimate); and (3) there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the situation can be improved 
significantly in the short or medium term given 
prevailing social and political conditions. 
Assistant Professor Chris Brown, 
National University of Singapore 
What Tree Huggers and Animal Lovers Should Do 
For Meat Eaters 
My aim is to describe and advocate a much 
neglected form of activism, one which should be 
of particular interest to anyone with serious, 
motivating concerns about the way we treat the 
environment and/or the way we treat (non-
human) animals.  I will start by evaluating the 
typical forms in terms of effectiveness, rather 
narrowly construed, and moral permissibility.  
Although several of these do fairly well on both 
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counts, I argue that not enough is being 
done.  The problem is not simply that too 
few people are adequately motivated, but 
also that too few of the available approaches 
have been recognized.  One additional 
approach reveals itself, however, once we 
fully appreciate the fact that many of the 
harms done to animals and the environment 
are effects of practices that bring products 
to the market.  Conscientious consumption 
is an admirable response, but competing on 
the market with the industries that fuel the 
relevant practices is a much more effective 
way of diminishing the relevant harms.  
Using meat as an example, I will argue that, 
for many existing products, “green” and 
humane practices can produce alternatives 
which are more appealing, in all respects, 
even to consumers who do not care about 
the environment or animals.  Non-profit 
organizations that make this their business 
could be uniquely effective, if run by the 
right people. 
Ms Diane Yu-Yen Lan, CAPPE, 
Australian National University 
Preventive Enhancement and the Doctrine of 
Double Effect 
I define “preventive enhancement” as 
“prenatal genetic intervention on normal 
embryos which do not inherit any defective 
genes or disorders for prevention of diseases 
or disabilities.” In this paper, I want to 
scrutinize the moral permissibility of 
preventive enhancement by introducing the 
doctrine of double effect (DDE). If the 
DDE is right and preventive enhancement 
satisfies four conditions of DDE, it is 
morally permissible for parents to enhance 
their future children via prenatal genetic 
intervention for the purpose of preventing 
diseases or disabilities. Even if the DDE is 
false or it could not apply to preventive 
enhancement, I still want to raise an 
argument by discussing the four conditions 
of DDE to demonstrate the moral 
permissibility of preventive enhancement. 
Mr Craig Edwards, UWA 
Reasons, autonomy and paternalism 
Since the late 1970s, liberal philosophers 
have sought to establish moral limits on 
paternalism that apply even when that paternalism 
would successfully promote the person’s overall 
interests. To this end, the seminal works on 
paternalism produced during the 1980s developed 
the ‘autonomy account’, at the heart of which is 
the claim that mentally competent persons have a 
moral right to inviolable personal autonomy. 
However, in recent decades even liberal 
philosophers have come to question whether a 
value-neutral autonomy has the kind of overriding 
moral worth that the demand for inviolable 
personal autonomy supposes. Superficially free 
choices may disguise an internalised oppression, or 
a learnt submissiveness, which stands at odds with 
the motivation for valuing autonomy.  In this 
paper, I argue two claims. Firstly, that the 
autonomy account is incapable of grounding the 
superior breadth of rights against paternalism that 
its proponents seek. Secondly, that the liberal 
project on paternalism can be better pursued by 
rigorously examining the paternalists’ claim that 
our choices are unreasonable. Rather than asking 
what business it is of others to interfere, we should 
ask ‘What makes your value structure more 
reasonable than mine?’. 
Dr Stephen Clarke, University of Oxford 
Governance and the Yuck Factor 
Steve Clarke and Rebecca Roache (Oxford)    
Throughout his election campaign, and in his 
inaugural address, President Barack Obama 
expressed an ambition to bridge the divide 
between predominantly conservative ‘red states’ 
and predominantly liberal ‘blue states’ (Haidt 2009; 
Loven 2008; Obama 2009), and to unite all 
Americans in a ‘common purpose of remaking 
th[e] Nation for our new century’ (Obama 2009). 
We consider the difficulty of meeting this objective 
given the prima facie evidence that conservatives 
and liberals not only hold very different moral 
views but also that the two respective groups think 
very differently about morality. We consider recent 
work in the psychology of morality which shows 
how moral judgments tend to change in response 
to changing social circumstances, such as the 
introduction of transformative technologies. We 
argue that governments can utilise these findings 
in order to plan changes in societies that will have 
the long term effect of reducing the gap between 
liberal and conservative moral thought. Some 
attempts to implement such a policy would be 
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condemned as unacceptably paternalistic. 
We argue, however, that such a policy can 
be conducted in a way that is consistent with 
Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) 
unobjectionable ‘libertarian paternalism’. 
Dr Simon Burgess, CQUniversity 
Moral judgement in professional counselling: 
both legitimate and important 
Many theorists and practitioners have 
stressed that counsellors should refrain from 
forming or expressing moral judgements 
about their clients. The idea gains intellectual 
sustenance from various sources, including 
‘Person-Centered Therapy’ (sometimes 
known as ‘client-centered therapy’ or 
‘Rogerian psychotherapy’). It cannot be 
denied that such ‘nonjudgementalism’ makes 
counselling easier, and generally makes good 
business sense too. But there are also 
important questions to raise about its 
effectiveness, its effect on social norms, and 
its moral justifiability. In this paper I argue 
that there are certain cases in relation to 
which counsellors should form certain moral 
judgements of their clients and subtly 
encourage those clients to adopt those moral 
judgements as their own. I also discuss the 
idea of counsellors forming and explicitly 
expressing moral judgements in certain 
cases. While some of the cases raised involve 
criminal actions or habits, others do not. 
Some of the most philosophically intricate 
issues arise through consideration of clients 
who have developed their habits in 
households and social milieux that are 
exceptionally violent and dysfunctional. The 
complexity is due to the fact that such cases 
raise the issue of whether, to some extent, 
certain causal explanations of behaviour can 
excuse such behaviour, and if so, precisely 
how such excuses may influence the nature 
of any relevant moral judgements. 
Dr Cynthia Townley, Macquarie 
University 
Animals, Care and the Separation Argument 
A widespread intuition grants humans a 
higher moral status than members of other 
species. While many would agree that we 
should treat human interests as more 
important than interests of non-humans, and that 
concern for humans legitimately trumps concern 
for non-human animals, it is difficult to identify 
the basis for such a claim. Without such a 
justification, the claims that humans are morally 
separate are vulnerable to the attack of 
‘speciesism.’ This paper challenges an argument 
that there are special morally salient bonds of care 
and dependence that unite all and only humans to 
the exclusion of other animals. A care based 
strategy does not solve the separation problem. 
Mr Nick Munn, CAPPE, University of 
Melbourne 
Re-Envisaging Criminal Disenfranchisement. 
Criminal Disenfranchisement as currently 
implemented in Liberal Democracies is 
fundamentally flawed.  Problems exist both in the 
way in which criminal disenfranchisement is 
instantiated, and in the underlying theoretical 
justification of criminal disenfranchisement.  I 
argue here that some degree of criminal 
disenfranchisement can be legitimate in a liberal 
democracy, and discuss the nature and extent of 
such legitimate disenfranchisement.  I claim that 
disenfranchisement ought to be: conceived of as a 
component of punishment; tied to imprisonment; 
and triggered only in cases where a person is 
imprisoned for the length of an electoral cycle or 
greater.  I present further restrictions on the use of 
disenfranchisement, designed to ensure that it is 
fairly and equitably applied when it is used.  I then 
argue that, despite the theoretical legitimacy of 
criminal disenfranchisement within a liberal 
democratic framework, there are countervailing 
considerations that are able to render such 
disenfranchisement inappropriate.  The most 
prominent of these, and the one I address in this 
presentation, is the disproportionate effect of 
criminal disenfranchisement policies on 
identifiable minority groups within society.  Even 
in instances where the disenfranchisement of any 
individual is legitimate, the compound effect of 
disenfranchisement may result in unjustifiable bias 
in democratic procedures and outcomes.  I suggest 
that considerations of these types are present in 
many, if not all, modern liberal democracies, and 
that as such, there are good reasons to restrict the 
application of criminal disenfranchisement beyond 
the theoretically acceptable level. 
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Ms Kylie Bourne, University of 
Wollongong 
Crowds and Collective Moral Responsibility 
This paper explains and defends the notion 
that collective moral responsibility can be 
ascribed to crowds. It examines the question 
of whether crowds can be the object of 
moral judgements such that they can bear 
ascriptions of praise and blame. In general, 
crowds have been overlooked in the 
philosophical debate regarding collective 
moral responsibility. Crowds have tended to 
be conceptualised atomistically such that 
intention, action and responsibility are not 
seen to exist at the level of the collective but 
are instead fully disaggregated to the 
individual crowd members. This paper 
examines May’s (1987) account of the mob 
that stormed the Bastille and Held’s (1970) 
account of a random collection of 
bystanders and uses then as starting points 
for the construction of a taxonomy of 
variety of crowds. This taxonomy then 
informs a model of how collective moral 
responsibility can be attributed to different 
types of crowds. The paper concludes by 
saying that some crowds do have a capacity 
to form a collective intention and then to 
direct action according to this intention. In 
such cases both the intention and the action 
may be legitimate objects of moral 
judgement. 
A/Prof Justin Oakley, Monash 
University 
Virtue ethics and conflicts of interest in 
physician-industry relationships 
Relationships between doctors and the 
pharmaceutical industry are currently the 
focus of much ethical scrutiny. A significant 
area of concern has been the medical 
conflicts of interest created by the pervasive 
influence that pharmaceutical companies are 
known to have on the prescribing behaviour 
of many doctors. The wrongs of doctors 
prescribing medications on the basis of 
certain links with pharmaceutical companies 
can be analysed in terms of how such 
behaviour harms patients, or how it violates 
patients’ rights. I argue that both of these 
approaches fail to identify what is essentially 
wrong with such behaviour in medical conflict of 
interest situations. The wrongs of doctors’ 
prescribing behaviour being influenced by their 
links with pharmaceutical companies can be 
properly understood only in terms of the sorts of 
character considerations central to virtue ethics. I 
also extend familiar monopoly of expertise 
arguments in professional ethics by arguing that, in 
return for being granted a monopoly of expertise 
on the provision of key goods, doctors are 
obligated not only to behave in certain ways but 
also to have certain professional character-traits. 
Doctors therefore betray society not only when 
they act (or fail to act) in certain ways, but also 
when they fail to develop particular character-
traits. 
Mr Andrew Donnelly, University of Otago 
Epistemic Uncertainty and Clinical Trials 
It is often thought that there is an ‘equipoise’ or 
‘uncertainty’  constraint on a clinician’s offering a 
patient entry into a randomised controlled trial 
(RCT).  In recent years there has been much 
discussion as to what this contraint might involve. 
Some writers maintain that equipoise exists where 
a clinician is indifferent as to whether one 
treatment offered in an RCT is superior to the 
others. Others suggest equipoise exists when the 
clinical community is in a state of collective 
uncertainty. I maintain that these accounts are 
hopeless because they make equipoise a matter of 
individual or group beliefs. Instead I advocate a 
replacement constraint of epistemic uncertainty. 
According to this constraint an RCT is only 
permissible when the best evidence available to the 
clinician is inconclusive as to whether one 
treatment is superior or inferior to the others being 
offered in the RCT. 
Mr David Douglas, University of 
Queensland 
The Social Disutility of Owning Software 
Opponents of software ownership such as Richard 
M. Stallman and Eben Moglen argue that the social 
disutility such ownership causes is a sufficient 
justification for prohibiting it. This social disutility 
includes the social instability of disregarding laws 
and agreements that cover software use and 
distribution, inequality of software access, and the 
inability to help others by sharing software with 
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them. Here I consider these and other social 
disutility claims against withholding specific 
software rights from users, in particular, the 
rights to read the source code, duplicate, 
distribute, modify, imitate, and reuse 
portions of the software within new 
programs. I find that generally while 
withholding these rights from software users 
does cause some degree of social disutility, 
only the rights to duplicate, modify, 
decompile, and imitate cannot legitimately 
be withheld from users on this basis. The 
social disutility of withholding the rights to 
distribute the software, read its source code 
and reuse portions of the software in new 
programs is not sufficient to prohibit 
software owners withholding them from 
users. In most cases a compromise between 
the software owner and user can minimise 
the social disutility of withholding these 
particular rights from users. 
Ms Philippa Smales, CAPPE 
Melbourne University 
Rejecting the Economic Arguments for 
Sweatshops 
In this paper, I discuss the two main 
economic arguments that are used to justify 
the violations of workers’ human rights that 
occur in sweatshops. The first argument is 
that sweatshops provide benefits for 
workers and that workers freely choose to 
work in sweatshops, and therefore 
sweatshop labour can be justified. However, 
I argue that workers do not freely waive 
their rights or consent to the violation of 
their human rights. Furthermore, I show 
that interfering in the free market system by 
improving wages and standards will not 
restrict workers’ freedom or remove the 
benefits of labour. The second argument 
concerns the supposed wider economic 
benefits of sweatshops for developing 
countries. This argument claims that 
improving wages and conditions will cause 
negative consequences for the economic 
growth in developing countries. I argue that 
ability of developing countries to grow and 
industrialise has changed in the modern 
economic climate, and that the trade-off of 
human rights for economic growth is not 
necessary for development.  Therefore, the 
economic arguments cannot justify sweatshop 
labour and I will conclude by discussing the 
prevention of human rights violations in 
sweatshops. 
Dr Mianna Lotz, Macquarie University 
Procreative Evil 
Attempts to explain the intuitive wrongfulness in 
alleged ‘wrongful life’ cases sometimes seek to do 
so by attributing harmful wrongdoing to the 
procreators in question. Such approaches identify 
the individual resulting child as having been, in 
some sense, personally culpably harmed by their 
coming into existence. In contrast, this paper gives 
an account of the relevance of procreative 
motivation for determining the morality of 
procreation in a class of cases not readily captured 
by an analysis of person-affecting harm. I begin by 
reviewing the main objection to the harm-based 
approach, arising out of Parfit’s analysis of the 
non-identity problem and its implications for 
preconception cases. Most attempts to avoid the 
non-identity objection in these kinds of cases 
either take an impersonal harm approach, or draw 
on some version of a metaphysical modal 
counterpart theory to defend a person-affecting 
harm account. I propose and defend an alternative 
view, one that locates the assessment of 
procreative motivation within a consideration of 
the normative expectations of moral communities. 
The proposed account construes the wrongfulness 
in the considered cases as ‘evil’ rather than harm, 
and the type of evil in question as being of a ‘non-
grievance’, welfare-connected, collective kind. 
Understanding the wrongfulness in this way offers 
a basis on which to explain the intuitive view that 
our procreative motivations do matter morally. 
Dr Robert Sparrow, Monash University 
A not-so-new eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on 
human enhancement 
In Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for 
Making Better People (2007), John Harris argues 
that a proper concern for the welfare of future 
human beings implies that we are morally 
obligated to pursue enhancements. Similarly, in 
“Procreative Beneficience: Why We Should Select 
The Best Children” (2001) and in a number of 
subsequent publications, Julian Savulescu has 
suggested that we are morally obligated to use 
genetic (and other) technologies to produce the 
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best children possible. In this paper I argue 
that if we do have such obligations then 
their implications are much more radical 
than either Harris or Savulescu admit. There 
is an uneasy tension in the work of these 
authors, between their consequentialism and 
their (apparent) libertarianism when it comes 
to the rights of individuals to use—or not 
use—enhancement technologies as they see 
fit.   Only through a very particular and not 
especially plausible negotiation of the 
tension between their moral theory and their 
policy prescriptions can Harris and 
Savulescu obscure the fact that their 
philosophies have implications that most 
people would find profoundly unattractive. 
Mr Sean Benedict McKenna, ACU 
National 
Failing to be Moral 
A preparedness to accept the failure of even 
highly significant projects in her life, due to 
their inconsistency with her moral outlook, 
is a defining characteristic of the serious 
moral agent. The moral position of an actor 
can be described, in part, by those points at 
which fidelity to her moral principles is 
capable of bringing about the failure of 
certain of her projects and endeavours. A 
moral agent cannot, with consistency, 
recognise an obligation to act in a way 
contrary to her moral position. For an action 
to be accepted as obligatory by a moral 
agent it must also be considered by that 
agent as morally permissible. Success in any 
project or endeavour is, for the serious 
moral agent, achievable only through 
morally permissible means. Therefore, a 
moral agent is obliged to accept the failure 
of those of her projects where success 
depends upon her acting in a way contrary 
to her moral position.     The paper argues 
that the source of all of an agent’s 
obligations can be traced back to her moral 
position.  The paper will argue against the 
notion that obligations outside of the moral 
might conflict and compete as drivers of an 
agent’s actions, considering in particular 
claims that the demands of public office or 
membership of a political community create 
obligations capable of overriding the moral 
agent’s personal morality. 
 
Asian and Comparative 
Philosophy 
Mr James Stewart, University of 
Tasmania 
Gambling with Belief in Early Buddhism 
In the Appanakasutra of the PÄ li canon, 
Gotama Buddha advances an argument for 
warranted belief that is comparable to the wager 
advanced by Blaise Pascal in his PensÃ©es. The 
purpose of the paper is to (1) provide a close 
analysis of the Buddhist Wager, (2) consider its 
comparability with Pascal’s Wager, and (3) 
examine its plausibility within the wider context of 
the PÄ li canon. In this latter evaluative phase of 
the paper I claim that there are two serious 
difficulties with the Buddhist Wager: (a) that the 
move from “belief in an afterlife” to the 
conclusion that “one should believe in the 
dhamma” is not warranted, and (b) that the 
strategy of warranted belief using a considered 
gamble is not consistent with the Buddhist 
concept of saddhÄ  (faith), a concept that entails 
not only a rational conviction but also a religious 
devotion. Belief by gambling might capture the 
first sense of saddhÄ  but not the second. I close 
by positing that both difficulties resemble some of 
the classical objections that are advanced against 
Pascal’s Wager. 
Dr Sonam Thakchoe, University of 
Tasmania 
Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: the Nature & 
Application of perception 
The dominant view in Buddhist epistemology 
debate is that the theory of perception (pratyakṣa) 
in Indian Buddhism is one that exclusively 
belonged to the foundationalist systems. Even the 
current Buddhist scholarship presupposes that a 
Buddhist epistemologist must endorse either the 
theory of perception introduced by Dignāga-
Dharmakīrti or the theory proposed in the 
Brahmanical systems by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and 
Mīmāṁsaka. This view, if it is correct, has two 
major problematic implications for the Prāsaṅgika 
philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti: (i) to the 
extend one grants the application of perception in 
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the Prāsaṅgika, to that extend one must be 
an epistemological foundationalist since 
there would be no other alternative account 
to choose from; (ii) to the extend one rejects 
the foundationalist theory of perception in 
the Prāsaṅgika context, to that extent one 
must be admit oneself as a radical 
epistemological sceptic, wholly rejecting any 
application of perception in Madhyamaka. 
The former is problematic because it implies 
that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are simply 
inconsistent and contradictory as it 
presupposes the synthesis of the 
foundationalist epistemology and the anti-
foundationalism metaphysics of the 
Prāsaṅgika. So far we have not seen any 
evidence being produced to show that these 
Prāsaṅgikas blend the two irreconcilable 
positions. The latter is also problematic 
because it reduces the Prāsaṅgikas into mere 
epistemological sceptics since it rules out the 
possibility of any alternative anti-
foundationalist account of perception, and 
the Prāsaṅgika clearly reject the 
foundationalist account. In this paper, I will 
discuss in detail the problems of ascribing to 
the Prāsaṅgika system any foundationalist 
theory of perception. I will instead propose 
an alternative theory of perception based on 
the Prāsaṅgika’s anti-foundationalist 
metaphysics, and will show that Nāgārjuna 
and Candrakīrti’s works provide us sufficient 
evidence to defend a typical Prāsaṅgika’s 
account of perception which, I believe, 
complements with its core anti-
foundationalism. 
 
Environmental Philosophy 
Mr Fabien Medvecky, University of 
Sydney 
Uncertainty, Economic Growth and 
Discounting in Environmental Decisions 
Discounting is an economic tool which 
determines the present values of future costs 
and benefits. As a key tool in inter-temporal 
decision making, discounting has received 
substantial interest, especially in regards to 
environmental decision making. Underlying 
discounting is the assumption that goods in the 
future are presently worth less than the same 
goods in the present, at least in economic terms. 
This assumption is commonly justified by an 
expectation of economic growth. Exponents of 
this view claim that as the economy grows, more 
goods are produced which theoretically leads to 
higher wages. Thus the price of goods relative to 
wages decreases. The decrease in the price of 
goods becomes a justification for the use of 
discounting. While this may be correct, the 
forthcoming levels of growth are, as they have 
always been, uncertain. Furthermore, the longer 
the decision, the greater this uncertainty will be. In 
this paper I will consider the extent to which an 
expectation of growth can be used as a justification 
for discounting in environmental decision making. 
This is especially pertinent given that 
environmental decisions often have a longer time 
frame than standard economic decisions, and with 
this longer time frame comes greater uncertainty. I 
will argue that the decision as to which discount 
rate to use should be approached using a decision-
theoretic framework. If this is correct, then 
everything turns on the level of uncertainty under 
which we are operating: whether we view the 
decision about the appropriate discount rate as a 
decision under risk or a decision under ignorance. 
 
Assoc Prof William Grey, University of 
Queensland 
Climate change and obligations to the future 
Climate change poses serious ethical, social, 
political and technical challenges. The science is 
complex and (like all complex science) uncertain, 
but because of the potential seriousness of the 
problem posed by global warming the task of 
making significant and far-reaching choices in a 
situation of uncertainty is both urgent and 
important. Our individuals and collective choices 
have potentially far-reaching implications for both 
non-humans and future generations. This paper 
will explore some of the central issues which arise 
in this complex debate, which include important 
concerns of environmental philosophy, such as 
obligations to the nonhuman world, and in applied 
ethics, such as issues of intergenerational equity 
and justice. 
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Epistemology 
Cei Maslen, Victoria University of 
Wellington 
Flexible Contextualism and Empathy 
Jason Stanley has argued persuasively for a 
view he calls Interest Relative Invariantism 
(IRI) as better at accounting for knowledge 
claims across contexts than the more 
familiar Contextualism about Knowledge. 
One case he examines in detail is a case in 
which someone in a high stakes situation 
employs a belief passed on from someone in 
a low stakes situation (for example, my 
mother gives me some information over the 
phone which unbeknownst to her I use to 
win a pub quiz.)  Stanley does acknowledge 
that actual interests and apparent interests 
can depart in such cases, but I argue that he 
underestimates the importance of this 
observation, and also ignores the flexibility 
we have to empathize with others by 
adopting their practical viewpoints.  I 
reanalyze Stanley’s examples and develop a 
notion of indirect identification of standards 
to help the Contextualist about Knowledge. 
Professor Jonathan Schaffer, 
Australian National University 
Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed 
The debate between contextualists and 
invariantists has been marked by various 
claims about what our intuitions are. Yet the 
claims that contextualists and subject-
sensitive invariantists have made about our 
intuitions have not withstood empirical 
scrutiny. Repeated surveys have failed to 
show any effect of stakes or alternatives on 
ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Joshua 
Knobe and I have since found what may be 
the first empirical results which support 
contextualism. Specifically, we have found 
that manipulating the contrast in specific 
ways produces significant alterations in 
people’s willingness to ascribe knowledge. 
This paper will survey the existing 
experimental philosophy literature on 
contextualism and invariantism, and discuss 
a range of new data that seems to favor the 
contextualist view. 
Dr Jennifer Bleazby, St Leonards College 
The Development of Imagination in Classroom 
Philosophical Inquiries 
The imagination has traditionally been thought of 
as the antithesis of reason. As such, education, 
which has traditionally focused on the cultivation 
of reason, has devalued the imagination and 
encouraged children to transcend their imaginative 
natures. When the imagination has been 
considered important, it is has normally been 
thought of as a distinct form of creative thinking 
that compliments critical thinking.  In this paper I 
will draw on the work of John Dewey to argue that 
imagination is actually integral to all thinking. 
Dewey describes thinking as the reconstruction of 
problematic experiences. Problematic experiences 
evoke imagination, because they compel us to 
imagine alternative possibilities, in which a 
fragmented, incomplete situation is a coherent, 
meaningful whole. Without the capacity to imagine 
problematic situations as other than they are, there 
would be no need for thinking because there 
would be no need, or means, for reconstructing 
experience. Thus, imagination enables us to 
interact with reality in a meaningful, transformative 
manner.    I will then address how, in contrast to 
traditional pedagogies, Philosophy for Children 
(P4C) facilitates this Deweyian ideal of 
imagination. P4C’s classroom community of 
inquiry involves the imaginative construction of 
alternative possibilities as a means to 
reconstructing philosophical problems. The 
communal nature of the classroom also facilitates 
imagination by exposing children to the alternative 
perspectives of others, which requires the use of 
the sympathetic imagination.  Furthermore, I will 
explore how the imaginary, as well as the 
fantastical, can help children develop philosophical 
ability and understanding, especially in logic, 
critical thinking, metaphysics and ethics.  Finally I 
will briefly address the importance of the teacher’s 
imagination. 
Dr David Coady, University of Tasmania 
The epistemology of the Blogosphere 
Blogging has changed the way in which people 
acquire knowledge and justify their beliefs. But are 
these changes good or bad? In particular, are we 
epistemically better off as a result of  blogging, or 
is it the case, as Alvin Goldman has argued, that 
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the blogosphere’s emergence as an 
alternative to the conventional media is “bad 
news for the epistemic prospects of the 
voting public”? Come along and find out. 
Dr Brent Madison, The University of 
Notre Dame Australia 
Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology 
One thing that nearly all epistemologists 
agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive 
counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of 
knowledge; whatever else is true of 
knowledge, it is not merely belief which is 
both justified and true.  They now agree that 
knowledge is not justified true belief because 
this is consistent with there being too much 
luck present in the cases, and that 
knowledge excludes such luck.  This is to 
endorse what has become known as the 
‘anti-luck platitude’. But what if generations 
of philosophers have been mistaken about 
this, blinded at least partially by a deeply 
entrenched professional bias?  There has 
been another, albeit minority, response to 
Gettier: to deny that the cases are 
counterexamples at all. Stephen 
Hetherington, a principal proponent of this 
view, advances what he calls the ‘Knowing 
Luckily Proposal’.  If correct, this radical 
and unorthodox position does not solve the 
Gettier problem; rather, it dissolves it.  If 
Hetherington is correct, the Gettier problem 
is a pseudo-problem, and therefore not a 
problem after all.  If correct, this would call 
for a major re-evaluation and re-orientation 
of post-Gettier analytic epistemology, since 
much of it assumes the anti-luck platitude 
both in elucidating the concept of 
knowledge, and in the application of such 
accounts to central philosophical problems.  
It is therefore imperative that the Knowing 
Luckily Proposal be considered and 
evaluated in detail. In this paper I critically 
assess the Knowing Luckily Proposal.  I 
argue that while it draws our attention to 
certain important features of knowledge, 
ultimately it fails, and the anti-luck platitude 
emerges unscathed.  Whatever else is true of 
knowledge, therefore, it is unlucky true 
belief.  For a proposition to count as 
knowledge, we cannot arrive at its truth 
accidentally or for the wrong reason. 
Dr Kennedy Matthew, University of 
Nottingham 
Scepticism, Safety, Subjective Similarity 
I develop a version of brain-in-a-vat scepticism 
which draws on the notion of epistemic safety. 
Safety is the idea that “If one knows, one could 
not easily have been wrong in a similar case” 
(Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, p. 147). 
Although many see safety as an anti-sceptical 
notion, we can convert it by articulating and 
defending a favorable similarity ordering of 
possible worlds. According to this ordering, all 
worlds in which one has the same perceptual 
experience as in the actual world are relevant to 
the question of whether one’s perceptual belief 
amounts to knowledge. We can see this ordering 
as the expression of epistemic internalist intuitions; 
and we can develop opposition to it in epistemic 
externalist fashion. A naïve-realist perspective will 
also be considered. The paper does not attempt to 
defuse external-world scepticism, but rather to 
understand its persistence in terms of a clash of 
appealing intuitions about experiential subjectivity, 
and its epistemic role. 
Dr Miri Albahari, University of Western 
Australia 
Does the sense of self weaken knowledge that there is 
no self? 
Anna is anxious about her talk on no-self.  
Gripping her sweaty palms she climbs the podium 
trembling so violently that she trips and breaks the 
power-point projector and has to give her talk on 
the fly... Suppose Anna’s anxiety betrays a strong 
sense of self — of exactly the sort whose existence 
she denies. Is she harbouring inconsistent beliefs? 
And if Anna knows that there is no self, could her 
knowledge of that fact be made defective by such 
inconsistency? Conversely, could her knowledge of 
no-self be improved by losing the sense of self? It 
depends partly on whether the sense of self 
involves a belief — and of the right sort. It also 
depends on whether knowledge can vary in its 
quality. In this paper I discuss a number of points 
that arise in relation to this case, drawing on the 
parallel debate over whether one can be a 
consistent determinist while having a sense of 
libertarian freewill. 
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Dr. Michael Titelbaum, 
ANU/University of Wisconsin-
Madison 
Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, 
Internalism, and No-Lose Epistemology 
Many epistemologists think there’s 
something wrong with a theory of 
knowledge that allows bootstrapping (Vogel 
2000), but it’s not clear exactly what’s 
wrong.  One thing wrong with 
bootstrapping may be that it allows 
investigations with the possibility of 
increasing an agent’s justification for a belief 
but no possibility of decreasing that 
justification.  After fleshing out these 
thoughts, I’ll show that a particular type of 
epistemic internalism prevents 
bootstrapping from creating such no-lose 
investigations. 
Professor Michael Lynch, University 
of Connecticut 
The Argument from Epistemic Disagreement 
The Argument from Epistemic 
Disagreement  Michael P. Lynch    
Epistemic disagreement is disagreement 
over epistemic principles. Deep epistemic 
disagreements are disagreements over 
fundamental principles — e.g. over whether 
a basic doxastic method, such as sense 
perception, is reliable.  A hallmark of deep 
epistemic disagreement is that it is subject to 
epistemic circularity. The principles in 
question can’t be justified except by appeal 
to themselves.   In this paper, I argue that 
the fact that deep epistemic disagreement is 
subject to epistemic circularity means that 
we must be prepared to confront arguments 
like the following:      1.  Deep epistemic 
disagreements are rationally irresolvable.   2. 
The best explanation for why deep epistemic 
disagreements are rationally irresolvable is 
that there are no objectively true 
fundamental epistemic principles.   3. If 
there are no objectively true fundamental 
epistemic principles, there are no objectively 
true derivative epistemic principles.   4. All 
epistemic principles are either fundamental 
or derivative.   5. Therefore, there are 
(probably) no objectively true epistemic 
principles.     The argument parallels a familiar 
argument for moral anti-realism. That argument 
moves from the premise that deep moral 
disagreements are rationally irresolvable to the 
conclusion that there are no objectively true moral 
principles. As in the moral case, the argument 
from epistemic disagreement is important and 
worth taking seriously. But it is ultimately 
unsound. I will argue that the first premise of the 
argument is reasonable, but only when qualified in 
a certain respect. But once qualified in that respect, 
the second premise is false. Consequently the 
argument should be rejected. 
Mr Leon Leontyev, ANU 
Assertions in context without contextualism 
DeRose and more recently Schaffer have put 
forward an argument for contextualism about 
knowledge attributions that relies on the following 
two claims: (1) that knowledge is the norm of 
assertion; and (2) that the epistemic propriety of 
assertion is sensitive to context. Claim (1), while 
not unchallenged, has been solidly defended by 
Williamson and others. Claim (2) is derived from 
the fact that we give different intuitive verdicts 
about the propriety of an assertion in a pair of 
cases where the only difference between the cases 
is the salience of an error possibility. In this paper 
I argue that the best explanation of the data that’s 
used to established (2) is actually to adopt a norm 
of assertion other than the knowledge norm. If 
that’s so, then claim (1) is undermined and 
contextualism about knowledge doesn’t follow. 
Ms Elizabeth Silver, The University of 
Melbourne 
Peer disagreement and reliability 
How should you react upon discovering that an 
epistemic peer disagrees with your conclusion? 
Recent answers to this question include ‘split the 
difference between your opinions’, ‘stand your 
ground’, and several positions in between those 
two extremes. However, most of these answers 
treat peer disagreement in isolation, creating the 
false impression that disagreement counts directly 
against your conclusion. I propose that the 
response to peer disagreement is just one instance 
of a general epistemic rule: you should always take 
your own unreliability into account when you 
decide how much confidence to place in your 
conclusion. Peer disagreement is a useful source of 
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information about your reliability in 
answering a particular question; it does not 
bear directly on your conclusion. Taking 
disagreement as evidence against your 
reliability implies you should “split the 
difference” (a.k.a. the Equal Weight View), 
but the implication only holds when certain 
assumptions are true. These assumptions 
include: a) there are only two possible 
answers to the question; b) your peer is 
exactly as reliable as yourself; c) you and she 
have access to, and affirm, the same set of 
relevant evidence; d) you have objective 
evidence about your own reliability; e) you 
have equally strong evidence about your 
peer’s reliability; and f) your reasoning is 
independent of your peer’s reasoning. In 
real, interesting cases of peer disagreement, 
those assumptions will almost always be 
violated. This helps explain the persistence 
of disagreement despite the appeal of the 
Equal Weight View. I attempt to outline 
how we should respond to disagreement 
when those assumptions are violated, 
including some cases where we are clearly 
not obliged to accord equal weight to our 
purported peer’s opinion. 
Mr Alexander Cox, University at 
Buffalo (SUNY) 
Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism 
In their recent books, John Hawthorne and 
Jason Stanley each present a version of 
subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI).  SSI is 
an epistemic thesis that claims that there is a 
single semantic value of ‘knows’.  It is 
distinguished from other invariantist 
theories by its claim that whether an 
instance of ‘S knows p’ is true or not 
depends in part upon the context and 
interests of the subject.  SSI is opposed to 
contextualism, which claims that the 
semantic value of ‘knows’ varies across 
contexts.  According to contextualism, the 
context and interests of the attributor 
determine which meaning of ‘knows’ 
applies.  Whether an instance of ‘S knows p’ 
is true or not depends in part upon this 
semantic value.  Hawthorne and Stanley 
each attempt to motivate subject-sensitive 
invariantism by applying it to an epistemic 
puzzle and arguing that it handles these 
puzzles at least as well as, if not better than, 
contextualism does. In this paper, I introduce 
these epistemic puzzles—lottery cases and 
high/low stakes cases—and the contextualist and 
SSI solutions.  After briefly motivating SSI over 
contextualism, I present three criticisms of SSI.  
First, I question whether the truth of knowledge 
ascriptions is sensitive to practical facts as SSI 
claims.  Second, I argue that SSI is consistent with 
the claim that knowledge vacillates.  That is, on 
this view it is easy for one to lose and regain 
knowledge simply by changing one’s context or 
interests.  Third, I argue that SSI has difficulty 
accounting for the ubiquity of third-person 
knowledge ascriptions.  In particular, it faces a 
dilemma between claiming that most third-person 
knowledge ascriptions are inappropriate and 
claiming that many such ascriptions are only true 
as the result of luck.  I conclude by briefly showing 
that contextualism is not susceptible to these 
charges. 
Professor Huw Price, University of 
Sydney 
One Boxer Rebellion 
Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal 
Decision Theory (CDT) are usually regarded as 
incompatible views of rational decision. I argue 
that this is a mistake, and that supporters of EDT 
should be supporters of CDT, too. The real issue 
then concerns the order of priority between 
causation and rational decision, and here my 
compatibilist version of EDT has the better of the 
argument. Unless causation is understood in the 
way the compatibilist recommends, its link to 
rational decision remains mysterious. 
 
European Philosophy 
Mr Paul Fearne, LaTrobe 
Heidegger, Being-in-the-world and Schizophrenia 
This paper uses the work of Martin Heidegger to 
interpret the notion of schizophrenia.  It uses 
concepts found in Being and Time to posit 
explanations that might help clarify some of the 
more difficult aspects of the condition.  In 
particular, it looks at two concepts: ‘Being-in-the-
world’ and ‘Being-with’.  It argues firstly that 
schizophrenia is a deficient mode of Being-in-the-
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world.  For Heidegger a person relates to the 
world in a number of distinct ways.  One of 
these ways is to see objects as having uses 
for particular ends.  The paper analyses the 
manner in which perceptions of objects in 
terms of their use (or ‘ready-to-hand’ 
perceptions as Heidegger characterises 
them) seem to be dysfunctional in 
schizophrenia.  It also uses Heidegger’s 
work on perceptions of ‘significance’ in the 
world to argue that such perceptions are 
heightened and distorted in schizophrenia.       
The paper then turns to look at how, in 
schizophrenia, a person’s relation to the 
Other is rendered dysfunctional.  We do this 
through a look at Heidegger’s notion of 
‘Being-with’.  For Heidegger, human beings 
are very much defined by their relations to 
other people.  We see that in schizophrenia, 
the person can try and distance themselves 
from others, and their social functioning can 
become impaired.    Through our analysis of 
these two important concepts of 
Heidegger’s it is hoped that we may 
diminish some of the current opacity that 
surrounds schizophrenia. 
Ingo Farin, School of Philosophy, 
University of Tasmania 
Heidegger’s Concept of Time 
In recent years, Heidegger’s concept of 
original temporality has been harshly 
critiqued, among others by Tugendhat and 
Blattner. In this paper I will briefly explore 
the historical landscape in which Heidegger 
developed the idea of original temporality 
(Husserl, Dilthey, Bergson, and Barth). I will 
then show that Heidegger’s reading of Paul 
(GA 60) is crucial to understanding his 
concept of temporality. Although Heidegger 
later played down the eschatological 
dimension, it still informs his concept of 
original temporality in Being and Time. If 
we keep this context in mind, a viable and 
non-contradictory idea of original 
temporality can be formulated. 
Mr James Burrowes, University of 
Auckland 
Your Symbols are Finite: Cassirer, Heidegger 
and Lask and the Kantian Tradition 
Heidegger and Cassirer, and their philosophical 
systems, were brought into direct confrontation at 
a debate in Davos, Switzerland in 1929. The 
debate was structured on their respective readings 
of Kant; the influence of these interpretations on 
their wider philosophy is telling. Both Heidegger 
and Cassirer were initially trained within the Neo-
Kantian tradition and, more importantly, under its 
third phase.  It was at this stage that the 
ontological issues arising from Lebensphilosophie 
were beginning to challenge the epistemological 
framework of transcendental logic at the basis of 
Neo-Kantianism. Emil Lask most clearly 
uncovered the contradictions within the Southwest 
School and integrated the concepts of 
Lebensphilosophie into a Kantian framework, 
thereby anticipating the final phase of Neo-
Kantianism.  In this paper I intend to compare the 
main elements of Heidegger’s existential analytic of 
Dasein with Cassirer’s conception of man as a 
Symbolic Animal and how these are inherent to 
their wider philosophical systems. Also, I will 
show how important Emil Lask’s theory of 
Kantian logic is to our understanding of both 
Heidegger and Cassirer. In this respect, we will 
investigate the effect of Lebensphilosophie on 
Kantian thought and put into perspective the 
elements of Kantian philosophy which remain 
within Heidegger’s thought. Specifically, we will 
look at each of these philosophers’ interpretations 
of Intuition and Imagination and the ontological 
conditions of Logic, Mathematics and the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. I will argue that the 
correct interpretations will need to rest on a 
clarified notion of finitude. I will also argue that, in 
line with the likes of Theodore Kisiel and Steven 
Galt Crowell, comparing Lask and Heidegger 
provides fundamental insights into Heidegger’s 
Philosophy, and will make further clarifications to 
the relationship between Cassirer and Lask and the 
strands of Neo-Kantianism that they each 
represent. 
Mr James Garrett, University of 
Melbourne 
Heidegger’s Aristotle 
Heidegger’s method of destruction returns 
philosophical concepts back to their original 
experiences in order to show that the clear formal 
appearance of familiar basic concepts is radically 
misleading.  Nowhere is the method of destruction 
employed in more detail and with higher stakes 
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than in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle.  In 
this paper, I will first briefly outline the early 
Heidegger’s basic critique of modern 
philosophy.  Heidegger’s critique amounts to 
the accusation that modern philosophy 
confuses formal logic with a general 
ontology.  The bulk of the paper is devoted 
to unpacking Heidegger’s project of 
recovering a different original sense of 
‘logic’, which emerges in conjunction with 
his destructive readings of Aristotle.  This 
original logic bears little resemblance with 
ordered realm of the Analytics, rather it 
remains transfixed with the problematic 
nature of Being.  The question of the 
meaning of Being makes no sense until one 
recognises the radical limitations of 
formalisation that Heidegger exposes.  Only 
when the conceptual superstructures of the 
history of philosophy are all undermined can 
the original challenges of original logic be 
understood. 
Dr Ashley Woodward, The 
University of Melbourne 
Deleuze and Nihilism 
This paper critically examines Deleuze’s 
treatment of the Nietzschean problem of 
nihilism. Of all the major figures in 
contemporary Continental thought, Deleuze 
is at once one of the most luminous, and 
practically a lone voice in suggesting that 
nihilism may successfully be overcome. 
Whether or not he is correct on this point is 
thus a commanding question in relation to 
our understanding of the issue. Many 
commentators on Nietzsche have argued 
that his project of overcoming nihilism is 
destined to failure because of the affinity 
between the problem of nihilism and the 
logic of negation. While Nietzsche wants an 
absolute affirmation of life, Spinoza’s 
principle that “all determination is 
negation,” as well as Hegel’s dialectical 
conception of negation, suggest that 
affirmation free of negation is not possible. 
However, some commentators suggest that 
Deleuze successfully shows how 
overcoming nihilism is possible because his 
“logic of difference” allows for an 
affirmation which is not dialectically 
reappropriated by negation. This paper 
argues that beyond such logical considerations, 
there are metaphysical and existential reasons why 
Deleuze’s interpretation of nihilism fails to show 
that it can be overcome. For Deleuze, the 
overcoming of nihilism hinges not just on a logic 
of difference, but on a radical interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as “selective 
being.” I argue that the metaphysical and 
existential implications of this understanding of 
eternal return reinstates nihilism at the very point it 
is supposedly overcome. Moreover, I argue that 
there are attendant political dangers to Deleuze’s 
position on nihilism. 
Dr Simon Duffy, University of Sydney 
Deleuze and Lautman’s dialectics of mathematics 
Albert Lautman, a philosopher of mathematics 
working in the late 1930’s, outlined a ‘critical’ 
programme in mathematics that was intended to 
displace the previous foundational discussions that 
were occupied with the criticism of classical 
analysis. Against the logicist claim that the 
development of mathematics is dominated a priori 
by logic, Lautman proposes a ‘metaphysics of 
logic,’ and calls for the development of a 
‘philosophy of mathematical genesis’ that retains a 
commitment to a form of Platonism. One of the 
tasks, indeed the challenges, that Lautaman sets 
himself but never carried through with, was the 
task of deploying the mathematical philosophy that 
he developed in other domains. It is Deleuze who 
shows the most assiduity in his engagement with 
Lautman by taking up this challenge. The 
mathematical work that is drawn upon and that 
plays a significant role in Deleuze’s philosophical 
project is that of Lautman. Indeed, the 
philosophical logic that Deleuze constructs as a 
part of his project of constructing a philosophy of 
difference is dialectical in the Lautmanian sense, 
although this requires qualification. The paper 
gives an account of the Lautmanian dialectic, of 
how it operates in Lautman’s work, and of what 
Deleuze does to Lautman’s dialectic when it is 
incorporated into his project of constructing a 
philosophy of difference. 
Dr. Paolo Diego Bubbio, University of 
Sydney 
Sacrifice in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
In this paper I apply the post-Kantian revisionist 
interpretation of Hegel, and specifically the 
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recognition-theoretic approach, to the 
notion of sacrifice in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Firstly, I conduct a preliminary 
analysis by examining the general meaning 
of sacrifice as a form of determinate 
negation. Secondly, I focus on two 
phenomenological moments (the struggle 
between “faith” and “pure insight”, and the 
cult) in order to answer the question, “Is a 
real (effective and unselfish) sacrifice 
possible?” Finally, I argue that sacrifice 
should be considered as a Darstellung, and I 
explain the twofold connection between 
sacrifice and recognition. I conclude that 
there is no sacrifice without recognition, and 
the process of recognition is intrinsically 
sacrificial. 
Mr Tim Themi, Deakin University 
Lacan, Nietzsche, Questions of Science 
As evidenced by the reactions to 
psychoanalysis in Todd Dufresne’s recent 
collection of interviews with critical Freud 
scholars, and the protests surrounding new 
UK Parliament proposals to regulate the 
various talking therapies — the status of the 
claims made by psychoanalysis, continues to 
be a contested affair.    The problem arises 
when adherents of psychoanalysis take a 
hostile or superficial stance towards 
epistemic considerations, and when critics 
take accordingly a hostile or superficial 
stance towards psychoanalysis in return, but 
risk covering over that knowledge of the 
human condition can also arise, especially 
initially, in discourses other than those of 
the positive science.     This paper explores 
two possibilities concerning the present 
discordance between psychoanalysis and 
science. First is whether the critical 
determination of psychoanalysis as a 
pseudo-science or religion imbued with false 
and harmful beliefs, shares a validating 
kinship with the epistemic criticisms that 
Nietzsche makes of Judeo-Christian beliefs 
in ‘The Anti-Christ’. Second is whether the 
criticisms of psychoanalysis made from the 
perspectives of science, rather more typify 
Nietzsche’s notion in the ‘Genealogy of 
Morals’, that the overvaluation of science 
carries on, in more contemporary form, the 
ascetic ideal of Judeo-Christianity.     I 
suggest there is value in considering both of the 
above possibilities, but that Lacan generally only 
focuses on the second when, in his ‘Ethics’ 
Seminar VII, and ‘Other Side’ Seminar XVII, he 
considers science’s need to split off, or castrate 
itself, from many real aspects of our subjectivity or 
desire, in order to accede to its rational function.     
In this way I attempt to evaluate an interesting 
ambiguity in Lacan’s position, which up until the 
mid 1960s, has the constructions of science more 
resembling than opposing those of paranoia; 
whereas by 1977, the elderly Lacan appears to 
determine psychoanalysis itself as “a delusion”, 
seemingly because it is “not a science”. 
 
Experimental Philosophy 
Associate Professor Eric Schwitzgebel, 
University of California at Riverside 
The Moral Behavior of Ethicists 
If philosophical moral reflection tends to improve 
moral behavior, one might expect that professional 
ethicists will, on average, behave morally better 
than non-ethicists.  However, the moral behavior 
of ethicists has never been empirically studied.  In 
this talk I will present results from three completed 
studies and (hopefully) one or more studies in 
progress.  The three completed studies examine: 
(1.) the rates at which ethics books are missing 
from academic libraries compared to similar non-
ethics philosophy books (with the primary analysis 
confined to relatively obscure books of the sort 
likely to be borrowed mostly by professors and 
advanced students in ethics); (2.) the voting rates 
of ethicists (including political philosophers as a 
subgroup) compared to other philosophers, 
political scientists, and the professoriate as a 
whole; and (3.) a survey of philosophers’ opinions 
about the moral behavior of ethicists.  The study 
currently under way for which I hope to have 
preliminary results in time for the AAP examines: 
(4.) the relationship between self-reported 
normative view and self-reported behavior on a 
number of measures such as vegetarianism and 
donating to charity. 
Dr Jakob Hohwy, Monash University 
The promiscuous self 
Normally, we experience our first-person 
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perspective as belonging exclusively to our 
own body, and also that our perception of 
the world makes good sense from there. 
One might think, on the basis of this robust 
sense of bodily self-consciousness, that the 
relation between one’s own body and one’s 
first-person perspective is especially 
fundamental and inescapable. Some versions 
of embodiment theories of the mind seem 
to subscribe to that idea. However, though it 
is hard to conceive of escaping a first-person 
perspective altogether, there is nothing 
fundamental or inescapable about which 
body, if any, your first-person perspective 
belongs to. A little visuotactile disintegration 
is sufficient to show that the first-person 
perspective will occupy whatever location 
makes most sense, and that the bodily self-
consciousness that this gives rise to in turn 
causes distorted perception and 
development of rather bizarre beliefs. We 
present preliminary data from a study on 
these effects and discuss their significance in 
terms of our understanding of embodiment 
and bodily self-consciousness. 
Miss Emma Wright, University of 
Sydney 
Should we be Error-Theorists about 
Happiness? 
Attempts to define happiness are often 
unsatisfying.  If, in anyone’s account, 
happiness is too narrowly defined, then 
‘happiness’ can easily become something 
that a great many of us would not care about 
having or getting.  In this paper I argue that 
a good test for an adequate definition of 
happiness is a question of whether, on 
reflection, all rational people would care 
about having or getting happiness as so 
defined.  If this is correct, however, it is also 
very possibly correct that error theory about 
happiness is true.  According to the standard 
picture of psychology that we have inherited 
from Hume, there is no such thing that we 
are rationally obligated to pursue, because 
desires are not open to rational scrutiny.  If 
we do not want error theory about 
happiness to be true, something has to give.  
Either the definitional requirement of 
happiness that it is worth pursuing in and of 
itself has to go, or Hume’s standard picture 
has to go.  Which one should it be? 
Ms Katinka Quintelier, Ghent University 
Creationism and morality 
In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that 
“defenders of evolution would help their case 
immeasurably if they would [â€¦] reassure their 
audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are 
not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We 
first consider the thesis that the creationists’ 
movement exploits moral concerns to spread its 
ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze 
their arguments and possible reasons why they are 
easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two 
contradictive strategies to expose the purported 
moral degradation that comes with accepting the 
theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim 
that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other 
hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as 
amoral. Both objections come naturally in a 
monotheistic view. But we can find similar 
conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of 
evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. 
Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate 
mainly focuses — understandably — on what 
constitutes good science. We consider the need for 
moral reassurance and analyze reassuring 
arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may 
stress that science does not prescribe and is 
therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the 
door for the objection of amorality that evolution 
— as a naturalistic world view at least — 
supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of 
morality and its relation to the acceptance of 
evolution may need more empirical research. 
 
History of Philosophy 
Professor Michael Williams, Johns 
Hopkins University 
Demons Drunkards and Doppelgangers: the 
Originality of Descartes’ Skepticism 
The skeptical problem concerning our knowledge 
of the external world is original with Descartes. At 
the same time, the arguments of the First 
Meditation seem to draw on materials and 
strategies already familiar to the skeptics of 
classical antiquity.  So what enables Descartes to 
formulate a new problem? Is he, for some reason, 
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willing to push ancient arguments farther? 
Or, superficial similarities notwithstanding, 
does he introduce new arguments? As for 
the problem itself, is it a discovery or an 
invention? According to me, Descartes 
introduces new arguments, thereby 
inventing a new problem. I defend this view 
by offering an account of the structure and 
content of Cartesian skepticism, paying 
special attention to the argument from 
dreams. 
Mr. Andrew Shortridge, Cornell 
University 
Varieties of Ancient Immoralism 
This paper argues against the view that the 
ethical views of the Greek Sophists can be 
best categorized by attending to the 
assessments of nomos (‘law’ or ‘convention’) 
and phusis (‘nature’) made by different 
Sophists. Surveying the secondary literature, 
the scholarly consensus is that the Sophists 
contrasted law with nature. Guthrie, in his 
History of Greek Philosophy, gives clearest 
expression to the idea both that the Sophists 
held law and nature to be antithetical, and 
that they can be compared most fruitfully by 
attending to their different interpretations of 
this antithesis. Three Sophistic theories are 
then discussed. Accepting Kerferd’s 
interpretation of Thrasymachus, it is argued 
that law and nature are not always 
antithetical to one another, since the law 
does not restrain the acquisitive nature of 
the ruler who makes the law. According to 
Glaucon’s apparent restatement of 
Thrasymachus’ argument, it seems that it is 
both natural to submit to law and just as 
natural to break the law. This is no 
antithesis. On Callicles’ account of natural 
justice, it is unclear whether the equality of 
distribution which characterizes law is in fact 
genuinely beneficial to the many because of 
facts about their natures, or whether the 
many would attempt to get more, if only 
they could. Hence, it is unclear whether 
Callicles appeals to an antithesis of law with 
nature, or to one involving two radically 
different natures. In none of these three 
cases do we find a clear antithesis of nomos 
with phusis; hence, there is little point in 
structuring any comparative inquiry of 
Sophistic ethics by taking “the nomos-phusis 
antithesis” as a central organizing principle. The 
paper concludes with some tentative suggestions 
as to how Sophistic ethical theories might best be 
compared, if not by appeal to the supposed 
antithesis of law and nature. 
Professor Calvin Normore, McGill/UCLA 
Matter, Spirits, and Extended Souls 
Descartes claimed that matter is res extensa and 
that minds are unextended and without parts . A 
considerable medieval tradition including Ockham 
and Jean Buridan  claimed that while human 
intellectual souls are unextended and hence 
spiritual ,  animal souls are extended substantial 
forms   which nonetheless cannot  not be 
identified with matter. Ralph Cudworth and Henry 
More claimed that both matter and spirits are 
extended. This paper attempts to chart some 
elements of the debate about the relations among 
extension, matter and spirit between the 14th 
century and the late 17th in an effort to determine 
what was at stake. One aim is to shed some light 
on what materialism might have been — and 
might be. 
Dr Deborah Brown, University of 
Queensland 
Descartes’ Secular Biology: Functions without Final 
Causes 
Recent debates about functions have been largely 
dominated by the question of whether functions 
are to be characterised etiologically or in causal 
terms, or whether both approaches are required to 
understand contemporary biological practices of 
classification and explanation. Interestingly, these 
debates have precursors in the early modern 
period. The teleological conception of function 
used by Aristotle and his followers relies explicitly 
on the assumption that functions make sense only 
in relation to the ends or purposes which they 
serve. Even though they typically rejected final 
causality in natural philosophy, Descartes and 
other mechanists frequently resorted to functional 
explanations, particularly when discussing the 
organization and behaviour of animals and plants. 
This raises the question of what they thought was 
essential to an organism’s exhibiting functionality. 
An increasingly popular approach in Cartesian 
studies is to read a non-intentional teleology back 
into the corpus as the context in which references 
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to functions are to be understood. I am 
sceptical of the soundness of this strategy 
but do not think that Descartes is working 
with a purely causal notion of function 
either (as causal functions are generally 
understood nowadays). A tour of Descartes’ 
fanciful account of embryogenesis reveals a 
commitment to a notion of function neither 
etiological nor causal but grounded rather in 
an understanding of the complex 
interdependence of the parts of organisms. 
One of the advantages of the Cartesian 
approach to functional explanation is that it 
offers some relief from what Dennis Des 
Chene calls the ‘boundary problem’ for 
mechanistic approaches in the life sciences 
of the seventeenth century, the problem of 
specifying what does and doesn’t count as 
belonging within an organic system when 
many things, both internal and external, may 
contribute to fitness in some direct or 
indirect way. 
Professor Moira Gatens, University 
of Sydney 
Compelling Fictions: Spinoza and George 
Eliot 
Spinoza understood religious accounts of 
the world to be fictional products of the 
imagination or knowledge of the first kind. 
Nevertheless, he thought, such knowledge 
can be useful in promoting sociability. This 
presentation will argue that Spinoza had an 
ambivalent attitude towards the imagination. 
George Eliot, who translated Spinoza’s 
works and was influenced by his philosophy, 
believed that fictions of a certain kind could 
be genuinely  edifying. What is the status of 
fiction for these thinkers? Are their views 
compatible? 
Dr Karen Green, Monash University 
Catharine Macaulay on Freedom of the Will 
(Karen Green and Shannon Weekes) 
Very little attention has been paid to the 
philosophical position on the will developed 
by Catharine Macaulay in her Treatise on the 
Immutability of Moral Truth and her Letters 
on Education. An exception is a recent 
paper by Martina Reuter, ‘Catharine 
Macaulay and Mary Wollstonecraft on the 
will.’ Reuter argues that the position on the will 
that Macaulay develops corresponds to the 
position that has been called ‘rational 
compatibilism.’ In this paper we argue that, while 
this characterisation of Macaulay’s position is not 
completely incorrect, it does not completely 
account for all the features of the ‘moral necessity’ 
that Macaulay identifies with freedom of the will. 
We attempt to clarify Macaulay’s account of the 
nature of free will by locating it in relation to the 
eighteenth century debate on the will with which 
she is engaged, and briefly raise the question of 
whether her version of the doctrine of moral 
necessity is coherent. 
Dr Martin Black, Boston University 
The Socratic Turn in Plato’s Phaedo, Parmenides, 
and Symposium 
Recently, more studies of Plato have paid attention 
to the dialogue form as an aspect of his 
comprehensive intention. This procedure implies 
that rather than focus on Plato’s ostensible 
development we need to account for Plato’s 
depiction of Socrates’ development or the 
“Socratic turn.” This term denotes Socrates’ 
criticism of “the inquiry into nature” and turn to 
an inquiry orientated by dialogue, the forms, and 
erÅ s. The “Socratic turn” in shown in three 
stages through Socrates’ “intellectual 
autobiography” in the Phaedo, the “first part” of 
the Parmenides, and Socrates’ instruction in erÅ s 
in the Symposium.   The Phaedo passage shows 
Socrates’ criticism of versions of materialism and 
teleology for abstracting from our incorrigible 
experience of the unity of things and from our 
experience that it is our opinions of what it is 
better to do that are “the true cause” of our 
actions.  Socrates’ hypothesis of the forms is 
intended to furnish the ground for his return of 
philosophy to its origins in the comprehensive 
horizon of opinion. Parmenides criticizes this 
hypothesis for effectively turning the unity or form 
of things into a thing, but also asserts that some 
such hypothesis is necessary for philosophy. 
Socrates’ instruction in erÅ s in the Symposium is 
intended to vindicate the philosophical life against 
its poetic and political alternatives, by 
demonstrating that the forms are inherent in 
human experience, which experience we normally 
misunderstand.   The interpretation of the stages 
of the Socratic turn provides a plausible basis for 
the mix of wisdom and ignorance Socrates claims 
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generally in the dialogues. It also shows 
Plato’s concentration upon the problem of 
theory and practice: the broadest perspective 
on practical concerns is motivated by 
theoretical and not ethical demands. 
Ms. Stephanie Lewis, Municipal 
Capital Management, LLC 
Lewis and the Australians 
This paper continues in the series of AAP 
presentations on the correspondence of 
David Lewis.  The influence of Australian 
philosophers, (including many temporary 
ones) and Australian philosophy on David 
cannot be overstated. The title is a bit of a 
gimmick.  The paper will discuss David’s 
correspondence on a wide variety of topics.  
It will illustrate a number of interchanges, 
and I hope show that Australia and its 
philosophers had an enormous impact on 
the development of David’s philosophical 
style as well as on his views. Topics 
discussed will include several of the great 
issues of metaphysics -- causation, mind and 
body, universals, and secondary qualities.  In 
addition, some less-than-earth-shaking 
interchanges will be presented. The purpose 
of the paper is to illustrate the influence of 
Australians, and Australia, on David. 
 
Meta-ethics 
Ms. Jacklyn Cleofas, National 
University of Singapore 
Fallible Omniscience: Wittgenstein’s Argument 
Against Moral Naturalism 
In “A Lecture on Ethics,” Wittgenstein 
explicitly adopts some of Moore’s ideas: 
“My subject, as you know is Ethics, and I 
will adopt the explanation of that term 
which Professor Moore has given in his 
book Principia Ethica.”  Despite this 
reference, Wittgenstein’s and Moore’s 
similar views on ethics have not been 
explored much.  Darwall, Gibbard and 
Railton note that unlike Moore, Wittgenstein 
recognized that attributing moral goodness 
to something cannot be captured by a 
complete description of that thing in terms 
of its natural properties because action-guidingness 
is semantically built into the former but not the 
latter.  Nevertheless, nobody saw that Wittgenstein 
also presents an improved version of Moore’s 
argument.  This paper seeks not only to 
demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s argument against 
moral naturalism is similar to Moore’s well-known 
open question argument; it also argues that 
Wittgenstein’s argument is better.  This argument 
is based on the possibility that someone who 
knows all natural facts could fail to know whether 
something is morally good.  Wittgenstein’s 
argument anticipates and even improves on 
contemporary versions of Moore’s argument by 
highlighting something that any metaethical theory 
has to account for: disparity between knowledge of 
the natural features of something and knowledge 
of that thing’s moral worth.  Unlike Moore, who 
tried to establish that moral properties are not 
natural by focusing on the semantic incongruity 
between being morally good and having some 
natural property, Wittgenstein uses the epistemic 
discrepancy between moral and natural knowledge 
to show that moral properties are either non-
natural or non-existent. 
Mr Benjamin Herscovitch, The University 
Of Sydney 
John Rawls’ Political Account Of Justice As Meta-
Ethics 
Arguably the most striking feature of John Rawls’ 
thought post-Political Liberalism is the explicitly 
political account of justice advanced. At the heart 
of this political account of justice is the claim that 
what is just is a function of the overlapping 
consensus of normative commitments held by the 
relevant subjects. Whilst this inter-subjectivist 
account of justice has received a great deal of 
attention from political philosophers, it has been 
largely ignored by meta-ethicists. In this paper I 
will argue that Rawls’ political account of justice 
yields a relativistic form of moral constructivism. 
Like the classical pragmatism of Williams James 
and John Dewey, which recommends that the 
notion of “truth” be reconceptualised and 
understood in terms of epistemic utility, Rawls’ 
political account of justice terminates in a 
reconceptualisation of the notion of “moral truth”. 
In particular, it entails that the truth of a moral 
truth-claim is relative to the overlapping consensus 
of normative commitments held by the relevant 
subjects. The crux of my unorthodox 
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interpretation of Rawls’ thought is that the 
corollary of Rawls’ political 
reconceptualisation of justice is a cognitivist, 
relativist and thoroughly anti-realist version 
of moral constructivism. Over the course of 
this paper I will respond to some of the 
most significant criticisms that might be 
made of my Rawlsian version of relativistic 
moral constructivism. 
Dr. Richard Wei Tzu Hou, National 
Chung Cheng University, Taiwan 
What Deflationism Can and Cannot Do to 
Expressivism 
Traditional expressivism has two major 
theses: (M) metaphysically, there are no 
normative facts or properties; (S) 
semantically, normative sentences have no 
truth value, no truth condition, and no 
content (/meaning).This paper consists of 
two parts regarding what deflationism can 
and cannot do to expressivism respectively. 
The first part gives an analysis of the relation 
between (M) and (S) in terms of which how 
deflationism helps expressivism to get rid of 
the unnecessary burden of holding (S) is 
explained. Also analysed is some 
misconception of the relation between 
deflationism and (S).The second part 
addresses the issue raised by recently 
developed so-called creeping or sweeping 
minimalism, that deflationism is responsible 
for giving a deflationary way to know about 
normative facts and properties. It is shown 
that the above mistaken view results from 
some puzzling interpretation and application 
of the deflationary theory of reference. 
Deflationism cannot help argue for or 
against expressivism in any conceivable way. 
Professor Michael Smith, Princeton 
University 
Between Thick and Thin 
Susan Hurley coined the term ‘centralism’ 
for the view that the general ethical concepts 
(ie the thin ones) right and ought are 
logically prior to and independent of the 
specific ethical concepts (ie the thick ones) 
such as just and unkind.  Non-centralism, by 
contrast, is the view that there is no such 
priority or independence.  My aims are 
three-fold: first, to identify a class of concepts that 
is in-between the specific and the general; second, 
to argue that the general ethical concepts are not 
logically prior to and independent of this in-
between class; and third, to say a little about the 
relationship between the sort of non-centralism I 
thus favour and the kinds of non-centralism that 
are more commonly defended. 
Mr David Plunkett, University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor 
The Closure Argument Against Metaethical 
Nonnaturalism 
In this paper, I give an argument against 
metaethical nonnaturalism that draws on Jaegwon 
Kim’s so-called “closure argument” from the 
philosophy of mind. I start by considering the 
following three claims: 1) Any cause of a physical 
event is itself a physical event. Call this “the 
closure thesis”. 2) Normative properties are not 
naturalistic properties and, hence, are not physical 
properties. Call this position “metaethical 
nonnaturalism”. 3) Epistemic contact with 
normative facts can have causal upshot in terms of 
normative beliefs and hence human action. Call 
this the “explanatory role thesis”. I argue that 
these three claims are inconsistent on the 
following grounds. Consider the event of an agent 
A forming a belief about what she should do. 
Insofar as we accept the explanatory role thesis, we 
are committed to holding that a) the content of 
this belief can be formed partly on the basis of 
epistemic contact with normative facts and b) that 
such a belief can help produce a human action. 
Assuming that human actions are physical events, 
then, according to the closure thesis, coming into 
epistemic contact with normative facts must itself 
be a physical event. Yet, given that nonnaturalistic 
properties by definition cannot be part of purely 
physical events, this is precisely what metaethical 
nonnaturalism denies. Therefore, the metaethical 
nonnaturalist must a) deny the closure thesis, one 
of the core tenets of modern physics and/or b) 
endorse an epiphenomenalism about normative 
judgment (i.e. reject the explanatory role thesis). I 
argue that these options are not only 
philosophically problematic but also run counter 
to the arguments that leading contemporary 
metaethical nonnaturalists such as Parfit, Scanlon, 
and Shafer-Landau themselves give in support of 
their view. I then consider and reject another 
possible response on behalf of non-naturalism: 
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namely, to reject the assumption that 
epistemic contact requires causal contact. 
Dr. Richard Paul Hamilton, School 
of Philosophy and Theology 
University of Notre Dame Australia 
Character, Complicity and Imagination in 
Vincent Amorim’s Good (2008) 
Amorim’s film (based upon C.P. Taylor’s 
stageplay) compellingly  portrays the moral 
degeneration of  Proust scholar, Jorg Halder 
(Viggo Mortensen) during the rise of the 
Nazis. A series of relatively trivial decisions 
leads him into collaboration with the regime, 
membership of the SS and finally active 
participation in the Final Solution.  These 
decisions are mirrored in his personal life by 
his abandonment of his wife and children 
following an affair with a student. Both 
personal and political betrayal is involved in 
the breakdown of his longstanding 
relationship with his Jewish friend Morris.   
The power of the film stems from its utter 
psychological plausibility.  No elaborate 
psychological or ideological explanation are 
needed to explain Halder’s corruption. 
Vanity, ambition and conformism all play 
their part but the simplest and most 
convincing explanation is that Halder simply 
has a weak character. He is unable to 
respond appropriately to the seriousness of 
the decisions he is called upon to make. He 
fails to situate those decisions in a broader 
moral context and see their full significance. 
Above all, he lacks moral imagination.    
Recent allegedly empirically-grounded 
criticisms of Virtue Ethics appear to 
problematise such a judgment. According to 
the Situationalist critique, character is a 
fiction which masks the powerful influence 
of social setting on our decisions. Studies 
such as the Millgram and Stanford Prison 
experiments apparently establish that we are 
much more susceptible to external influence 
than our commonsense conceptions of 
character allow. If this interpretation is 
correct, then the most we can say about 
Halder is that he is Everyman.   Such a 
conclusion ought to trouble us.  In this 
paper therefore, I hope to respond to the 
Situationalist challenge in three ways. Firstly, 
I will argue that the notion of character is 
indispensible, especially when confronted 
Mr Masafumi Matsumoto, Centre for 
Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, 
ANU 
How to end a metaethical war between cognitivists 
and expressivists 
One of the questions in metaethics is about how 
moral language works. There are two main 
contenders: cognitivism and expressivism. Some 
philosophers argue that cognitivism is the correct 
theory about moral language, while others argue 
that expressivism is the correct one. There is a 
battle between cognitivism and expressivism, in 
order to decide which position is the correct 
theory about moral language. But is this battle 
necessary? I think there is no need to decide which 
position is the correct theory about moral 
language; in my view, these positions are 
concerned with different projects and both of 
these projects are essential in accounting for how 
moral language works. My strategy is the 
following. Firstly, I will set up the scene by briefly 
explaining what cognitivism and expressivism are 
and over what the defenders of these positions are 
fighting against one another. Secondly, I will clarify 
what it means for cognitivism and expressivism to 
oppose to one another. I will use the framework of 
what I call the elimination question in order to 
analyse the situation. Also, I will draw a line 
between the strong version and the weak version 
of each position; this distinction will help us see 
what the battle between cognitivism and 
expressivism should be like. Finally, I will offer an 
argument for my view that there is no battle 
between cognitivism and expressivism over the 
elimination question. This argument comes with 
two simple premises. I will examine each premise 
in turn, and show how these premises lead us to 
the conclusion that there is no battle between 
cognitivism and expressivism over the elimination 
question. 
Prof Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie 
University 
Moral Reasoning in vitro and in vivo 
Much of the recent research on moral judgment in 
the social and  cognitive sciences focuses on 
subjects’ responses to vignettes which  impose a 
forced choice (approve/disapprove, 
appropriate/inappropriate)  on them or which 
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present them with highly unusual or 
disgusting  scenarios - for example various 
versions of the trolley problem or sex  with 
animals. No doubt many useful things can 
be learned from such  studies- such as the 
ways in which moral opinions co-vary with  
socio-economic status - but it is at least not 
clear that they shed as  much light as is 
claimed on the cognitive processes involved 
in moral  reasoning - and so on implications 
for meta-ethical debates - in part  because 
they do not and perhaps cannot take 
account of the cross  temporal aspects of 
moral reasoning in everyday life. Our moral 
choices have histories as well as 
consequences, and many of the most 
important moral decisions we make are not 
the work of a moment. I suggest some 
alternative interpretations of the responses 
derived from these studies and consider the 
implications for meta-ethics and moral 
cognition research. 
Dr Josh Parsons, Otago University 
Command and consequence 
The “standard view” of imperatives found in 
prescriptivists such as R.M. Hare and J.J.C. 
Smart suffers from serious problems having 
to do with consequence relations between 
imperative and indicative sentences.  I argue 
that these problems cannot be solved 
without abandoning the standard view, and 
suggest an alternative account of imperatives 
that will hopefully be friendly to 
prescriptivism. 
Mr. David Mollica, The Australian 
National University 
Disregarding Moral Considerations 
Much moral philosophy has been concerned 
with developing arguments to convince the 
moral agent that he ought all-things-
considered to act morally (or, at least, not 
immorally) even when he judges that a) he 
would benefit greatly from acting immorally, 
and b) the probability of his immoral acts 
being detected and punished is very low. 
Some of these arguments try to show that, 
despite appearances, it is not really in the 
agent’s interest to act immorally. The agent’s 
immoral acts might, for example, incur him 
a significant emotional cost, diminish his sense of 
self, or impair his ability to participate fully in 
relationships based upon love or friendship. A 
related line of thought familiar from various 
religious traditions asserts that moral agents never 
really escape detection and punishment for their 
unrepented wrongdoings; rather, they find their 
punishment in a future existence. Other arguments 
are based on the claim that moral agents ought to 
be moral because at least some moral imperatives 
are justified — they are based on objective moral 
facts, capable of being reflectively endorsed by 
rational agents, required by the respect due to 
autonomous rational agents, and so on. Still others 
attempt to align the requirements of morality with 
those of practical rationality, so that the moral 
agent who acts immorally, even according to his 
own lights, is thereby practically irrational. Some 
of these arguments overlap somewhat.    I argue 
that there are some possible moral agents for 
whom these arguments all fail to provide adequate 
reason to behave morally in circumstances in 
which they have judged both a) and b) and that, 
all-things-considered, these agents ought to act in 
accordance with their will. I conclude by 
discussing the possible psychological profile of 
such morality-immune moral agents and the 
question of whether their existence could be 
established empirically. 
Ms. Alison Duncan Kerr, The Ohio State 
University 
Emotions: Static vs. Dynamic Assessments 
Emotions are not merely isolated events.  An 
agent’s emotion usually fits into a pattern of 
similar emotion types.  I introduce a new account 
of emotion assessments that reflects the fact that 
emotions fit into these sorts of patterns.  This 
account involves a distinction between an agent 
feeling a single emotion in a particular situation 
(static) and an agent feeling a pattern of similar 
emotions in similar situations (dynamic).  Nearly 
all theories of emotions that specifically discuss 
assessments are concerned with the former only.  
This is a mistake—I argue that a theory of 
emotion assessments that aims to supply a 
sufficient understanding of emotional excellence 
(or well-functioning emotions) must be able to 
capture assessments of not merely singular 
emotional episodes, but also assessments of 
patterns of emotions.  Dynamic assessments show 
how well one is using information about previous 
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emotional states in the regulation of one’s 
future states, whereas mere static 
assessments do not yet reveal the extent to 
which one has control over one’s emotions.  
It is only through the dynamic assessments 
that emotional excellence is truly revealed.  
Dr Karen Jones, University of 
Melbourne 
Guiding Action by Reasons 
The clearest cases of guiding action by 
reasons have the following shape:  the agent 
judges certain considerations to be reason-
giving in a context, deliberates about where 
the weight of these reasons lies, decides 
what all-things-considered she should do 
and acts accordingly. At the other extreme, 
as apparent paradigms of failure to guide 
action by reasons, are Freudian cases where 
what is done is only later, and perhaps after 
prompting by a third party, reinterpreted as 
action rather than mere happening. Where, 
between these two extremes, are we are we 
to locate the divide between action guided 
by reasons and action that is not? I 
investigate a series of cases that suggest this 
distinction is harder to draw than might be 
supposed. I start from standard inverse 
akrasia cases where the agent non-
accidentally acts as she has most reason to 
do because her emotional capacities allow 
her to track her reasons despite failings in 
her judgment. Here those of us with anti-
intellectualist intuitions are tempted to say 
that the agent’s action is guided by reasons. 
Inverse akrasia cases sometimes also involve 
“masked reasons,” where the agent is 
mistaken about the consideration that she is 
responding to, thinking it is one thing when 
actually she is tracking something quite 
different. If we allow that standard inverse 
akrasia cases count as action guided by 
reasons, it seems we should allow that these 
do too. Now remove the “masking reason”. 
If its presence was irrelevant to determining 
whether action was guided by reasons in the 
previous case, then removing it should make 
no difference. But remove the masking 
reason and you have a Freudian case. Where 
did we go wrong? 
 
Dr Nicole Saunders, Deakin University 
Critiquing Smith on Williams and internal reasons 
attributions 
Michael Smith’s a critique of Bernard Williams on 
internal reasons involves two important exegetical 
errors. I will clarify these errors and show how 
such clarification allows us to see how Williams 
can close the door on ambitious normative 
revisions to the set of plausible reasons-
attributions one might make to the motivational 
set of an agent ignorant of some fact. 
Furthermore, this also allows us to better 
understand Williams’s notion of a ‘sound 
deliberative route’ and gives us a new appreciation 
of Williams’s position on internal reasons and 
lends added plausibility to his view that reasons 
attributions must be agent-relative. 
Dr. Jennie Louise, University of Adelaide 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Normative Priority 
and the Value/Disvalue Distinction 
These days many meta-ethicists have adopted the 
view that an object’s having some evaluative 
property (e.g., being admirable) can be explained in 
terms of the existence of reasons for a pro-
response (e.g., admiration) towards the object.  
Much attention has been given to defending this 
claim about the priority of the normative against 
the so-called “Wrong Kind of Reason” objection 
(which argues that such accounts cannot properly 
differentiate those reasons which entail evaluative 
facts from those which do not).  However, there is 
another potential difficulty for normative-priority 
accounts, which has to date been inadequately 
explored: namely, how to differentiate pro-
responses (which ground claims of value) from 
con-responses (which ground claims of disvalue).  
I argue that this issue does in fact pose a serious 
problem for advocates of the normative priority 
thesis — at least, in the form which most of its 
advocates wish to defend.  I explore the idea that 
the phenomenon of emotional valence might be 
used to ground the value/disvalue distinction, and 
conclude that this is not as promising an avenue as 
it may seem. 
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Meta-philosophy 
Dr Rachael Briggs, The University of 
Sydney 
Decision Rules and Voting Rules 
Evidential decision theory (henceforth 
EDT) and causal decision theory 
(henceforth CDT) both advise agents to 
maximize expected value.  The two theories 
give different definitions of expected value, 
so their advice sometimes conflicts.  In 
certain famous cases of conflict----medical 
Newcomb problems----CDT seems to get 
things right.  In other cases of conflict, 
including some recent examples suggested 
by Andy Egan, EDT seems to get things 
right.  Ratificationism looks like a promising 
way of combining the theories’ insights, and 
refined ratificationist proposal by Ralph 
Wedgwood, which I call Benchmark Theory 
or BT, gets things right in both the medical 
Newcomb problems and the Egan 
examples.  Unfortunately, there are other 
examples where both CDT and EDT get 
things right, while BT gets things wrong.    
It’s no accident, I claim, that all three 
decision theories fail.  Decision rules are 
analogous to voting rules, and the 
problematic examples have the structure of 
voting paradoxes.  The upshot of voting 
paradoxes is that no voting rule can do 
everything we want.  Likewise, the upshot of 
the decision theoretic paradoxes is that no 
decision rule can do everything we want in 
every situation.  Luckily, the so-called `tickle 
defense’ establishes that EDT, CDT, and 
BT will do everything we want in a wide 
range of situations. 
Professor Paul Horwich, New York 
University 
Can Philosophy be Theoretical? 
Philosophers have traditionally been prone 
to engage in systematic, explanatory, 
theorization projects -- aiming to unearth, 
for example, the foundations of morality, or 
the principles of truth-making, or the 
semantics of natural language. The present 
paper will appraise Wittgenstein’s notorious 
meta-philosophical dictum that such 
projects are misguided and that we should respond 
to philosophy’s long-standing theoretical 
questions, not by attempting to answer them, but 
by exposing them as products of scientistic 
confusion. 
Dr. Henry Jackman, York University 
Two sorts of skepticism about intuition 
There are two sorts of views that could be labeled 
“skepticism about intuitions”.    The first doubts 
that what philosophers refer to as their ‘intuitions’ 
when investigating knowledge, reference, justice 
and the like really are a reliable guide to their 
subject matter.   Such skeptics could be 
characterized more specifically as a pessimist about 
intuitions, while those who think that appeals to 
intuitions in philosophy are justifiable can thus be 
characterized as optimists about intuitions.    The 
second type of skepticism questions whether 
“intuition”, really picks out an explanatorily useful 
epistemic kind in this area.  The skepticism is not 
so much about the value of those judgments that 
we label “intuitions” in philosophy, but rather 
about whether that value can be explained in virtue 
of these judgments being intuitions.    With this 
second type of skepticism in mind, we can 
(speaking very roughly) distinguish realists about 
intuitions, philosophers who think “intuitions” 
must share some substantial epistemically 
explanatory property, and nominalists about 
intuitions, who think that “intuition” is currently 
just a catch-all term for judgments that 
philosophers find themselves inclined to label as 
such.    If one is inclined to be pessimistic about 
intuitions, nominalism might seem natural.  
However, this paper will, though a discussion of a 
number of problematic attempts to underwrite 
optimism from within a realist framework, argue 
that nominalism makes more sense for the 
optimist as well. 
Dr Jack Reynolds, La Trobe 
Transcendental Arguments: Analytic and 
Continental Philosophy 
In this paper, I present a paper I have coauthored 
with James Chase (UTas) on transcendental 
arguments, which examines some of the various 
arguments for and against their use in philosophy, 
and argues that the methodological decision on 
whether or not they are viable is a significant 
factor in the ‘divide’. We also examine the extent 
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to which the deployment of them has been 
important in certain philosophers coming to 
be labelled ‘postanalytic’, and in a 
corresponding shift in the citation rates of 
such philosophers in major analytic journals. 
Time permitting, it will also be suggested 
that their use (or otherwise) also helps to 
differentiate pragmatism (and perhaps 
feminism) into two camps that are roughly 
isomorphic with what we have come to call 
analytic and continental philosophy 
respectively. 
Mr Raphael Fiorese, Monash 
University 
Philosophy: Still Autonomous after All these 
Years 
I review some recent challenges to the 
evidential use of intuition in philosophical 
theorizing and take issue with an argument 
put forward by Robert Cummins to the 
effect that “philosophical intuition is 
epistemologically useless”. I then try to 
motivate a construal of the nature of the 
targets of philosophical intuition which, I 
argue, allows us to make good sense of the 
evidential appeal to intuition in philosophy. 
I conclude with a note on the autonomy of 
philosophy. 
 
Metaphysics 
John Fox, La Trobe University 
Why the Case Against Propositions is 
Stronger Than You Thought 
There is a well-known Quinean argument 
against ontologising "meanings" or 
"propositions", based roughly on the maxim 
"no entity without identity", i.e. that we 
should not countenance entities K unless we 
have applicable criteria for a being the same 
K as b. The gist of the argument is that the 
criteria to determine whether two sentences 
express the same proposition depend on 
criteria to determine their synonymy; that 
since we lack applicable criteria to determine 
this, we lack them for the identity of 
propositions; so we should not countenance 
them. 
I argue that this is just the weaker horn of a 
dilemma.  There is a maxim , which I call the 
nominalist policy, even more cogent than 'no 
entity without identity'.  This spells out how under 
certain circumstances, even where we did have 
such criteria for identity, we should not 
countenance the entities.  I show that in the case 
of propositions, such circumstances hold.  So 
given both horns, the case against propositions is 
much stronger than is generally realised. 
I do not in fact go to bat for the Quinean maxim.  
I consider the other horn functions quite well in 
unicorn fashion, and is sufficient for lethal 
impalement.  It is also telling in many other 
contests; for instance, against sentences 
(understood as types rather than as tokens) and 
against types in general. 
Mr Dan Marshall, ANU 
A new problem for linguistic ersatzism 
Linguistic ersatzers claim to enjoy the benefits of 
possible world talk without incurring the cost of 
being committed to the existence of concrete 
possible worlds. They claim to do this by 
interpreting their possible world talk as talk about 
surrogates of possible worlds (or surrogates of the 
entire pluriverse of possible worlds) rather than 
talk about possible worlds themselves. Typically, 
linguistic ersatzers hold that:    i) possible world 
surrogates (or pluriverse surrogates) can be set-
theoretically constructed out of individuals and 
properties;    ii) these surrogates can be used to 
analyze modal notions such as possibility, necessity 
and counterfactuality in terms of a single primitive 
modal notion; and    iii) individuals and properties 
only contingently exist.    I will provide a new 
argument that linguistic ersatzers cannot 
consistently hold i)-iii). 
Dr Paul Kabay, University of Melbourne 
You Just Can’t Say No: On the Undeniability of 
Trivialism 
Trivialism is universally considered to be an 
unacceptable view and so should be discarded - 
but I present reasons in this paper for rejecting 
this assessment. I argue that in order to deny a 
given view, one must assert an alternative view. 
But, as I argue, one cannot assert an alternative 
view to a conjunction by asserting one of its 
conjuncts. But given that trivialism is the view that 
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consists of the conjunction of all 
propositions, there are no alternative views 
to trivialism. Precisely because everything is 
part of the content of trivialism, one cannot 
deny it.  But a position that one cannot deny 
shouldn’t really be thought of as 
problematic, and so we should make our 
peace with trivialism and learn to live with it. 
Dr Antony Eagle, University of 
Oxford 
Location 
Many philosophical debates—including 
those over persistence, mereology, and 
composition—are sensitive to issues about 
which regions of space and time are the 
locations of material objects. Yet the 
location relation itself has received perhaps 
less attention than it is due. Following some 
recent work by Josh Parsons, I develop a 
framework for discussing relations between 
regions and their occupants. I then describe 
three relations, each of which is a plausible 
candidate to be location. I argue that only 
one of these candidates is able to 
accommodate everything that is true of 
locations. This result has a number of 
applications; I discuss one, the currently 
popular topic of extended simples. 
Emeritus Professor Graham Nerlich, 
University of Adelaide 
How the Leibniz Shifts Backfire 
Leibniz shifts, and Poincare “nocturnal 
doubling” arguments are routinely cited as 
shining illustrations of (i) the shaving power 
of Ockham’s razor and the methodology of 
parsimony (ii) the ease with which one can 
fall into hoarding ontic garbage. The 
arguments misfire either because they make 
no sense outside Euclid or they don’t yield 
the promised symmetry; this can be made 
obvious in simple 2 dimensional examples. 
The shifts backfire because they entail 
nothing at all unless some space and its 
geometry are specified. Leibniz’s aim was to 
detach thing-thing from thing-space spatial 
relations. But the failure to yield any result 
without a geometry shows the reverse - the 
former obviously depend on the latter. So 
the shifts are weapons in the arsenal of 
realism not relationism. 
Dr Markus Schrenk, Nottingham 
University, UK 
Being Indisposed 
To say that something x is soluble means, roughly, 
that “if you were to put it in water (Tx), it would 
dissolve (Mx)”. To say that something is not 
soluble means, then, that “it is not the case that if 
you were to put it in water it would dissolve”. 
However, in ordinary language it feels also natural 
to say something else, namely that something is 
not soluble just in case “it would not dissolve if 
you were to put it water”.  This paper investigates 
whether and when there is a difference between 
the external negation (EN) of a counterfactual 
associated with a dispositional predicate “not (if 
Tx then Mx)” and the internal negation (IN) of 
this counterfactual “(if Tx then not Mx)”.  I will 
claim that only for a limited (yet central) class of 
dispositions do (EN) and (IN) coincide. Yet, for 
the vast majority of cases, (IN) rather defines a 
further dispositional predicate, being indisposed, 
than to coincide with the (external) negation of 
being disposed. There is, however, still a 
logical/conceptual connection between the two: 
while, when something is not disposed, it still may 
or may not be indisposed (likewise, if it is not 
indisposed it may or may not be disposed), it can 
certainly not be disposed and indisposed at the 
same time. 
Associate Professor Heather Dyke, 
University of Otago 
The Trouble with Propositions 
According to the standard view propositions are 
language-independent, mind-independent, 
atemporal, abstract entities, which are the primary 
bearers of truth and falsity. I argue that this 
standard view is a product of the philosophical 
tendency to conflate reality with language about 
reality that I call the representational fallacy. I 
think the standard view is false; there are no such 
things as propositions thus understood. Talk of 
propositions is just that: talk. It is a useful façon de 
parler which makes much of our talk about what 
we say go more smoothly, but it is a mistake to 
reify this talk. I then discuss examples of the sorts 
of disastrous consequences that can arise if we 
take talk of propositions ontologically seriously. 
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Professor Alexander Bird, 
University of Bristol (UK) and 
Monash University 
Can Dispositions Have Intrinsic Finks and 
Antidotes? 
One might suppose that dispositions cannot 
have intrinsic finks and antidotes (masks). 
For what would then be the difference 
between having a disposition that for 
intrinsic reasons does not yield its 
manifestation, and not having that 
disposition at all?  If that is right, then 
standard answers to certain important 
problems fail, for example the dispositional 
accounts of rule following or of intentional 
action, which require intrinsic finks or 
antidotes to respond to standard objections.  
In this paper I examine whether the 
dismissal of intrinsic finks and antidotes just 
given stands up, and if not, what does make 
the difference between possessing such a 
disposition and not possessing it.  I suggest 
that there is a difference, and that there can 
be intrinsic interference with a disposition 
when that interference does not originate in 
a design feature (artificial entities) or a 
natural function (natural entities). 
Dr Richard Corry, University of 
Tasmania 
Can Dispositional Essences Ground the Laws 
of Nature? 
A dispositional property is a tendency, or 
potency, to manifest some characteristic 
behaviour in some appropriate context. The 
mainstream view in the 20th Century was 
that such properties are to be explained in 
terms of more fundamental non-
dispositional properties, together with the 
laws of nature. In the last few decades, 
however, a rival view has become popular. 
According to the rival view, some properties 
are essentially dispositional in nature, and 
the laws of nature are to be explained in 
terms of these fundamental dispositions. 
Indeed the supposed ability of fundamental 
dispositions to ground natural laws is the 
strongest reason to believe that some 
fundamental properties have a dispositional 
essence. I am sympathetic to the 
dispositional essentialist position, but in this paper 
I point out a serious obstacle to the claim that the 
laws of nature can be grounded in dispositional 
essences. 
Prof William Lycan, University of North 
Carolina 
Metaphysics and the Paronymy of Names 
Paronymy--ambiguity that is not sheer ambiguity--
is underdiscussed by philosophers of language.  
And hardly anyone has noticed that _proper 
names_ are paronymous: Different occurrences of 
a single name have slightly and subtly different 
referents.  I invoke this fact to illuminate some 
issues in metaphysics: a puzzle about fictional 
characters; Jenny Saul’s phenomenon of referential 
opacity in the absence of opacity-inducing 
operators; the relation between persons and 
bodies; personal identity through time; and death. 
Prof Max Cresswell, Victoria University of 
Wellington 
Are Contingent Facts a Myth? 
In pp.78-80 of Real Time II, Hugh Mellor presents 
a ‘truthmaker’ version of McTaggart’s argument, 
which is designed to establish that there are no 
tensed facts. In this paper I consider the modal 
analogue of this argument, and shew first that, 
while there is a sense in which untensed facts 
might be held to make utterances of tensed 
sentences true, in that same sense non contingent 
facts can make utterances of contingent sentences 
true. I then shew that, while there is a sense in 
which tensed facts can be held to be contradictory, 
in that same sense contingent facts are equally 
contradictory. 
Mr. David Gawthorne, University of New 
England, Armidale 
Representational Presentism and Monotheism 
William Lane Craig uses what may be called 
representational actualism to explain facts about 
past and future events, and about the various 
relations between past, present and future 
individuals, in a presentist theory of time. 
Oaklander objects to Craig’s approach with the 
claim that it falls prey to the very problem 
purported by presentists to be solved by 
presentism: McTaggart’s argument against A-
theories of time. It is first proposed to substitute 
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temporally extended possible worlds for 
Craig’s tensed possible worlds in order to 
reinforce representational presentism. 
However, this approach fails to differentiate 
between competing possible candidates for 
the actual history of the universe unless a 
leaf is taken out of Bourne’s book and it is 
hypothesised that there can only be one 
actual, temporally extended possible world. 
Even so, there is nothing about a temporally 
extended possible world that makes it a 
more authoritative representation of the way 
the history of the universe was than any 
other representation of the past, including 
human memory. The only privileged 
representation of the past is a necessarily 
realised representation of the past. As the 
will of God is a necessarily realised, 
representation of the past and future of the 
universe, reference to the will of God (or 
something like it) as a representation of 
universal history grounds all truths about the 
past, the future and the relations between 
times. 
Prof. Graham Priest, University of 
Melbourne 
Contradiction and the Structure of Unity 
The paper addresses the problem of the one 
and the many, in the form: what makes 
something with parts one thing, and not just 
a congeries? Consideration of the situation 
concerning a unity drives one into 
contradiction. In the paper, I will harness 
the contradiction to provide a solution to 
the problem, employing an appropriate 
paraconsistent notion of identity. 
Professor Mathias Frisch, University 
of Maryland 
Causes, Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality 
In order to motivate the thesis that there is 
no single concept of causation that can do 
justice to all of our core intuitions 
concerning that concept, Ned Hall has 
argued that there is a conflict between a 
counterfactual criterion of causation and the 
condition of causal locality.  In this paper I 
show that Hall’s worry arises for causal 
structures simpler than that of double 
prevention, to which Hall appeals.  I then 
propose and defend two strategies that advocates 
of counterfactual accounts of causation can pursue 
to respond to Hall’s challenge:  a ‘field-theoretic’ 
account of property instantiation and the adoption 
of a counterfactual sufficient condition of causal 
action-at-a-distance in place of Hall’s ‘process’ 
condition of non-locality.  I conclude that Hall’s 
argument against counterfactual accounts is 
unsuccessful. 
Dr Sungho Choi, Kyung Hee University 
What is a dispositional masker? 
Manley and Wasserman put forward an apparently 
strong objection to the   conditional analysis of 
dispositions and propose an alternative account of 
the link between dispositional ascriptions and 
counterfactual conditionals. But I will argue that 
their discussion rests on a fundamentally wrong 
understanding of the phenomenon of masking. 
The key idea is that they neglect a crucial 
difference between cases of masking where the 
disposition is manifested because the appropriate 
stimulus conditions are present but a masker 
prevents the manifestation, on the one hand, and 
other plain cases where the disposition is not 
manifested because the appropriate stimulus 
conditions are not present. To develop this idea 
with rigour and clarity, however, it will be 
necessary to look closely into the context-
dependence of dispositional ascriptions and the 
incompleteness of dispositional predicates. 
Mr Takeshi Sakon, Kyoto University, The 
Faculty of Letters, Philosophy, (JSPS 
Research Fellow) 
Tensed-Property Presentism and Causality 
Presentism in philosophy of time is the thesis that 
only the present exists: what is past no longer 
exists and future does not yet. One of problems 
for presentism is that, if both past and future do 
not exist as the present does, it seems hard to give 
an account of past and future truths. There are 
several possible responses to the problem, 
according to which theories of presentism vary. In 
this paper, I shall focus on Tensed-Property 
Presentism first offered by J. Bigelow (1996), and 
briefly describe the general idea. Next, I shall raise 
the question of what the difference between 
Tensed-Property Presentism and Four-
Dimensionalism would amount to be. Following 
this, I shall point out that Four-Dimensionalist 
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account of the direction of causation 
involves difficulties  whereas Tensed-
Property Presentism faces no such 
problems. If my attempt succeeds, it will be 
shown not only that the idea of tensed 
properties can help presentism, but also that 
it has an advantage over 
Fourdimensionalism with respect to the 
direction of causation. 
Mr. Jamin Asay, The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Truthmaker Gaps 
In this paper, I take up the topic of 
truthmaker gaps: truths that are true in spite 
of having no truthmaker. David Armstrong 
has charged those who believe in truthmaker 
gaps with being dualists about truth, and 
further suggests that we might need to be 
minimalists about truth for any truth we take 
to be a truthmaker gap. I argue that 
Armstrong’s charge relies upon some false 
assumptions about the nature of 
truthmaking. In particular, I argue that 
truthmaker theory does not by itself offer a 
theory of truth, and that truthmaker theory 
is perfectly consistent with minimalism 
about truth. Still, I believe that Armstrong’s 
demand for a systematic account of 
truthmaker gaps has yet to be met, and I 
take this paper to be a first step toward 
offering a defensible metaphysics of 
truthmaker gaps. 
Professor Daniel Nolan, University 
of Nottingham 
Defining Metaphysical Indeterminacy 
There have been a number of recent 
theories providing theories of metaphysical 
indeterminacy, or of particular varieties of 
metaphysical indeterminacy, especially 
metaphysical vagueness.  We do not yet have 
a satisfactory definition of what it is that 
these rival theories are rival theories of.  
This paper discusses the project of 
providing such a definition.  The paper 
discusses why it would be good to have such 
a definition; why definitions currently in the 
literature are not entirely satisfactory;  and 
what features we should look for in a 
definition of this kind.  Then steps are taken 
towards constructing a more satisfactory definition 
of metaphysical indeterminacy.  The paper offers a 
candidate analysis of what it is for there to be 
metaphysical indeterminacy, and concludes with 
some outstanding problems for that analysis. 
Dr. Edward Zalta, Stanford University 
Possible Worlds, the Lewis Principle, and the Myth 
of a Large Ontology 
Each conception of possible worlds is defined by 
the principles that govern them.  The most 
fundamental principle of Lewis’s conception of 
worlds, for example, says: (absolutely) every way a 
world might be is a way that some world is (On 
the Plurality of Worlds: 2, 71, 86).  This “Lewis 
Principle” grounds any reasonable theory of 
possible worlds, including those based on a more 
abstract conception of them. I review how a 
representation of this principle can be derived in 
object theory, and then show that the axioms from 
which it is derived are true in tiny models. (The 
last fact is confirmed using tools of computational 
metaphysics.) So Lewis’s *theoretical* principle 
(prior to application) doesn’t require a large 
ontology.  I then argue that the axioms used in the 
derivation of the Lewis Principle are logical in 
nature and are analytic, by analogy with other 
principles that we accept as logical and analytic.  
From this, one can argue that belief in possible 
worlds is more easily justified. We don’t have to 
justify belief in worlds on a case-by-case basis; 
instead, we need only justify the Lewis Principle, 
and we can do so on the grounds that it is 
derivable from analytic truths. 
Dr Neil McKinnon & Prof. John Bigelow, 
Monash University 
Tensed Instantiation (Neil McKinnon and John 
Bigelow) 
Elise has a son, so she is a mother. Since her son 
has been treading the Earth for some time now, it 
is also the case that she was a mother.  Eternalists 
are able to treat both of these truths in the same 
way.    Things stand differently with presentism. 
True enough, presentists are able to 
straightforwardly handle Elise’s being a mother; 
Elise has the property of being a mother. Elise’s 
having been a mother presents complications. 
Since presentists want to say that reality is 
exhausted by what is present, it seems that Elise’s 
having been a mother must amount to her having 
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some property in the present.  
Unfortunately, that property cannot be plain 
motherhood. A standard enough move at 
this point is to say that Elise has the 
property of having been a mother.     At this 
point, though, it is natural enough to 
wonder what the relationship is between the 
property of being a mother and this other 
property of having been a mother. For one 
thing, there is an intimate, but unexplained, 
relationship between a present-tensed 
property, and its past-tensed correlate. We 
think there is a preferable alternative.     
Presentists ought to stop thinking of 
*having been a mother* as being, 
fundamentally, a property that attaches to 
Elise. At base, presentists ought to think 
instead of the tenses as applying to 
instatiation.  Thus, rather than having a 
single present-tensed instantiation tie, 
presentists should admit a past-tensed 
instantiation tie, and if there are future-
tensed truths, a future-tensed tie should also 
be admitted. 
Prof Stephen Mumford, University 
of Nottingham, UK 
Powers and double prevention 
Does A cause B merely if A prevents a 
preventer of B? In his last words on 
causation, David Lewis said that it does. 
Double prevention is causation for him 
because there is a counterfactual 
dependence involved when A prevents 
something that would have prevented B.   
There are a number of consequences of 
double prevention that suggest it ought not 
to be taken as a case of causation. It makes 
causation an extrinsic matter because 
whether B occurs is not dependent solely on 
its intrinsic features but also on what 
happens at other places and times. One of 
the alleged causes of the event is extrinsic to 
it. There is no continuous chain of events 
leading from the cause to its effect; indeed 
there is causation at a distance with nothing 
making a connecting bridge across the gap. 
Double prevention also involves causation 
by absence. The cause involves an absence 
of something — the absence of a prevention 
— and one might question whether 
absences are fit to be causal relata.  Lewis 
accepts all these consequences as permissible in a 
theory of causation. I argue that they are not. Each 
of them is theoretically counterintuitive. Instead, a 
theory of causation is being developed that is 
based on an ontology of real dispositions where 
causation becomes the passing around of powers. 
It would be a consequence of such a view that 
double prevention cases are not cases of causation 
because no power is passed from A to B. An 
absence of prevention is taken as indicative of an 
absence of causation and one need not then accept 
that causation can be extrinsic, occur over a 
distance without a causal chain, or involve 
absences as relata. 
Mr Matthew Hammerton, The University 
of Sydney 
Fictionalism: a shopper’s guide 
Fictionalism is a position that attempts to explain 
how one can continue to make utterances in a 
region of discourse, such as mathematics or ethics, 
even if one does not believe the propositions 
expressed by such utterances. It is of particular 
interest in metaphysics where it has featured in a 
number of localized debates between realists and 
anti-realists. While a few fictionalist proposals are 
well known, many philosophers are not aware of 
the large variety of fictionalisms on offer. This 
paper attempts to rectify this by providing an 
overview of the different kinds of fictionalist 
positions. I suggest that there are four dimensions 
in which fictionalist proposals can vary and from 
these dimensions I derive 12 kinds of fictionalism. 
To support this, I offer examples of philosophical 
theses (both contemporary and historical) that 
appear to fall under each kind of fictionalism. 
Finally, I identify philosophical problems where a 
fictionalist analysis seems especially promising. 
Ms. Angie Harris, University of Utah 
One World is Not Enough: Two-Dimensionalism 
and Determinacy of Personal Identity 
Is there a fact of the matter concerning the criteria 
of personal identity over time? If so, what is it? 
The two leading contenders are the same body and 
the same psychology, and the discussion 
surrounding the topic has largely been stuck in an 
either/or frame of mind. Recently, a number of 
philosophers have concluded that there is no fact 
to be found because the concept itself is 
indeterminate.  In this paper I challenge this 
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conclusion focusing on Ted Sider’s 
indeterminacy argument. Briefly, I claim 
contra Sider, determinacy is compatible with 
a multiple-candidate view. Secondly, I 
employ a two-dimensional semantic 
framework to analyze the concept.  The 
two-dimensional analysis shows that the 
concept of personal identity is determinate. I 
consider one potentially fatal problem for 
the semantic view described above.  Call this 
the argument from biological super-
organisms. Finally, I sketch broad strokes 
for a hybrid view   which reconciles the 
allegedly opposing views. In part, because of 
multiple use and eligibility conditions 
personal identity is precisely the kind of 
thing requiring multiple candidates while 
maintaining the ability to be determinate.  I 
make use of Sider’s own tools, influenced by 
Lewis, to cast doubt on his indeterminacy 
thesis as well as offer a positive account of 
‘person’ coupled with the proposal that 
identity is a necessary relation.  This more 
adequately captures the nature of persons in 
a way that illustrates the implausibility of the 
idea that personal identity is indeterminate. 
Prof David Chalmers, Australian 
National University 
Kaplan’s Paradox and Epistemically Possible 
Worlds 
Kaplan’s paradox suggests that there is a 
possible world for every set of possible 
worlds, so that the possible worlds cannot 
comprise a set with a cardinality, and so that 
(arguably) there is something incoherent 
about the very notion of a possible world.  
Some (e.g. Lewis) have responded by 
denying the premise, holding that some 
apparent possibilities here are not possible.  
But this move is harder to maintain for 
those (like me) who think that there is a 
possible world for every epistemically 
possible scenario  (one that cannot be ruled 
out a priori).  And the problem arises in any 
case for the framework for epistemically 
possible worlds, or scenarios, which is 
central to epistemic two-dimensionalism 
among other applications.  In this paper, I 
attempt to respond to Kaplan’s paradox by 
developing a stratified system of 
epistemically possible worlds, with different 
sets of worlds corresponding to different 
cardinalities, and I argue that this system can do 
most of the work that we need possible worlds to 
do. 
Dr Stephan Leuenberger, Australian 
National University / University of 
Glasgow 
Logic for liberals about modality 
Modal liberalism holds that everything is possible 
— with a few principled exceptions: roughly, those 
propositions that are ruled out by non-modal logic, 
broadly construed to include truths traditionally 
called `analytic’, plus the uncontentious truth that 
what is necessary is true. It takes the slogan `there 
are no brute necessities’ very seriously. But 
liberalism does not identify possibility with logical 
consistency. While it denies that there are any 
brute necessities, it allows that there could be — 
after all, nothing in non-modal logic rules out that 
there are brute necessities. Indeed, nothing in non-
modal logic rules out fatalism, the view that the 
necessary coincides with the true.      In this paper, 
I examine what modal logic a modal liberal can 
accept. A simple argument shows that the logic 
needs to provide the so-called “rule of 
disjunction”: that if the disjunction of formulas 
`Lpi’ is a theorem (0 < i < n+1), then at least one 
of pi is a theorem too (`L’ is the necessity 
operator). Otherwise modal logic will dictate that 
~pi, for some i, is impossible even though it is not 
ruled out by logic. The widely accepted logic S5 
does not provide the rule of disjunction (for 
example, LMp v LM~p is a theorem even though 
neither Mp nor M~p is), and neither does KTB. 
Logicians have shown that there is a wide range of 
logics that do provide the rule, though, including 
KT, S4, and S4 with the addition of the McKinsey 
axiom M. I will suggest that among the normal 
modal logics, the liberal should only accept KT. 
However, she can adopt a non-normal logic that 
includes S4 and even M, provided she restricts the 
rule of necessitation in such a way that it does not 
apply to theorems derived with the help of 
Mr. Graeme A. Forbes, Department of 
Philosophy, University of Sheffield 
McTaggart’s Dilemma 
McTaggart famously claimed time is unreal on the 
grounds that the existence of more than one 
moment of time would involve a contradiction. 
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This argument has been used to set up a 
dilemma: philosophers have been asked to 
choose between a static view of time 
(according to which the sum-total of 
existence never changes) and Presentism 
(according to which the sum-total of 
existence consists solely of the present 
moment). This dilemma has been taken to 
show that Presentism is the only option for 
anyone who hopes to hold a dynamic view 
(i.e. a view on which the sum-total of 
existence does change).    Though many, I 
among them, cannot identify the 
contradiction to which McTaggart refers, I 
argue that the only form the purported 
contradiction could take affects Presentism 
as much as any dynamic view of time. The 
purported contradiction, I claim, consists in 
different A-series being successively true of 
reality. If we replace these different A-series 
with different present moments, as the 
Presentist must, we do nothing to get rid of 
anything problematic in different A-series 
being true of reality.     I reformulate 
McTaggart’s argument in a way that doesn’t 
appeal to any times other than different 
successive present moments. I show, by 
contrasting Presentism with ‘Parmenidean 
Presentism’ that my reformulation of 
McTaggart’s argument poses a problem for 
Presentism as serious as McTaggart’s 
original argument ever posed for any view of 
time. The upshot is to deny to the Presentist 
any advantage they might have claimed over 
other dynamic theories of time in their 
response to McTaggart. 
Dr Patrick Girard, University of 
Auckland 
Defusing the conditional fallacy 
The alethic antirealist analyses the notion of 
truth in terms of justifiability or rational 
acceptability. This commits the antirealist to 
define truth in terms of a counterfactual 
such as:          Necessary, it is true that P just 
in case, if there were a suitably informed 
epistemic agent, she would believe that P. 
Planting, Rea, Wright and Brogaard and 
Salerno contend that this definition of truth 
entails a conditional fallacy. Briefly, it would 
commit the antirealist to believing that there 
is necessarily an epistemic agent. If this were 
true, we would probably obtain a reductio of 
antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of 
truth.  In this paper we aim to prove an 
impossibility claim: if a combinatorialist theory of 
possibility is assumed, no proof of the conditional 
fallacy is possible both either in classical modal 
logic or in intuitionistic modal logic enriched with 
formal resources for counterfactuals. Our 
conclusion is that the antirealist who opts for a 
combinatorialist theory of possibility does not fall 
afoul the conditional fallacy objection. 
Mr Matthew Tugby, University of 
Nottingham 
Varieties of Pandispositionalism 
Roughly, pandispositionalism is the view that it is 
of the essence of all (natural) properties that they 
bestow dispositions or ‘powers’ upon their 
possessors. I begin by identifying three views 
which all appear to be pandispositionalist in spirit: 
dispositional monism (Mumford 2004, Bird 2007), 
the two-sided view (Martin 1993) and the identity 
view (Heil 2003, Martin 2008). I argue, however, 
that the identity view ultimately collapses into 
neutral monism, and so should not be regarded as 
a genuine form of pandispositionalism. I then 
outline what many take to be fatal objections to 
dispositional monism and the two-sided view, 
before sketching possible lines of defense. It is 
often argued that the picture presented by 
dispositional monism either contains a vicious 
regress (Lowe, 2006), or removes anything 
resembling substantial nature from the world 
(Heil, 2003). I suggest that if dispositional monism 
is cashed out in a certain way, then these worries 
lose their force. With respect to the two-sided 
view, it is often asked whether the ‘categorical’ and 
‘dispositional’ sides of a property are contingently 
or necessarily related. If contingency is accepted, 
then the two-sided view arguably collapses into a 
form of property dualism (in which case it would 
no longer be a version of pandispositionalism), yet 
if necessity is accepted, we are left with what 
appears to be a brute, opaque necessity 
(Armstrong, 1997). In response, I suggest that if 
categoricity is understood in a certain way, one 
may be able to make putative categorical — 
dispositional necessity less opaque.  I conclude, 
therefore, that neither dispositional monism nor 
the two-sided view should immediately be 
dismissed by those with inclinations towards 
pandispositionalism. In the end, the choice one 
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makes is likely to depend upon one’s views 
on other philosophical issues, such as 
whether one holds there to be mental qualia. 
Mr. Alexander Skiles, The University 
of Notre Dame 
From Monism to Holism 
Radically anti-pluralistic theses have made a 
comeback in contemporary metaphysics. 
The most widely discussed is priority 
monism, according to which, though there 
are many material objects, exactly one of 
them is fundamental: the maximal 
mereological fusion of them all, the world as 
a whole (cf. recent and forthcoming work by 
Ross Cameron, Jonathan Schaffer, 
Theodore Sider, and Kelly Trogdon). 
Traditionally, its proponents have been 
tempted by the still more radical thesis of 
relational holism: that every proper part of 
the world exists at least partially in virtue of 
the relations it bears to the remaining 
subworld objects. I argue that the more 
recent defenders of priority monism ought 
to follow course (for better or for worse). 
Ms Tessa Jones, The University of 
Queensland 
Comparing Constitution, Identity and 
Attributes on Cases of Replacement of Parts 
Consider the Mona Lisa, the “greatest work 
of art” in history. The relation between the 
Mona Lisa and its parts (say, canvas and oil) 
remains a matter of debate. Some would 
have Leonardo’s masterpiece identical to the 
matter which constitutes it. Others, such as 
Lynne Rudder Baker, would have it that 
relational properties (such as its place in the 
history of art) motivate thinking of the 
Mona Lisa as not identical to the matter 
which constitutes it and yet not distinct 
(separable) from the oil and canvas either (a 
material duplicate is a forgery). Thus the 
matter constitutes the masterpiece. A 
Spinozian notion of an attribute explains 
that the painting exists under differing 
attributes, thus allowing one thing (the 
painting) to be both the “greatest work of 
art in history” and a configuration of paint 
and oil without such deeper meaning.  This 
paper compares different theories on test 
cases, such as whether the Mona Lisa in fact 
survived the addition of an oak frame and the 
watercolour touch up of the 1950s; whether, if the 
oil paint constituting the Mona Lisa was somehow 
separated from the canvas only to be laid back on 
it using a sophisticated paint by numbers, the 
painting would be the original; as well as cases 
beyond the standard problem of material 
constitution for objects, including that of roles. 
That is, how the case in which a role, such as 
Director of the Louvre, which can be instantiated 
by different individuals may illuminate our 
intuitions in other cases.  If we prefer a theory 
which solves the widest range of cases, the case of 
roles may undermine constitution as a forerunning 
solution. 
Ms. Reina Saijo, Hokkaido University 
Naturalness and Eligibility 
Naturalness and eligibility play important roles in 
David Lewis ‘s metaphysics. Naturalness is a 
metaphysical concept that applies to properties 
and relations. Lewis emphasizes that natural 
properties are the fundamental elements of the 
world, and that they are discoverable mainly by 
physics. On the other hand, eligibility is a 
metasemantic concept that applies to referents and 
interpretations. According to Lewis, these two 
concepts are interrelated. A set of objects is 
eligible as the extension of a predicate iff its 
members are things that share some natural 
property. Moreover, naturalness and eligibility are 
comparative. The more natural properties the 
things have, the more eligible referents they are, 
e.g. blueness is more eligible than grueness. A few 
questions, however, might well be raised about 
these concepts. How can we know whether a given 
property is natural or not? How can we tell when 
the referents of one term are more eligible than 
those of another term? In this paper, I will clarify 
Lewis ‘s concepts of naturalness and eligibility by 
examining these questions, and discuss what 
ontological basis that Lewis ‘s views has. 
Mr Nigel Leary, University of Birmingham 
(UK) 
Natural Kinds, Artifact Kinds and Anti-
Essentialism 
Natural kind essentialists claim that the world is 
organised objectively into a hierarchy of natural 
kinds, and that the mind-independent, intrinsic 
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essences of natural kinds demarcate them. 
On this view when we empirically 
investigate the world we are able to discover 
where nature is ‘carved at the joints’, and 
thus our classifications of the world capture 
fundamental facts of reality.    In this paper I 
will defend two theses. In the first instance I 
will argue that the naturalness of natural 
kinds is redundant, and has been for some 
time following the synthesis of elements and 
compounds. Following LaPorte (2004) I will 
claim that what we really mean by ‘natural’ 
now is ‘explanatory’, and as such that the 
natural kinds are the explanatory kinds. 
However, I will also point out that what we 
know about synthesised natural kinds before 
they exist makes them, in many cases, 
remarkably similar to artifact kinds.    The 
second thesis I will defend is John 
DuprÃ©’s (1995) pluralist ontology against 
Brian Ellis’s (2001) six-category ontology. 
More specifically I will address the 
essentialist claims about the objectivity and 
intrinsicality of essences, and defend the 
view that although the properties of objects 
are themselves objective insofar as they exist 
independently of us, our classifications on 
the basis of these properties have a distinctly 
conventionalist flavour. My arguments will 
focus primarily on examples from chemistry, 
the mainstay of the contemporary 
essentialist. By challenging these key 
examples I hope to challenge the very 
cogency of natural kind essentialism. 
Dr. Denis Robinson, University of 
Auckland 
Metaphysical Questions and Contingency 
The paper ruminates about metaphysical 
enquiry. An easy line of thought about 
metaphysics distinguishes metaphysical 
questions, answers to which are to be 
thought of as metaphysically necessary, from 
other questions — scientific questions, for 
instance — answers to which are to be 
thought of as merely contingent. This 
thought however conflicts with the fact that 
certain doctrines — for instance Humean 
Supervenience  — seem to be contingently 
true at best, despite being debated in an a 
prioristic and metaphysical manner. I sketch 
an account of metaphysical concern with 
such cases, which I call “metaphysically local”, and 
attempt to distinguish them from some more 
difficult kinds of case, involving questions 
appearing to have what I call “metaphysical 
generality”. Some have suggested that such 
questions might also have contingent answers, but 
this can seem unpalatable. I discuss some of the 
issues raised by these debates. 
Mr S.M.Hassan A.Shirazi, University of 
Brussels (Belgium) 
A Truthmaker For Necessary Truths 
In the course of his works on color, David 
Armstrong upholds the three following statements: 
i) Relation truthmaker: the property red and the 
property blue subsume under color in virtue of 
certain (internal) relation held between them, ii) 
Rigidity: the color terms ‘red’ and ‘blue’ are rigid 
terms, and iii)Physicalism: the property red, for 
instance, is identical with a certain  type of 
molecular structure instantiated by the surface of a 
red object. On the side of critiques, almost all texts 
are concerned with rejecting his physicalism. 
However, even if his physicalism is well-
established, I will argue that his approach suffers 
from a more fundamental problem: it is circular. 
To reveal this problem, I use Salmon’s 
formalization of rigidity and a posteriori identity.   
Instead of denying his approach totally, my 
ambitious is to diagnose the problem from 
Armstrongian point of view. From this 
perspective, I see that it would be less costly to 
give up i. Moreover, there are also some 
independent reasons to drop i. For instance, it 
sounds more intuitive to maintain colorness of the 
property red apart from any (potential) relation 
that it might have with the property blue. In the 
place of i, I suggest a non-relation truthmaker: the 
symmetrical demonstration of physical properties 
which determine color properties.   Due to the fact 
that ‘red is a color’ is a necessary truth, whatever is 
the truthmaker for falling red under color will be a 
truthmaker of a necessary truth as well. Therefore, 
my suggestion appoints to some helpful idea for 
notorious topic of ‘truthmaker for necessary 
truths’. 
Prof. Helen Beebee, University of 
Birmingham 
Is there any evidence for libertarianism? 
Libertarians claim not only that free will requires 
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that (at least some) decisions are 
metaphysically undetermined right up to the 
moment of choice, but that this condition is 
(at least sometimes) actually met — for 
example in what Robert Kane calles ‘self-
forming actions’. This paper concentrates on 
the second claim, and argues that there is, in 
fact, no evidence to support this empirical 
claim about the causal history of decision. 
Even if we grant that there is empirical 
evidence for indeterminism in general, this 
does not license the claim that all our 
decisions are indeterministically caused; and 
libertarians have no plausible story to tell 
about how we might have epistemic access 
to which of our decisions are 
indeterministically caused (and hence free) 
and which are not. 
Dr Colin Shingleton, Swinburne 
University 
Metaphysics of Interaction 
The philosophical debate concerning the 
capacity of material object metaphysics to 
configure a secular ethics, an effective 
psychology or an existential aesthetics points 
to the need to rethink Anglophone 
philosophy’s intellectual hegemony.  New 
sciences like Biohermeneutics, biosemiotics, 
complexity theory, techniques for crisis 
management and endophysics which are 
tailored to problems beyond the scope of 
physicalist science require philosophical 
justification.    Referring to Arran Gare’s 
work on process metaphysics which 
prioritises events and processes 
ontologically, I shall use Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger to explore whether process 
philosophy is an ontological extension of 
material object metaphysics or whether it 
reaches beyond traditional metaphysics. 
Dr. David Rathbone, PASI, 
University of Melbourne 
On the intersubjectivity of topography in 
Malpas’s Heidegger’s Topology 
In his Letter on Humanism Heidegger 
writes that “precisely through the 
characterization of something as ‘a value’, 
what is so valued is robbed of its worth.” 
(Jeff Malpas Heidegger’s Topology n.142  
p.377).  Space as a concept is generated out of 
place as an experience through a process of 
abstraction which, if misunderstood as an increase 
in ontological fidelity, inevitably perpetrates this 
same robbery.  But if interpreted appropriately, 
phenomenology can reveal space as an actual 
experience of an “infinite given magnitude” (as 
Kant put it).  The admission of this phenomenon 
is problematic for Heidegger’s strict insistence 
upon finitude as the meaning of existence.   
However interpreting place as an essentially 
intersubjective phenomenon, the finitude of 
existence can remain essential, while the possibility 
of temporary transcendence into a realm of infinite 
consequence is not disallowed.   While Heidegger’s 
way of thinking sees intersubjectivity as essential to 
existence (i.e. if Dasein is always already Mitdasein, 
then dwelling means sharing), it also accesses 
transcendence through language, “the temple of 
Being”.  Finite existence is not incompatible with 
infinite consequence if the latter is accessible 
intersubjectively.  The often misunderstood 
pertinence of etymology to this project will be 
clarified.    Just as the person contriving to seek 
friends because they find out “mateship” is an 
“Australian Value” effectively prevents themselves 
from encountering the authentic joy of 
spontaneous friendship  generated through shared 
experience, the contrived manufacture of a “place” 
on the ground of a mere space can only ever result 
in an ersatz experience of thinking.  Drawing on 
both Theunissen’s The Other and Mensch’s 
Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism, I 
aim to show the way in which Malpas in 
Heidegger’s Topology indicates a direction which 
avoids the criticism leveled by Bourdieu in The 
Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger. 
Dr Stuart Brock, Victoria University of 
Wellington 
What Fictional Characters Could Not Be: The 
Creationist Fiction 
In this paper I explain why creationism about 
fictional characters is an abject failure.  It suffers 
from the same problem as theological creationism: 
the purported explanation is more mysterious than 
the data it seeks to explain.  Unlike theological 
creationism, though, the phenomenon to be 
accounted for is not particularly mysterious in the 
first place.  This uniquely philosophical variety of 
creationism does not explain why there is 
something rather than nothing, or why the 
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universe and elements within it have the 
appearance of design, or why some people 
have apparent experiences of a creator.  
Instead, creationism about fictional 
characters is put forward as the best 
explanation for why people occasionally say 
things that, if taken at face value, seem to 
entail that fictional characters exist and are 
created by their authors.  One might wonder 
if taking the folk at their word in this way is 
appropriate, particularly when the same 
individuals deny these entailments when 
asked explicitly about them.  One might 
already suspect that a better explanation, 
then, is that the folk are mistaken, or 
pretending, or speaking metaphorically, or 
speaking elliptically.  I will not be exploring 
the merits of these alternative explanations, 
here, however.  Instead I will attempt to 
show that when the details of creationism 
about fictional characters are filled in, the 
hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than 
the linguistic data it is used to explain.  The 
basic idea is that no matter how the 
creationist identifies where, when and how 
fictional objects are created, the proposal 
conflicts with other strong intuitions we 
have about fictional characters. 
Emeritus Professor Jack Smart, 
Monash University 
From Physics to Metaphysics and Back Again 
This paper will discuss a  certain continuity 
between physics and metaphysics (and 
mention the curious reason for the 
appellation ‘metaphysics’. It is not that 
metaphysics is the meta theory of physics.)  
It will explain the grain of truth in 
Rutherford’s somewhat rude remark that 
science is physics plus stamp collecting. 
Dr. Aidan Lyon, University of 
Sydney 
Counterfactual--Probability 
In this paper, I give an analysis of 
counterfactual-probability. I start with some 
examples of counterfactual-probability (the 
chaos game, population genetics models, 
and statistical mechanics) to motivate the 
analysis. I then argue that the best way to 
analyse counterfactual--probability is in 
terms of a similarity relation over an ensemble of 
possibilities, and explore one way in which this can 
be done. 
Dr Andy Egan, Rutgers University 
Decision Theory for Time Travelers 
Decision-making for time travelers isn’t always 
straightforward.  It’s not obvious that what’s good 
advice for the rest of us is good advice for time 
travelers.  And what’s good advice for time 
travelers depends on what the background 
metaphysics of time is like.  I look at some options 
for how the metaphysics could be, and the 
consequences for how it’s rational for time 
travelers to act.  I also look at some related 
aesthetic issues about time travel fiction. 
 
Normative Ethics 
Dr Iwao Hirose, McGill University 
Choosing what is rational 
Here is a much-discussed (probably misleading) 
question on distributive justice in moral and 
political philosophy. John Rawls contends that 
self-interested individuals behind a veil of 
ignorance would “rationally” choose the maximin 
rule, whereas John Harsanyi and other proponents 
of utilitarianism contend that self-interested 
individuals in a similar hypothetical situation 
would “rationally” choose the maximization of 
average utilitarianism: who is correct? I will argue 
that there is no answer to this question.   First, I 
consider what exactly Rawls and Harsanyi claimed, 
and elucidate the similarities and differences 
between Rawls’s and Harsanyi’s assumptions. 
Second, I will consider the recent literature of 
experimental economics concerning this question, 
and show that it is irrelevant. Third, I will argue 
that either of (1) or (2) is the case: (1) if the notion 
of rationality is understood in a minimal sense (i.e. 
the absence of inconsistencies), there is no answer 
because some basic properties that separate the 
maximin rule and average utilitarianism are not 
concerned with consistency requirements; (2) if the 
notion of rationality is more substantive than the 
absence of inconsistencies, the correct answer 
depends on our account of what rationality 
consists in, and therefore, the original question is 
about a disagreement concerning the notions of 
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rationality (but I will show that Rawls and 
Harsanyi agree to the basic notion of 
rationality). 
Mr Dan Turton, Victoria University 
of Wellington 
Defining Pleasure for Hedonism: Lessons from 
Science 
A long-standing criticism of Benthamite 
Hedonistic Utilitarianism is that the pleasure 
it requires for its hedonic calculus does not 
exist. The criticism argues that the pleasures 
experienced from eating, sex, reading a good 
book, and contemplating the good life are so 
different that they are incommensurable. 
This inability to compare various pleasures 
entails that assessing the value lives or 
actions with hedonic calculus will be 
impossible in most cases. Despite some 
philosophers’ recent attempts to avoid this 
criticism by redefining pleasure (e.g. Fred 
Feldman’s Pleasure and the Good Life), 
there is still no widely accepted definition of 
pleasure that can unify the various 
‘pleasures’ while remaining true to the 
everyday notion of pleasure. In this talk, 
recent findings in neuroscience are applied 
to this problem to argue for an account of 
pleasure that will satisfy scientists, classical 
hedonists and our general intuitions about 
pleasure. 
Dr William Ransome, QUT 
The Philosophy of Wellbeing: Aristotle to Sen 
and back again 
Wellbeing has achieved talismanic status in 
several areas of social research and public 
policy, but what does it mean? A significant 
body of research and analysis concerning 
wellbeing has emerged across a number of 
research disciplines, yet the concept itself 
does not admit of any unified or consistent 
interdisciplinary interpretation. Social 
researchers and policymakers may look to 
philosophers for decisive definitional 
guidance, yet the nature of wellbeing has 
been sharply disputed throughout the 
Western philosophical tradition. Modern 
philosophical theories of wellbeing fall into 
three basic categories — ‘hedonistic’, 
‘desire’, and ‘objective list’ approaches — 
which mirror well-established doctrinal divisions 
between normative theories of utilitarian and 
deontological ethics. This paper briefly sketches a 
philosophical history of wellbeing, discusses the 
three broad competing contemporary 
specifications of wellbeing, and canvasses 
philosopher and economist Amartya Sen’s hybrid 
freedom-based ‘capabilities’ approach. Sen’s 
avowedly Aristotelian approach to the question of 
wellbeing nudges the contemporary philosophical 
discussion back towards its ancient Greek origins. 
This paper seeks to ground, strengthen and extend 
Sen’s capabilities account of wellbeing by returning 
directly to its source — Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics — and especially to the central notions of 
human flourishing, practical wisdom and virtue. 
Dr Toby Handfield, Monash University 
The good in satisfying preferences 
Supposing that there is some good in satisfying 
preferences, how do we compare the goodness of 
having no preference with the goodness of having 
a satisfied preference? I argue that the most 
plausible relationship is that these are 
incommensurate. I then show that this has some 
interesting implications for various problems in 
population ethics. 
Mr. William Cunningham, University of 
New South Wales 
The Quest for Unity in Ethics 
The recent prevalence of discussions regarding 
moral dilemmas has served to emphasize what is a 
fundamental necessity in moral philosophy: 
theoretical and practical unity. There are several 
forms of moral dilemma, each arising out of an 
inconsistency inherent in a particular moral theory. 
Varying theories fall victim to varying forms of 
dilemma but most do face one or another. This 
theoretical vulnerability forces us to revise or reject 
our theories. If one is to escape this type of 
theoretical weakness it is necessary to hold to a 
theory that presents the moral life as a unified 
whole. Inasmuch as morality is both a theoretical 
and a practical endeavour, the adequate theory 
must both be theoretically coherent and able to 
unite personal and social beliefs and desires. In this 
paper I argue that there is one such theory that is 
capable of escaping moral dilemmas and providing 
the above type of unity. I present a teleological 
approach that draws on Aristotelian and Judeo-
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Christian traditions. I argue that this theory 
is able to unite the obligations and desires of 
the individual and of rational beings as a 
whole, in such a way as to escape theoretical 
and practical inconsistency. 
Mr Simon Roberts-Thomson, 
University of Arizona 
Recognition Self-Respect and Equality 
To have recognition self-respect is to 
recognise and respect a certain fact about 
oneself, namely that one has an intrinsic 
moral worth that is equal to the intrinsic 
moral worth possessed by every other 
person. An adequate theory of recognition 
self-respect must satisfy two criteria. First, it 
must provide us with an acceptable account 
of the conception of moral equality that is 
present within recognition self-respect. 
Second, it must be able to explain why self-
respect is such an important personal good. 
In this paper, I examine two theories of 
recognition self-respect, namely those put 
forward by Thomas Hill and Catriona 
McKinnon, and argue that these fail to 
satisfy both criteria. I then present an 
interest-based account of the conception of 
moral equality present in recognition self-
respect, and argue that this account is able to 
satisfy both of the above criteria. 
Dr Caroline West, The University of 
Sydney 
What Is This Thing Called Happiness? 
What Is This Thing Called Happiness?  The 
concept of happiness plays a central role in 
moral theory and in practical prudential 
deliberation. We generally think that 
happiness, whatever it is, is a good; 
something worth seeking for its own sake. 
But what, exactly, is the nature of this good? 
There are a variety of candidates available, 
ranging from hedonic states (such as 
pleasure) to local desire-satisfaction, life-
satisfaction and/or flourishing of some 
broader kind. Which (if any) of these is 
happiness, and how should we decide? 
 
 
Prof. Garrett Cullity, University of 
Adelaide 
Loving the Bad 
Loving the bad is bad, according to Brentano and 
Chisholm. They add that loving the good is good, 
hating the good is bad, and (with qualifications) 
hating the bad is good. However, these claims 
(even with the qualifications) are too crude to be 
true. Sometimes, loving the bad is good. There are 
some forms of loving the bad which we have 
reason to promote and celebrate. This paper offers 
a framework for understanding and explaining the 
differences between these cases. Its main focus is 
on understanding the way in which someone’s 
enjoyment can provide us with reasons to promote 
it. Often, the fact that you will enjoy something is 
a reason for me to help you to get it. Brentano and 
Chisholm seem right that whether this is true 
depends on the object of your enjoyment. The fact 
that you will enjoy seeing someone suffer gives me 
no reason to procure that for you. However, their 
attempted explanation of this fails. It is not 
because malicious enjoyment is a case of loving the 
bad that I have no reason to promote it. So what 
explanation should we offer instead? 
Dr Nin Kirkham, The University of 
Western Australia 
Transcending our Biology: The Appeal to Nature in 
Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethicists generally agree that a virtue is a 
trait that a person needs to live a life characterised 
by eudaimonia (flourishing, happiness etc). 
However, this claim is compounded from two 
further interrelated claims; the first being that the 
virtues benefit the individual possessing them; and 
the second that the virtues make their possessor a 
good human being. While both these claims have 
invited criticism, the second, because it involves 
the controversial appeal to human nature, has 
given rise to disagreement over the viability of a 
modern version of virtue ethics. Many 
philosophers argue that the notion of an ethics 
founded upon an account of the essential features 
of human nature is inherently problematic. 
Humans, they argue, have in some sense 
‘transcended our biology’, so an understanding of 
humans as a biological species is extraneous to 
ethical questions. In this paper, I examine and 
defend the appeal to nature, as a way to ground an 
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ethic of virtue, from some of the more 
common criticisms that are made against it. 
I ask whether there is any coherent sense in 
which we can say that humans have 
‘transcended our biology’, and how we are 
best to understand the relevance of an 
account of ‘human nature’ to virtue ethics? 
Dr Daniel Cohen, Charles Sturt 
University 
The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer and 
Newcomb’s Problem 
Attached to your body is a shock generator 
with 1001 settings, ranging from no pain to 
excruciating agony. While you are barely able 
to distinguish adjacent settings, distant 
settings are easily distinguishable. Every day 
you are offered $10,000 in return for 
permanently raising the settings by 1. The 
puzzle is that while you will clearly be 
tempted, each day, to advance, you will 
nevertheless regret advancing beyond a 
certain point. So what should you do? Is 
there some point beyond which it is 
irrational to advance, despite the temptation, 
or are rational agents committed to 
advancing all the way to 1000? I will argue 
that we can better understand this puzzle by 
seeing an analogy with Newcomb’s problem. 
According to causal decision theory you 
ought, every day, to advance, while 
according to evidential decision theory there 
is some point beyond which advancing is 
irrational. 
 
Philosophy of Language 
Prof Richard Holton, MIT 
Facts, Factives and Contra-Factives 
Frege begins his discussion of factives in 
‘On Sense and   Reference’ with an example 
of a purported contra-factive, i.e. a verb   
that entails the falsity of the complement 
sentence. But the verb he   cites, ‘wähnen’, is 
now obsolete, and native speakers are 
sceptical   about whether it really required 
the falsity of the complement   sentence. 
Despite the profusion of factive verbs, there 
are no clear   examples of contra-factive 
propositional attitude verbs in English,   French or 
German. Where one would expect to find them 
one finds verbs   that don’t take sentential 
complements (‘refute’; ‘delude’; ‘mistake’;   
‘hallucinate’) or that don’t require the falsity of the 
complement   (‘pretend’; ‘wish’). One finds that 
one cannot even add negating   prefixes to 
propositional attitude factives to obtain contra-
factives,   not even when the same prefixes can be 
affixed to related   constructions taking NP-
clauses. This paper attempts to give an   
explanation of why there are no contra-factives, 
and to use this to   shed light on the behaviour of 
factives more generally. The suggestion   is that 
factive propositional attitude verbs take facts, not   
propositions, as the referents of their complement 
sentences; and that   as there are no contra-facts 
(merely false propositions), there can be   no 
contra-factives. This claim is then used to help 
explain Timothy   Williamson’s observation that 
knowledge is the weakest stative   propositional 
attitude factive. 
Professor Meredith Williams, Johns 
Hopkins University 
Master and Novice in the Later Wittgenstein 
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
opens each major philosophical issue with a 
description of a child or a pupil learning, for the 
first time, language or arithmetic or sensation talk.  
This device is both methodologically important—a 
naturally occurring primitive language game that 
can be used in examination of philosophical 
theories and pictures—and explanatorily 
important.  The master-novice relation is a 
window onto the nature of normativity, the kind 
of primitive normativity that underwrites our more 
sophisticated uses of language. 
Mr. David Ripley, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Against Structured Propositions 
Linguists and philosophers of language commonly 
agree that sets of possible worlds cannot be 
propositions---they do not individuate finely 
enough. Proposed substitutes for possible worlds 
tend to fall into two camps: the circumstantialist 
and the structuralist. Circumstantialist views hold 
that possible worlds are not enough; impossible 
circumstances too must be acknowledged. 
Structuralist views make do with only possible 
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worlds by holding propositions to be 
internally structured; typically this structure 
is derived from sentential syntax. I’ll argue 
that structuralist views face serious problems 
not shared by circumstantialist views, and 
that extant arguments against 
circumstantialist views miss their target. 
Mr Stephan Kubicki, University of 
Melbourne 
Propositions, Kaplanian semantics, new-wave 
relativism 
Recent debates about semantic relativism 
have been conducted in terms of the theory 
developed by Kaplan in his 
“Demonstratives’’. This raises the question 
of what broader philosophical import this 
debate has for those who don’t accept 
Kaplan’s semantic theory. Some participants 
to the debate, such as Max Kolbel and 
Francois Recanati, have claimed that the 
debate is philosophically significant because 
it has consequences for traditional 
philosophical concerns about the nature of 
propositions. While I agree that that is what 
is at stake, I also believe that conducting the 
debate in terms of Kaplan’s semantics 
obscures those concerns. More specifically, 
it’s one thing to argue about the correct 
assignment of semantic values to some class 
of linguistic expressions, it’s quite another to 
argue about the nature of what we assert, 
and what beliefs we express, when we utter 
sentences containing such expressions. In 
short, there’s an important distinction 
between semantic values, which are part of 
the subject matter of linguistics, and 
propositions, which are part of the subject 
matter of philosophy of language. I can not 
argue for this claim in full generality here; 
instead I will refute interpretations of 
Kaplan which read him as identifying 
semantic values with propositions. My 
method is straightforward: I will note those 
places where what Kaplan writes suggests 
that he identifies semantic values with 
propositions; then I will develop a more 
sophisticated and accurate reading, 
according to which Kaplan does not identify 
semantic values with propositions. This will 
show, at least, that Kaplan’s 
“Demonstratives’’ offers no support for 
conducting debates about semantic relativism in 
terms of Kaplan’s semantics. What is required is 
either a supplementary argument showing that 
Kaplan’s semantic values can be identified with 
propositions, or a direct investigation into the 
nature of propositions. I hope to say more about 
these soon. 
Mr Brian Rabern, Australian National 
University 
Why double indexing? 
In the 1960’s theorists working in the science of 
language began applying the powerful tools of 
model-theory to the study of languages involving 
“context-dependence” or “indexicality” -- the 
phenomenon that the extension (or intension) of 
certain expressions depends on the context of use. 
Early theorists, e.g. Montague (1968), Scott (1970), 
and Lewis (1970), proposed that we simply expand 
the indices used for intensional languages (e.g. 
modal and tense logic) to include the relevant 
contextual coordinates. A model-theory that made 
use of these expanded indices was thought to 
afford a formal unified treatment of both 
intensionality and indexicality -- what Lewis later 
called “a happy coincidence”. Several problems, 
however, were immediately presented and the 
model-theory used in the study of indexicality was 
succeeded by the now orthodox doubly-indexed 
semantics. A major motivation away from single 
index theory toward double-indexing was a 
dilemma presented by Kaplan (1977). I will 
rehearse Kaplan’s dilemma and show that the 
single index theorist does not actually fall victim to 
this dilemma. Thus, the most commonly appealed 
to argument for double-indexing fails and, in fact, 
Kaplan’s considerations provide no motivation 
toward a system of double indexing. This raises the 
question -- Why double-indexing? In the 
remainder of the paper I will present two further 
motivations for double-indexing. One due to 
Lewis (1980) via Cresswell (1973) and the other 
due to Kamp (1971). Since the various motivations 
for double-indexing are fundamentally different 
they provide us with different theoretical and 
philosophical import -- I will draw out a few 
morals for the study of indexical intensional 
languages. 
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Dr Conrad Asmus, University of 
Melbourne 
Expression, truth and use in a trivial 
language. 
“Doesn’t triviality ensue? Isn’t every 
sentence (therefore) both true and false? 
Yes.” (Azzouni, Tracking Reason 2006, pg 
101-102)    Prima facia natural language 
appears inconsistent and tradition says that a 
contradiction entails any sentence. Most 
people take this as reason to either reject the 
inconsistency of natural language or to 
employ a paraconsistent logic. Jody Azzouni 
takes the road less trodden; he accepts the 
consequence that every sentence is true and 
false. Nonetheless, Azzouni argues, natural 
language remains useful for our purposes. In 
this presentation I will use Azzouni’s 
position to throw further light on the 
connections between meaning, use and 
truth. I will argue that the very principles 
which Azzouni uses to rescue his position 
from absurdity should force him to 
recognise that the arguments leading to his 
position are mistaken. 
Mr. Umut Karagoz, Middle East 
Technical University 
On Metaphysical Status of “Language Game” 
in Later Wittgenstein 
The purpose of this study is to present the 
metaphysical status of  “language game” in 
later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language 
and to  deal with the revolutionary role of 
“language-game” by means of Hintikka ‘s 
interpretation of later Wittgenstein. It is 
usual to divide Wittgenstein’s work into the 
early and the later period. The early period is 
based upon the picture theory of meaning, 
according to which a sentence represents a 
state of affairs. On the other hand, the later 
period gives special emphasis on the actions 
of people and the role their linguistic 
activities. In the later work, Wittgenstein 
emphasizes everyday usage of language in 
“language-game” as social activities of 
ordering, advising, measuring, and counting 
and so on. These different “language-
games” make up “form of life”, “Language 
game” with other vital notions of later 
Wittgenstein, as “form of life”, “agreement” 
establishes language matrix. In his later period, 
Wittgenstein aims to bring back words from 
metaphysics to everyday usage. To sum up, the 
notion of “language-game” is conceptually/ 
ontologically prior to its rules. In this sense, 
Wittgenstein forms “language-game” as a model 
for the other social activities of human beings. 
Furthermore, “language-game” is regarded as a 
bridge between language and reality. 
Mr Paolo Santorio, MIT 
Monsters and binding: redesigning the semantics for 
the de re 
Orthodoxy in philosophy of language has it that 
indexicals and names are directly referential: this 
means that they are interpreted prior to other 
elements of the sentence, and hence cannot be 
bound. I argue that orthodoxy has it wrong. Pace 
Kaplan, all indexicals and names are systematically 
bound when they occur in the scope of a wide 
range of modal quantifiers.    My argument is 
based on a puzzle involving indexicals and 
epistemic modals. After introducing the puzzle, I 
generalize it to names and link it to a more 
traditional puzzle in the semantics for belief. I 
show that both can be solved by treating epistemic 
modals and attitude verbs as two-dimensional 
quantifiers that bind the directly referential terms 
falling within their scope. On the resulting 
semantics, indexicals and names range over 
epistemic counterparts of the object they pick out 
in unembedded occurrences.    My conclusion is 
that lack of `descriptive meaning’ and non-
bindability come apart. The semantics maintains 
the idea that the contents of names and indexicals 
are objects rather than intensions. But it does 
justice to the intuition that these terms, when 
embedded under certain modal quantifiers, are 
associated to a richer cognitive significance. 
Dr. Joe Salerno, Saint Louis University 
Embedded Epistemic Modals 
Typical relativist arguments against contextualism 
about epistemic modals (specifically, about 
epistemic `Might’) are primarily directed at a naive 
speaker-contextualism, which says unrestrictedly 
that the speaker’s knowledge is always relevant to 
the content and truth-value of claims in which 
`Might’ is embedded.   However, the core 
contextualist thesis is that the speaker’s context 
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determines whose knowledge makes the 
semantic contribution---and this knowledge 
may or may not be the speaker’s.  A hidden 
variable thesis will be defended.  We will 
assume that the linguistic data is robust, and 
argue that this form of indexical 
contextualism fares better than relativism at 
explaining the data. 
Mr Tama Coutts, The University of 
Melbourne 
Mass Terms and Absolute Truth Definitions 
Many philosophers, most obviously Donald 
Davidson, think that there is something 
philosophically significant about absolute 
truth definitions; that is to say truth 
definitions of the kind Tarski showed how 
to construct. Let us suppose so, and suppose 
so for Davidson’s reasons; namely that the 
possibility of constructing such truth 
definitions, together with the argumentation 
he provides, give an insight into the nature 
of content and the structure of agency. It 
turns out that the argumentation requires 
one to be able to deal with recalcitrant 
stretches of natural languages. Davidson lists 
many such stretches. Of these I was unable 
to understand in what the recalcitrance of 
two consisted: claims involving probability 
and mass terms. In this paper I attempt to 
work out just what the problem is with mass 
terms, and insofar as this is a problem to 
solve it. The view that emerges is roughly 
like that of Terrence Parsons, involving a 
commitment to an ontology of (what 
Parsons calls) substances, although we shall 
see that his view is perhaps somewhat 
inadequate. 
Dr. Kevin Scharp, The Ohio State 
University 
Replacing Truth 
Most contemporary approaches to the liar 
paradox are “traditional” in the sense that 
they reject one of the premises or inference 
rules that are used to derive the paradoxical 
conclusion. Over the years, however, several 
philosophers have developed an alternative 
to the traditional approaches; according to 
them, our very competence with the concept 
of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning 
used to derive the paradox is sound. That is, our 
conceptual competence leads us into 
inconsistency. I call this alternative the 
inconsistency approach to the liar.  I develop a 
novel version of the inconsistency approach on 
which we replace our defective concept of truth 
with a team of concepts, ascending truth and 
descending truth, that do the work we require 
without giving rise to paradoxes.  This approach 
requires two theories--a prescriptive theory that 
specifies the changes to our conceptual repertoire, 
and a descriptive theory that explains our defective 
concept of truth.  It is essential that the descriptive 
theory depends on the prescriptive theory, and 
does not appeal to our defective concept of truth. 
Mr Matt Sayball, Virginia Tech 
What are Penumbral Connections? 
When we consider the logic and semantics of 
vague languages, it is vital that we correctly 
account for relations that hold between vague 
terms.  In this paper, I analyze Kit FIne’s account 
of penumbral connections and argue that it loses 
sight of its intended target of analysis.  I suggest a 
more refined characterization of penumbral 
connections and discuss the importance of getting 
penumbral connections right. 
Mr. Rory Wood-Ingram, University of 
Melbourne 
Laughing at Nothing 
The serious approach to life calls for the 
systematic creation of meaning through reason 
and/or logic, intuition, belief, ideals, culture, 
superstition, i.e. anything which can be taken 
seriously.  Humour turns this on its head, 
celebrating idiocy and foolishness.  A part of 
humour is directly related to a reduction in 
understanding, an annihilation of meaning.  Kant’s 
idea, “Laughter is an affection arising from the 
sudden transformation of a strained expectation 
into nothing,” underlines this thought.  This 
reduction in understanding is why an analysis of 
humour inevitably kills the joke and fails to 
identify the humour, even as it explains the joke.  
The idea of the annihilation of meaning offers an 
original and important breakthrough in the 
philosophy of humour.  I argue that whilst the 
causes and mechanisms of humour are so varied as 
to defy any unifying theory of humour, the effect 
of humour is profound and enlightening.  This 
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effect, the annihilation of meaning, involves 
a complete negation of serious meaning.  It 
entails an utter denial of the values and 
ethical constraints of society and even the 
willful rejection of reality, in order to impose 
a silly and contemptible meaning.  The end 
point of the annihilation of meaning is a 
blankness and clarity of the mind, such that 
we can no longer confer sense on anything 
and the world appears to us freed from 
discursive meaning.  This is a transient state, 
however, as meaning quickly reasserts itself, 
but the process of constructing and 
annihilating meaning is in itself greatly 
rewarding and contributes towards our own 
enlightenment.  In this light I examine 
humour as an anti-rational force. 
Dr Mark Jago, Macquarie University 
Propositions 
Propositions play a variety of theoretical 
roles in philosophy: the bearers of truth; 
what an utterance expresses; what one says 
when one says something; the objects of 
belief; contents; and meanings. I’ll focus on 
the first three of these roles. First, I will 
argue that propositions qua bearers of truth 
cannot be sets of possible worlds. Next, I’ll 
argue that propositions qua what is 
expressed by an utterance (or by a sentence 
in a context) cannot be structured tuples of 
semantic values, as they are on the 
Russellian picture of propositions. I’ll then 
construct an attractive picture of 
propositions as sets of possible and certain 
impossible worlds, where those impossible 
worlds are subject to certain logical closure 
principles. Finally, I’ll suggest that this 
account of propositions might have 
something to say about the perplexing 
question of the conditions under which two 
speakers say the same thing. 
Mr Peter Fritz, Australian National 
University / University of Konstanz 
Higher-Order Vagueness and Degrees of 
Truth 
Degree-theoretic accounts of vagueness 
using fuzzy logics avoid a sharp boundary 
between the objects to which a vague 
predicate applies and the objects to which it 
doesn’t by using the real numbers between 0 and 1 
as truth-values. For example, stating that a 
borderline case for the predicate “bald” is bald is 
said to receive some intermediate truth-value. 
However, they thereby draw a sharp boundary 
between the men for which “This man is bald.” 
receives truth-value 1 and the ones for which it 
doesn’t. This is a version of the argument by 
higher-order vagueness against a degree-theoretic 
account.   The argument is mostly taken to show 
that the metalanguage in which the truth-value 
assignments are performed must be vague as well. 
As this reasoning can be iterated indefinitely, it is 
claimed that such a degree-theoretic treatment of 
“bald” must provide an infinite hierarchy of 
metalanguages each of which is provided with a 
multi-valued semantics, which is considered 
undesirable.  Agreeing with this sentiment, I will 
show that such a hierarchy is not required if we 
enable the object language to ascribe truth-values 
to its own sentences. I will explain why this 
doesn’t remove the need for the metalanguage to 
be vague, and consider two objections against 
vague metalanguages. I will counter these 
objections by making explicit the role of formal 
languages in explaining the phenomenon of 
vagueness. I will especially consider in which 
respects the metalanguage must be vague, and how 
real numbers and truth-values in natural languages 
relate. 
 
Philosophy of Literature 
Dr Tom Martin, Rhodes University, South 
Africa 
The indifference of the world and the desire for 
transcendence in ‘The Man Who Wasn’t There’ 
I employ resources from Sartre’s Nausea, Being 
and Nothingness, and Existentialism and 
Humanism to provide a reading of the Coen 
brothers’ film The Man Who Wasn’t There that seeks 
to account for the film’s recurrent tropes of hair 
growth, dry cleaning, and flying saucers. While I 
do not claim that the film exemplifies Sartrean 
philosophy, I do claim that it shares several 
concerns with Sartre and that it is on these 
grounds that reading Sartre alongside The Man Who 
Wasn’t There can be a fruitful and worthwhile 
exercise. This paper is an exercise in both 
philosophy of film and philosophical film 
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criticism, and is part of a larger collaborative 
project on Existentialism and Contemporary 
Cinema. 
 
Philosophy of Logic and 
Mathematics 
Dr Sam Butchart, Monash University 
Why we need a theory of mathematical 
explanation 
Explanation and justification in mathematics 
are intimately connected, in much the same 
way as they are in the physical sciences. 
Understanding mathematical explanation is 
therefore vital to the project of providing an 
adequate epistemology of mathematics - an 
account of the ways in which mathematics is 
justified. In this paper I will discuss the 
relevance of an account of mathematical 
explanation to a wide variety of problems in 
the epistemology of mathematics. In 
particular, I argue that understanding the 
concept of mathematical explanation is 
crucial to issues such as the the status of 
indispensability arguments, the justification 
of axioms, the role of non-deductive 
evidence in mathematics and the nature of 
proof.  
Dr Hartley Slater, UWA 
A perfect language? 
In recent Logic, languages without indexicals 
have been widely studied, since they have 
been thought to be more ‘perfect’ than our 
normal language.  This paper shows the 
error in this line of thought as well as 
providing a plausible account of why it has 
been so attractive to its adherents.  The 
possibility of a language without indexicals 
has been important, as well, to recent 
theorists about Truth, such as Tarski; and its 
attraction is shown to be a large part of the 
motivation for later developments in this 
view of Truth, made by Priest.  By 
considering languages containing indexicals 
instead, it is shown that it is the removal of 
them that has created many of the major 
problems that have arisen within this 
semantic tradition.  Furthermore, one 
consequence of Gödel’s First Incompleteness 
Theorem is that indexicality is inescapable in 
languages of sufficient complexity. 
Dr Anne Newstead, UNSW 
Knowing the Infinite 
‘The finite mind cannot grasp the infinite’. 
Mathematical knowledge provides a material 
refutation of this claim.  Some mathematical 
statements involve quantification over infinitely 
many objects. Some mathematical statements refer 
to infinitely complex structures.  On our view, 
with a nod to Quine, a grasp of the truth of these 
claims involves an ontological commitment to the 
existence of infinitely many objects. We do not 
shirk from our ontological commitment to 
infinities, but seek to understand how the mind 
can grasp the truth conditions for statements 
about infinities. Rationalist and empiricist 
proposals for explaining the feat are examined.  
Ultimately we side with the rationalist proposal 
that the mind’s understanding of the infinite does 
not come about through sense-perception or 
imagination, but relies on the intellect and its 
powers of conception. We demonstrate 
connections between the historic rationalist 
proposal and contemporary cognitive science work 
on this topic. 
Dr John Howes, Learningguild 
Hypothetical inferabilty: a tradition revealed and 
extended 
Concerning the strict kind of hypothetical 
statement suitable for use in deductive arguments, 
there has been a tradition of interpretation, almost 
unrecognized even by its members, in which such 
a statement, whether open, remote or 
counterfactual, has (rightly) been regarded as an 
assertion of what may be called hypothetical 
inferability. The statement asserts that in the 
hypothetical case in which it is true that p, it 
would, because p (and often in a given context), be 
no less certainly true that q. Moreover, a strict 
statement of the form ‘Either –p or q’ is explained 
as equivalent to the strict ‘If p then q’: each is 
richer than ‘–p v q’. This tradition may (apart from 
Mill) be called an Oxbridge one. I begin with 
Whately of Oxford, and go on to Mill, and then to 
Ramsey and Moore of Cambridge. We return to 
Oxford for Ryle, Strawson and the Kneales, and 
include Australia’s Gasking (Cambridge) and 
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Armstrong (Oxford). A major reason why 
this tradition has been less influential so far 
than the truth-functionalist one is that it has 
not yet been known to include any form of 
representation of deductive arguments for 
testing. The “orthodox” truth-functionalist 
treatment is notorious for the paradoxes that 
occur because in it ‘p . –q’ is used ‘–(if p 
then q)’ is in fact equivalent to−to negate ‘If 
p then q’. “There is no hypothetical-
inferability bar against the conjunction ‘p . –
q’”, which asserts much less than does ‘p . –
q’, and can be abbreviated to ‘–hib (p . –q)’. 
A reliable method of testing (with a 
conversational counterpart) is set out, using 
‘hib’ and ‘–hib’ before bracketed 
conjunctions. Quine and his followers have 
been willing to treat ordinary language, to 
the great detriment of logic, in an 
unashamedly “procrustean” way. 
MA Michael von Boguslawski, 
University of Helsinki 
Erik Stenius on Defining Logical Antinomies 
Erik Stenius (1911-1990) was professor of 
philosophy at the Helsinki university 1963-
1974 and before that at Åbo Akademi 1954-
1963. His early work concentrates on logic 
and the consistency of formal systems. 
Among his tutors, we find David Hilbert’s 
assistant Paul Bernays. This paper presents 
an overview of the method Stenius employs 
in his dissertation “Das Problem der 
Logische Antinomien” (1949) aiming to 
solve Russell’s paradox, Grelling’s antinomy, 
and the Löwenheim-Skolem paradox, 
among others. Stenius wishes to solve the 
antinomies within the natural language in 
which they arise. The central part of the 
method consists in placing strict 
requirements on the definitions of concepts 
used in logic. According to his view, 
paradoxes arise through faults in the 
definitions of the concepts involved. Thus, 
when these faults are isolated and corrected 
the paradoxes are removed. Stenius suggests 
some additional concepts for axiomatic set 
theory in order for his method to be 
efficiently applicable. 
 
Dr Kenny Easwaran, Australian National 
University 
The Tarski-Gödel Thesis 
A distinction is standardly drawn between so-
called “structural” axioms (those that define a type 
of mathematical structure, like a group, or a field) 
and “foundational axioms (those like PA or ZFC 
that characterize some pre-existing structure).  
However, some mathematicians with structuralist 
sympathies deny that there is such a distinction, 
and assimilate all axioms to the “structural” type.    
In this talk, I will consider Gödel’s Completeness 
Theorem and show that its standard interpretation 
depends on a non-mathematical thesis parallel to 
the Church-Turing thesis in computability theory.  
Consideration of this thesis shows that the type of 
structuralist view mentioned above is untenable, 
since it suggests that any consistent system is 
equally good, but says that there is no fact of the 
matter about whether certain systems are 
consistent. 
Dr. Greg Restall, University of Melbourne 
Why the paradoxes of self reference are even more 
difficult than we thought 
I present a form of the paradoxes of self reference 
which avoids the use of negation and other logical 
connectives.  This means that we cannot simply 
‘change the logic’ to sidestep the paradox: debates 
about truth-value gaps or truth-value gluts are 
beside the point.    In this talk I will spell out the 
paradox, explain what is going on, and draw out 
some lessons for philosophy of logic and language. 
Dr Lionel Shapiro, University of Sydney 
and University of Connecticut 
Deflating Logical Consequence 
Deflationists about truth argue that an 
appreciation of the expressive role of ‘true’ 
undercuts the demand for a metaphysically 
substantial account of the property of truth.  
Corresponding claims have been made concerning 
reference and satisfaction.  By contrast, 
deflationism about logical consequence appears 
not to have been explored.  In this paper, I 
formulate a deflationism about consequence, one I 
suggest shares the motivation and attractions 
claimed for deflationism about truth.  I then offer 
several explanations for why deflationism about 
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consequence has not been pursued, and 
argue that they do not point to good 
objections.  Finally, I consider the 
ramifications of deflating logical 
consequence for logic.  Many have argued 
that a language containing a deflationary 
truth predicate faces restrictions on its logic 
stemming from the Liar paradox.  I examine 
the conditions the Curry paradox places on 
the logic of a language that is additionally 
capable of expressing a deflationary 
consequence predicate, and criticize recent 
arguments by Hartry Field and Jc Beall 
which would show that these conditions 
cannot be met. 
Dr Robbie Williams, University of 
Leeds 
Degree supervaluationism and logical 
revisionism 
Simple supervaluationism says that a 
sentence S is determinate/true iff it is true at 
all sharpenings. Degree supervaluationism 
says that a sentence S is determinate/true to 
degree k, if it is true on d% of the 
sharpenings. With proportions of 
sharpenings to play with, there are 
numerous ways to define logical 
consequence. In a single-conclusion 
language without determinacy operators, 
these are all match classical logic. But with 
degreed-determinacy operators in the 
language, they come apart. One of the most 
natural and promising turns out to violate 
principles like Cut and a version of 
conjunction introduction. I argue that this 
isn’t such a bad thing, given a certain 
understanding of what logic is for.      
Though the discussion mainly focuses on 
the logic of indeterminacy, the formal 
machinery is similar to Adams “Probabilistic 
logic”, and similar revisionary issues arise 
when we add probability operators to his 
language. 
Dr Jc Beall, University of 
Connecticut 
Truth, necessity, and abnormal worlds 
A theory of truth answers both `nature’ and 
`logic’ questions. On the former front, 
questions concern the `nature’, if any, of 
truth. On the latter front, questions---with truth-
theoretic paradoxes in the forefront---concern the 
logic of `true’. In /Spandrels of Truth/ (Oxford, 
2009), I answer the former question along 
deflationary lines, and the latter question along 
`dialetheic’ lines. In short: `true’ is a see-through 
device introduced for expressive purposes; and 
liar-like sentences are spandrels of the device that 
give us true sentences with true negations. A 
suitable paraconsistent logic (in the B-ish vicinity) 
keeps us from absurdity; and a suitable (i.e., 
suitably deflationary) philosophy of truth keeps us 
from grimacing at contradictions.     Work is not 
done after answering both the `nature’ and `logic’ 
questions. Room must be made for other 
philosophically important notions. One such 
notion is alethic modality, and in particular /alethic 
necessity/ (and, derivatively, possibility). This is 
particularly pressing in light of the worlds-
involving---and, in particular, /abnormal/-worlds-
involving---formal semantics of the underlying (B-
vicinity) logic of the target truth theory (-ies).     
My task, in this talk, is to add a plausible (say, S5-
ish) necessity operator to the target truth theory (-
ies). While the solution is relatively 
straightforward, there are a few surprising 
obstacles along the way. This talk records some of 
the difficulties and advances a solution. 
Professor Mark Colyvan, University of 
Sydney 
A Ricci Curvature Tensor By Any Other Name 
A common view of mathematics is that it is “the 
language of science”. Although intended as a 
compliment, this slogan seriously understates the 
role mathematics plays in science. I will start by 
saying a little about what is right about the slogan. 
Thinking of mathematics as a language is useful in 
appreciating the significance of, and the difficulties 
encountered in arriving at, a good notational 
system. Good notation is far from trivial. The 
development of differential geometry, for example, 
with its Ricci curvature tensors and the like, is 
intimately connected with the notation employed. 
Next, I turn to what is wrong about the slogan. 
Thinking of mathematics as a mere language is to 
ignore the role of mathematics as an explanatory 
tool. I will look at the recent work on 
mathematical explanation and argue that there are 
genuinely mathematical explanations of empirical 
facts and, moreover, the transparency of some of 
these explanations is dependent upon the 
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mathematical notation used. While a Ricci 
curvature tensor represented via different 
notation would still be a Ricci curvature 
tensor, it may not live up to its full potential 
and deliver the kinds of explanations it is 
capable of. 
Dr Patrick Greenough, University of 
St Andrews 
Truthmaker Gluts 
Some species of indeterminacy give rise to 
some kind of gap, while other species of 
indeterminacy give rise to some kind of glut. 
In this talk I outline a novel “truthmaker 
glut” model of indeterminacy which is the 
dual of the truthmaker gap model of 
indeterminacy defended in Sorensen (2001) 
and Greenough (2008). This glutty model 
preserves both classical logic and classical 
semantics and represents a proposition <p> 
to be (glutty) indeterminate in truth-value 
just in case <p> has one and only one truth-
value and the state of affairs that p/not-p 
both obtain.  Various applications of this 
theory of indeterminacy are explored 
(including the liar paradox, incoherent 
stipulations, incoherent fictions, and the 
open future). I also set forth a 
*truthmaking* glut theory of indeterminacy 
which is embedded in a more plausible 
theory of the relationship between truth and 
being. Finally, I (i) address the worry that 
(classical) truthmaker gluts are unacceptably 
queer and (ii) show within the model how 
one might make sense of the distinction 
between representational and metaphysical 
indeterminacy. 
Mr Ryan Young, The Australian 
National University 
A Short Guide to Solving the Liar Paradox 
Despite considerable philosphical and 
logical attention, there remains no generally 
accepted solution to the Liar Paradox. This 
paper will motivate and present a new 
formal approach to the Liar Paradox which 
resolves the problems and has a number of 
remarkable and highly attractive properties. 
The most important of these are that the 
approach can be implemented consistently 
in any formal logic (including classical logic); 
and it allows a semantically closed formal truth 
definition. This new approach will be motivated by 
a careful examination of the properties of the Liar 
Paradox, and crucially, an examination of the 
compatibility of orthodox Model Theoretic 
Semantics with a consistent, semantically closed 
formal truth definition. Since it can be shown that 
the key principles of orthodox model theory are 
incompatible with a consistent, semantically closed 
formal truth definition, an intuitive modification to 
our understanding of formal semantics will be 
presented. This modification can then be used as 
the basis of a new and very promising solution to 
the Liar Paradox. 
Ms Rebecca Hosking-Young, University 
of Leipzig 
Philosophical Intuitions and Multiple-Consequence 
Relations 
Deep philosophical intuitions about the nature of 
Truth, Falsity, Vagueness and Consistency (among 
others) have often driven the development of 
Many-Valued Logics. However, such logics have 
rarely satisfied their philosophical motivation, and 
fail to accurately represent intuitions as intended.    
A recent development in logic by Shramko & 
Wansing suggests a method by which the 
intuitions behind Many-Valued Logic might be 
better represented. Namely, they offer a system 
that features two Consequence relations — one 
preserving Truth, the other Falsity. From this, a 
novel way of treating Falsity as False rather than 
merely Not-True can be generated, allowing us to 
formally express a key philosophical intuition. This 
intuition, and the philosophical grounding and 
potential of multiple-consequence logic will be 
explored. 
Dr. Adriane Rini, Massey University 
Aristotle’s Mathematical Cyclists 
Quine objected to Aristotelian essentialism and he 
objected to modal logic generally. Quine is unable 
to make sense of a view he attributes to Aristotle 
— that properties can apply by necessity to things 
independently of how they are described. Aristotle 
scholars have considered ways Aristotle might 
answer Quine’s objections to essentialism. They 
are on the whole concerned with metaphysical 
issues, and this paper looks briefly at some of this 
recent literature. It also looks at examples from 
Aristotle which make Quine’s point about 
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mathematical cyclists. The paper then shows 
that Aristotle, qua modal logician, is aware 
of Quine’s problems. 
Prof. Alan Hájek, Australian National 
University 
A Poisoned Dart for Conditionals 
An infinitely thin dart is thrown randomly at 
a representation of the [0, 1] interval of the 
real line. Here are two propositions 
concerning its landing point: A: The dart 
lands in [0, ½]. B: If the dart lands anywhere 
in [ ½ , 1], then it lands exactly on ½, the 
left-hand edge. Obviously one should assign 
probability ½ to A. And I will offer 
arguments, which I find compelling, that A 
entails B, and that one should assign 
probability 0 to B. But something has 
apparently gone badly wrong—for 
probability cannot decrease through 
entailment. I submit that we have a paradox. 
I will canvas some possible responses. My 
intuitions recoil at each of them. 
 
Philosophy of Mind 
Dr. Susanna Schellenberg, ANU 
Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology 
I develop a view of the common factor 
between subjectively indistinguishable 
perceptions and hallucinations that avoids 
analyzing experiences as involving awareness 
relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or 
any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is 
that hallucinating subjects employ concepts 
(or analogous nonconceptual structures), 
namely the very same concepts that in a 
subjectively indistinguishable perceptual 
experience are employed as a consequence 
of being related to external, mind-
independent objects or property-instances. 
Since a hallucinating subject is not related to 
any such objects or property-instances, the 
concepts she employs remain unsaturated. I 
argue that the phenomenology of 
hallucinations and perceptions can be 
identified with employing concepts and 
analogous nonconceptual structures. By 
doing so, I defend a minimalist view of the 
phenomenology of experience that (1) satisfies the 
Aristotelian principle according to which the 
existence of any type depends on its tokens and (2) 
amounts to a naturalized view of the 
phenomenology of experience. 
Professor Declan Smithies, ANU/Ohio 
State 
Do Zombies Have Beliefs? 
Zombies have no phenomenally conscious states, 
but beliefs are not phenomenally conscious states. 
So, do zombies have beliefs? I argue that beliefs 
are individuated by their relations to phenomenal 
consciousness and hence that zombies do not have 
beliefs. The argument relies on a thesis about the 
epistemic role of consciousness and a thesis about 
the epistemic individuation of belief. I go on to 
explore the consequences of this argument for 
functionalist theories of belief. Here, I distinguish 
between causal and normative versions of 
functionalism and I argue that belief is 
individuated by its normative role, rather than its 
causal role, in reasoning. 
Mr. Clement K. S. Huang, National 
University of Singapore 
Is phenomenal fission possible? 
Phenomenal continuity accounts claim that an 
earlier person survives as a later person if and only 
if the stream of consciousness of the former is 
phenomenally connected with the latter’s stream 
of consciousness. I will be examining the question 
of whether such an account of personal identity 
can allow for personal fission. I argue that it is 
impossible for a stream of consciousness to divide 
into two streams of consciousness, i.e. impossible 
to undergo fission. This is because two persons 
cannot share a single experiential state, and for 
phenomenal fission to be possible, it has to be the 
case that the two resulting persons can do so. If 
this argument is right, then given a phenomenal 
continuity account, a person cannot undergo 
fission and survive as two or more persons. This 
may not be such a bad consequence for the 
phenomenal continuity account however, and I 
want to suggest that this is so because the notion 
of personal fission is hard to make sense of 
anyway. 
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Assistant Professor Carrie Figdor, 
University of Iowa 
What is a Piece of Mind? 
A fundamental assumption of cognitive 
science is that the mind is divisible. This 
assumption grounds the search for 
mechanistic explanation of mental 
phenomena. I argue that cognitive scientists 
have not yet articulated adequate criteria for 
individuating mental individuals or identified 
mental part-whole relations. As a result, 
current talk of mental components and 
mental structures, and of mechanistic 
explanations of mind, are either merely 
metaphorical or empirically empty. 
Dr. Berit Brogaard, University of 
Missouri 
Some Kind of Seeing 
I offer a simple argument against the thesis 
that natural kind properties sometimes occur 
in the phenomenal content of visual 
experience which rests on reflections on 
what the phenomenal content of an 
experience is.   I then respond to three 
arguments aimed at establishing that natural 
kind properties do occur in the phenomenal 
content of experience: the argument from 
phenomenal difference, the argument from 
mandatory seeing, and the argument from 
associative agnosia.  Finally, I offer criteria 
for when a natural kind property is visually 
detectable and use these criteria to formulate 
a new argument for the thesis that natural 
kind properties sometimes occur in the non-
phenomenal content of visual experience. 
Mr Sho Yamaguchi, Kyoto 
University, Graduate School of 
Human and Environmental Studies 
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument and 
Representationalism 
Currently, one of the most important issues 
in the discussion on Frank Jackson’s 
knowledge argument is whether or not 
representationalism blocks this anti-
physicalist argument. Representationalism is 
the view which implies that the nature of 
sensory experiences is exhausted by their 
representational properties. Jackson argues that we 
can defend physicalism against the knowledge 
argument if (and only if) we accept 
representationalism. But several authors disagree 
with this viewpoint. For example, John Bigelow 
and Robert Pargetter claim that 
representationalism might be false and that their 
old-property/new-mode theory is more promising. 
Torin Alter suggests that representationalism does 
not invalidate the knowledge argument because the 
issues of whether representationalism is true and 
whether the argument is sound are irrelevant.   The 
aim of this presentation is to point out the 
advantages of representationalism and to argue 
that this view offers good resources to deal with 
the knowledge argument. I would like to get rid of 
the intuitive reluctance to accept 
representationalism. 
Dr Edoardo Zamuner, La Trobe 
University 
Visual Perception of Emotions 
Some philosophers think that perception is a 
perfectly good source of knowledge about other 
people’s mental states. In particular, they think it is 
possible to know that others have emotions by 
perceiving that they have emotions. In this view, 
there is such a thing as perceiving that someone 
has an emotion. Does this mean that we cannot 
perceive emotions themselves, but only that 
people have emotions? Although only a few 
philosophers explicitly argue for this view, most 
are likely to say that it’s not at all clear what it 
means to say that we see emotions. On the other 
hand, those who think that we do see emotions 
hardly provide any positive argument for their 
view and confine themselves to explaining why 
some philosophers deny that we see emotions. In 
this paper, I provide a positive argument for the 
view that we see emotions. I develop my approach 
by running two separate but interdependent 
arguments. The first shows that facial expressions 
of emotions are patterns of changes that carry 
information about the emotions that produce 
them. The second shows that the visual system 
functions to extract the information that 
expressions carry. I develop this argument by 
drawing on empirical data from psychology and 
brain studies. The conjunction of the two 
arguments provides an explanation of what it 
means to say that we see emotions. 
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Dr Barry Maund, University of W.A. 
A Defence of A Projectivist Theory of 
Perceptual Experience 
The idea of Projectivism is that we 
experience objects in the world as having 
certain properties which they do not have _ 
properties which are qualities internal to our 
own experience. The idea goes back at least 
as far as David Hume, playing a central role 
in his theory of morality and causality. My 
interest with the theory is in its application 
to perceptual experience in general. 
Specifically, I wish to defend a version of 
Projectivism, understood as a theory of 
perceptual experience.     Projectivism, as a 
theory of perceptual experience, assumes 
that perceptual experiences have two sorts 
of features; intentional features_ they 
represent the world as being a certain way _ 
and non-intentional, subjective features. The 
sense in which the theory is ‘projectivist’ is 
that the subjective qualities play two sorts of 
role:  (i) they are intrinsic qualities (either of 
subjective, phenomenal items, or of 
experiences, themselves) which are 
presented in experience;   (ii) they form part 
of the representational content carried by 
the experience.     Projectivism, in the form 
that I shall defend, is primarily concerned 
with a fundamental type of representational 
content, one that is sometimes called “non-
conceptual content”, but which I shall argue, 
is better thought of as “practical content”, 
content which is related to one’s abilities to 
act. This form of content stands in contrast 
to a more sophisticated conceptual content, 
which the experiences also carry. I shall 
argue for two claims: (i) that the more 
sophisticated conceptual content is ‘mixed’, 
containing theoretical and practical 
components; (ii) that projectivism provides 
an account that makes good sense of both 
forms of content that perceptual experiences 
carry, and is not subject to the “obvious” 
criticisms standardly levelled at the theory. 
Dr Colin Cheyne, University of 
Otago 
Emotion, Fiction and Rationality 
Our emotional responses to fiction, in 
particular our responses to fictional characters, 
apparently gives rise to a paradox. We emotionally 
respond to fictional characters that we do not 
believe to exist, although rational emotional 
responses to objects presuppose belief in the 
existence of those objects. I argue that when we 
bring together recent work in evolutionary 
psychology, naturalised epistemology and cognitive 
science, we see that such responses are not 
surprising and nor are they irrational. We have 
both the capacity to hold contradictory beliefs and 
to respond emotionally when reasoning 
hypothetically and contemplating imaginary 
scenarios. These capacities, properly deployed, are 
useful and rational. We cannot avoid their coming 
into play when we consume fiction, and thank 
goodness for that. 
Dr Simon Beck, University of KwaZulu-
Natal 
Misunderstanding Ourselves 
Marya Schechtman has argued that contemporary 
attempts to save Locke’s account of personal 
identity suffer the same faults that are to be found 
in Locke. To avoid these problems, she advocates 
giving up the mainstream Psychological View and 
adopting a narrative account like her “Self-
Understanding” View, which has the further virtue 
of maintaining important insights from Locke. My 
paper argues that it is misleading to understand the 
Psychological View as sharing Locke’s 
commitments and that (partly as a result) 
Schechtman has not isolated a problem that needs 
fixing or a reason for going narrative. It further 
argues that the Self-Understanding view is a great 
deal more at odds with Locke’s view than 
Schechtman cares to acknowledge. 
Mr. Nir Fresco, UNSW 
Dynamicism and its relation to connectionism and 
classical computationalism 
This paper deals with the question: what is the 
interrelationship between dynamicism, classical 
computationalism and connectionism on the 
cognitive map? Three answers are examined in this 
paper: 
1. A narrow conception of dynamicism - 
dynamicism is contrasted with classical 
computationalism and is a superset of 
connectionism. 
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2. A broad conception of dynamicism - 
connectionism is a subclass of dynamicism 
and overlaps with classical 
computationalism. 
3. A complementary view of dynamicism - 
dynamicism, connectionism and classical 
computationalism are complementary.  
Some researchers, who support the first 
answer, have suggested in the last two 
decades that classical computationalism and 
connectionism should be abandoned in 
favour of dynamicism. In this paper, I 
examine their presuppositions about 
computation and representation. The second 
answer is a connectionist attempt to address 
criticisms of radical dynamicists and advance 
connectionism as a plausible dynamical 
cognitive model. The last answer is a 
reconciliation of all three approaches with 
some aspects of cognition best viewed as 
computational, some as connectionist and 
others as dynamical. I argue that having a 
clear distinction between analogue and 
digital computation will further elucidate the 
debate at hand and facilitate a unified view 
of cognitive science. 
 
Dr William Fish, Massey University 
Pure Hallucination 
Recently, some disjunctivists have claimed 
that hallucinations count as such in virtue of 
meeting the “negative epistemic criterion” 
of being unknowably not a veridical 
perception. M.G.F. Martin, the originator of 
this view, claims that meeting this criterion 
also suffices for a state to qualify as sensory. 
Others claim that this explains why 
hallucinations seem sensory when they are 
not. In a recent paper, AD Smith takes issue 
with Martin and argues that Martin’s 
criterion fails to distinguish between states, 
such as hallucinations, that are truly sensory, 
and other experiences - dreams, mental 
imagery, experiences under hypnotic 
suggestion, and so on - that may nonetheless 
meet the negative epistemic criterion. In 
arguing his case, Smith allows that the 
problematic non-sensory cases may qualify 
as “experiences”, may “seem sensory to 
their subject”, and may even be such that 
“there is something it is like to have” them. In the 
only positive characterisation of these “sensory” 
states that Smith offers, he tells us that “a [pure] 
hallucination is the sort of state that could in 
principle be induced in a subject by stimulating a 
sense-organ in precisely the way it is stimulated 
when a subject sees something” (184). This claim, 
however, raises all sorts of interesting questions: If 
the possibility of non-sensory states that seem 
sensory is accepted, what underlying assumptions 
could lead to Smith’s claim that replication of 
sense-organ stimulation will yield a truly sensory 
state as opposed to a state that merely seems 
sensory? Should these assumptions be accepted? 
Precisely what is meant by an experience’s being 
“sensory” when that notion is divorced from such 
things as there being something it is like to have 
that experience? In this paper, I will discuss these 
questions in the light of empirical evidence from 
various sources. 
Mr Johan Gersel, Copenhagen University 
McKinsey’s Dilemma and Reasoning from Memory – 
an analogous solution 
McKinsey has presented the following dilemma 
for externalism of content. He suggests we look at 
the following argument.   a) I am thinking that 
water is wet  b) If I am thinking that water is wet, 
then water exists or has existed in my external 
environment  c) Water exists or has existed in my 
external environment  Our knowledge of A is 
based on privileged access to our own mental 
states. Knowledge of B follows from conceptual 
considerations regarding the external individuation 
of the concept of WATER. A and B seem to be 
known a priori and C follows by modus ponens, 
so we seem to have a priori knowledge of what is 
clearly an empirical proposition.  Traditional 
solutions to McKinsey’s Dilemma either deny 
externalism of content, argue that either A or B is 
empirically known, or question the transmission of 
warrant by the involved modus ponens. I suggest 
that by applying the Kantian distinction between 
the a priori and the pure a priori to the dilemma a 
potential dissolution is available that doesn’t 
involve any of the strategies above. When viewed 
in light of this Kantian distinction, McKinsey-style 
reasoning seems to be in relevant ways analogous 
to reasoning to existential conclusions based on 
memory. In light of this, if one’s theory of 
externalism mimics the epistemic qualities that 
render reasoning from memory (relatively) 
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unproblematic, one is able to solve the 
dilemma without surrendering any of the 
core intuitions driving the dilemma. The 
downside is that our options as to what 
forms of externalism we can adopt are 
severely restricted, if such an externalism 
must mimic said epistemic qualities of 
memory states. Nevertheless if one is 
independently drawn to such a form of 
externalism or thoroughly troubled by the 
traditional solutions to McKinsey’s dilemma, 
the present solution will be of interest. 
Ms Mette Kristine Hansen, 
University of Bergen(Visiting 
student at ANU) 
The Phenomenology of Intentionality 
Traditionally, conscious mental states have 
been divided into two broad categories; 
intentional mental states and purely 
phenomenal states, or qualia. Propositional 
attitudes like thoughts, beliefs and desires 
have been regarded as clearly intentional 
whereas sensations have been seen as non-
intentional and purely phenomenal (Visual 
experiences have by some philosophers 
been seen as hybrids since such states 
appears to   have both propositional content 
and phenomenal character). 
Representationalist and intentionalist 
theories of consciousness break with the 
tradition and claim that all mental states are 
intentional states.  Recently, it has been 
argued that conscious thoughts, believes and 
desires have phenomenal character(Siewert 
1998, Horgan & Tienson 2003, Lycan 2008). 
This idea too challenges the traditional 
separatist view. The view has, however, been 
considered as controversial even by 
philosophers who defend 
intentionalist/representationalist theories of 
consciousness(e.g. Tye 2000). In this paper I 
address some of the complications that arise 
from this, and argue that if cognitive 
phenomenalism is true it provides us with an   
argument in favour intentionalism. 
Dr Christopher Mole, University 
College Dublin, Ireland 
Attending and Referring 
There is a close relationship between 
attending to a thing and being acquainted with it, 
and between acquaintance with a thing and the 
possibility of demonstratively referring to it. Some 
philosophers have hoped that these close relations 
can be put to explanatory work, but it is not 
obvious in which direction the explanations should 
proceed.  The project that Bertrand Russell 
assayed in his abandoned 1913 manuscript, Theory 
of Knowledge, takes acquaintance to be an 
explanatory primitive, and attempts to build a 
theory of attention and reference on that basis.  
The project of John Campbell’s 2002 book, 
Reference and Consciousness attempts a 
somewhat similar explanatory project, starting 
from psychological theories of attention and using 
these to provide an explanation of reference.  I 
shall be examining some reasons for thinking that 
this project has its explanatory priorities 
backwards, and so that it cannot be carried 
through. 
Dr Peter Slezak, University of New South 
Wales 
Content Externalism and Intuition 
A decade ago, Egan (1999) described externalism 
regarding mental content as “clearly in the 
ascendancy” while “Individualism seems passÃ©.” 
Segal (2000) remarked that “Putnam’s Twin Earth 
example has become a sort of paradigm in the 
philosophies of language and mind” and Farkas 
(2003) describes externalism as “almost an 
orthodoxy.” Fodor (1987a) has noted that the 
Twin-Earth Problem “isn’t a problem; it’s just a 
handful of intuitions together with a commentary 
on some immediate implications of accepting 
them” (1987a, 208). However, Fodor doesn’t 
question or analyse the intuitions themselves.  In 
support of the dissident internalist position, I take 
up the matter of intuitions mentioned by Farkas 
(2003b) and also by Boghossian (1998) as being at 
the heart of externalism. Farkas characterizes this 
“deeply rooted” intuition as “baffling” and a 
“vexatious problem” that “poses a serious 
challenge for any attempts to give an internalist 
analysis” of the familiar thought experiments such 
as Putnam’s (1975) Twin Earth scenario. I focus 
attention directly on theorists’ “intuitive responses 
to a certain kind of thought-experiment” that 
“appear to leave them little choice” (Boghossian, 
1998, 273). The internalist or individualist accounts 
can be strengthened if this compelling intuition 
can be given a diagnosis in the way that one might 
 65 
show that the Müller-Lyer illusion is 
deceptive in spite of its subjective force. 
That is, the externalist position may be 
undermined by attending to its aetiology and 
demonstrating how the intuition arises from 
explicable mechanisms. Instead of defending 
internalism directly I ask: If internalism is 
true, why does it seem to be so implausible? 
Or, conversely, if externalism is false, why 
does it seem so convincing to so many smart 
philosophers? 
Mr Wilson Cooper, Macquarie 
University 
Can Functional Reduction Close the 
Explanatory Gap? 
Reductively explaining the mental in terms 
of the physical has been an enterprise 
attracting scant support recently.  However, 
Jaegwon Kim has argued that this is because 
of a flaw in the most prominent method of 
reduction employed to date.  Bridge law 
reduction seeks laws that connect higher-
level descriptions with lower-level 
descriptions to allow a derivation of the 
higher-level laws from lower-level laws.  The 
main criticism Kim makes against bridge law 
reduction is that the bridge laws cannot 
reductively explain the higher-level property, 
since the correlation itself needs an 
explanation.  In order to explain why a 
lower-level property is correlated with a 
higher-level property, such explanations 
need to respect a constraint that the 
explanatory premises contained in the 
deductive nomological argument do not 
refer to the property being explained, or to 
any other properties at that higher-level or 
above.  Abiding by this constraint results in 
explanatory ascent and thus the closure of 
explanatory gaps.  Kim argues that 
functional reduction can deliver explanatory 
ascent, and thus close explanatory gaps by 
functionally defining higher-level properties, 
like pain, in terms of their causal roles.  
Since definitions are not explanatory 
premises in a D-N explanation, if the 
defined causal role is found at a lower level, 
say neurophysiology, as a law about a neural 
state then we have an explanation of why 
pain defined by causal role C is correlated 
with neural state N.  N satisfies causal role C 
and pain is nothing more than having causal role 
C.    In this paper, I argue that Kim’s method of 
functional reduction is unsuccessful in closing 
explanatory gaps between the non-reducible and 
the physical because of two assumptions that beg 
the question against opponents of reductive 
physicalism: the Principle of Physical Causal 
Closure and Causation as Generation. 
Mr. Simon van Rysewyk, School of 
Philosophy, University of Tasmania 
Is there a pain face? 
This paper addresses the consequences of pain 
facial expression in humans as an epiphenomenon 
to a gross behavioural defensive response to pain. 
On this view, facial activity is part of a global 
effort of writhing and tensing which function to 
protect the body and remove the pain stimulus 
(Pankseep & Pasqualini, 2002; Salzen, 2002). 
Clenching one’s teeth, for example, may contribute 
to the suppressive functions of contortions and 
tensing elsewhere in the body by diverting 
attention away from the pain sensation (Frijda, 
2002). But, unlike limb and bodily movements, 
pain facial expression can only minimally protect 
during injury, for example, narrowing or closing 
the eye openings to protect them. We propose 
instead that pain facial expression cannot remove 
pain stimuli other than through obtaining 
interventions from others. Facial displays of pain 
signal danger to usually instigate empathy and 
provision of care, and provide a dynamic, 
embodied representation of pain (Craig & Badali, 
2002). The face is an interlocutor between the self 
and the world, and it is central in the sense of self 
(Cole, 2001). In human interactions, caregivers 
situate themselves so as to be able to attend to the 
ongoing patterns of feelings and thoughts revealed 
in the face. The object of empathy is not the 
squirming body, but the person whose body it is 
(Wittgenstein, 1958). The view that facial 
expression is constitutive of global homeostatic 
processes therefore neglects essential 
communicative functions of the face in pain. 
Mr Raamy Majeed, Sydney University 
Refutations of Revelation & Experiential 
Eliminativism 
The doctrine of revelation (which has nothing to 
do with religious revelation!) states that by having 
an experience, we know the essence of that 
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experience. This is one of the possible 
interpretations of what qualophiles might 
mean by identifying the quale of an 
experience. Physicalists are motivated to 
deny revelation because the essences we 
supposedly come to know in experience 
don’t seem to be physical properties. They 
don’t seem to be relational properties that 
we can characterize causally by the empirical 
sciences. In this paper, I argue that while 
physicalists are motivated to reject revelation 
in order to avoid a commitment to property 
dualism, denying revelation across the board 
leads to an eliminativist account of 
experience. As a consequence, I set out to 
determine whether the dichotomy between 
revelation and experiential eliminativism can 
be resolved by having a modest version of 
revelation. 
Mr Ole Koksvik, The Australian 
National University 
What Do Minimal-Pair Arguments Show? 
Some recent attention has been paid to the 
question of whether there is cognitive 
phenomenology; whether there is something 
it is like to think. Two broad types of 
argumentative strategies for a positive 
answer stand out. One, pursued in great 
detail by David Pitt (2004), is an inference to 
the best explanation: we need to postulate 
the phenomenology in order to explain 
other (non-phenomenal) facts. The other, 
embraced by (among others) Pitt, Charles 
Siewert (1998) and Horgan and Tienson 
(2002), is what one might call argument by 
minimal pairs, where two situations are 
contrasted. The aim is to elicit the response 
that being in one situation would be 
phenomenologically different from being in 
the other, and that this must be because 
there is a phenomenology of cognition.    In 
this paper I focus on the the latter type of 
strategy. I discuss what it would take for the 
argument to work, raise some doubts about 
whether this is attained, and suggest a less 
demanding--though still interesting--
conclusion, for which I try to show that the 
argument is successful. 
 
Mr Koji Ota, Kyoto University, JSPS 
Cartesian Materialism in Neural Studies of 
Consciousness 
While neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) 
have been increasingly explored, we are now 
confronted with the clash of two major theories. 
According to the first of these theories, 
functionally specialized perceptual modules have 
conscious contents and the local neural activity 
that implements them is the NCC. The second 
theory insists that globally accessible contents are 
conscious and that the global neural activity that 
implements such accessibility is the NCC. From 
the viewpoint of the local theory, global neural 
activity merely constitutes a cognitive mechanism 
operating on the contents which are already 
conscious. In contrast, the global theory argues 
that local neural activity can unconsciously work, 
and that some extra mechanism is needed in order 
to make their contents conscious, which would be 
implemented by global neural activity.  I will show 
how both of these theories presuppose a particular 
metaphysical doctrine ——namely, one version of 
Cartesian Materialism—— which claims that there 
must be a boundary dividing conscious and 
unconscious contents within the brain. They can 
be precisely mapped onto two hypotheses that 
presuppose Cartesian Materialism which were 
described and criticized by Daniel Dennett. I argue 
that the apparent tension between these two 
theories disappears if we adopt a conception of 
gradual consciousness. Furthermore, I will show 
that it is indeed possible to measure and theorize 
about such an aspect of consciousness. 
Ms Zoe Drayson, University of Bristol 
(Visiting Student, ANU) 
Representation-hungriness: food for thought 
Since the decline of behaviorist psychology in the 
1950s, the cognitivist movement has dominated 
the sciences of the mind with its assumption that 
mental processes involve representations: content-
bearing internal structures which function to stand 
in for aspects of the environment. In recent years, 
however, the need for internal representations has 
been questioned by various research programs in 
robotics, artificial intelligence, psychology, and 
philosophy. While these non-representational 
programs have experienced some success in 
attempting to explain basic sensory-motor aspects 
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of behavior, there is a class of cases which 
proves much more difficult for them to 
explain. These are the cases of so-called 
‘representation hungry’ behavior, which 
seem resistant to a non-representational 
explanation (Fodor 1986, Clark and Toribio 
1994). Recently, however, Ramsey (2007) 
has claimed that much of the alleged 
commitment to representations in cognitive 
science is unwarranted, because the states 
which are claimed to be playing a 
representational role are in fact performing a 
different function. Ramsey argues that this is 
the case in ‘representation hungry’ scenarios: 
he thinks that while the behavior in question 
requires explanation in terms of internal 
states, these internal states are mere causal 
mediators which do not stand in for aspects 
of the environment and therefore should 
not be interpreted as representations. In this 
paper, I argue that Ramsey’s non-
representational account of ‘representation 
hungry’ scenarios fails to explain certain 
important aspects of the behavior involved. 
I claim that we have good reason to think 
that these cases are almost inexplicable 
without a commitment to representational 
states, and I argue that, moreover, this 
conclusion follows as a consequence of 
Ramsey’s own views about representational 
explanations. 
Mrs Neralie Wise, Macquarie 
University 
Delusions: Two Philosophical Approaches 
There are two fundamentally different 
approaches to the study of delusions, the 
analytic and the phenomenological. In this 
presentation I will discuss the difference 
between the two and the strengths and 
weaknesses of each. My conclusion is that 
each approach could benefit from 
incorporating aspects of the other. 
Gabriel Rabin, UCLA / ANU RSSS 
Physicalism and the Idealization of A Priori 
Entailment 
Both physicalists and dualists alike can, and 
many do, accept some version of an a priori 
entailment principle.  Such a principle says, 
roughly, that if F is a complete fundamental 
description of the world, and F entails P, then 
F→P is knowable a priori.  Some version of an a 
priori entailment principle is a crucial premise in 
both the zombie and the knowledge arguments 
against physicalism.  In this paper, I examine the 
motivations for endorsing the principle and argue 
that appropriately formulating the principle in light 
of these motivations significantly reduces its ability 
to play the requisite role in both the zombie and 
the knowledge arguments, thus undermining those 
arguments.  I close by offering a decision-theoretic 
procedure for deciding between physicalism and 
dualism.  I argue that the weight of considerations 
favors physicalism. 
 
Philosophy of Religion 
Dr. John Lamont, Catholic Institute of 
Sydney 
Versions of Molinism 
The paper compares the Molinism of ï€ Thomas 
P. Flint and Alvin Plantinga ï€ with that of Molina 
himself. These versions of Molinism prove to be 
different in philosophically significant ways, in 
both object and content. The object of Flint’s 
Molinism is to preserve both libertarian freedom 
and divine providence. Plantinga’s object is to 
show that the existence of evil is not logically 
incompatible with the existence of God. Molina’s 
object is to give an account of grace and 
predestination in response to Protestants. Flint’s 
version of Molinism is a faithful development of 
Molina’s view, but its clarification of the 
implications of Molinism brings out problems with 
that view. Plantinga’s version of Molinism, unlike 
Flint’s, differs significantly from Molina’s. 
Plantinga holds transworld depravity to be 
possible, but Molina does not. This difference is 
explained by a fundamental disagreement over the 
nature of good and evil. Plantinga has an 
accounting conception of these attributes, while 
Molina has a teleological conception of them. 
These two conceptions produce the different 
approaches to the problem of evil found in Molina 
and Plantinga, approaches that are characteristic of 
traditional vs. modern conceptions of the problem 
of evil. The distinction between these conceptions 
is important, but is not currently discussed. 
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Associate Professor Cecilia Wee, 
National University of Singapore 
Descartes’ Ontological Proof of God’s 
Existence 
This paper seeks to contribute to the extant 
discussion on the ontological proof of 
God’s existence in Descartes’s Fifth 
Meditation by examining an aspect of the 
proof that has thus far been neglected — 
viz., the ontology that underpins the proof. 
Focusing on this ontology will contribute to 
a better understanding of the nature of the 
claims made in the proof. Again, attention to 
the Cartesian meditator’s developing 
metaphysical views in the Third and Fourth 
Meditation will make clear why this proof 
could only have been put forward in the 
Fifth Meditation (and not, as with the other 
proofs of God’s existence, in the Third 
Meditation). 
Dr Russell Blackford, Monash 
University 
NOMA No More 
Attempts are sometimes made to take the 
sting out of the science/religion debate by 
invoking the idea of Non-Overlapping 
Magisteria (“NOMA”) or similar ideas. If we 
accept NOMA, science and religion do not 
overlap but are complementary. Science asks 
questions about the the workings of the 
natural world, while religion asks questions 
about how we should live, find a sense of 
meaning in our lives, and so on. Sometimes 
this is portrayed as a difference between 
“how” and “why” questions or between “is” 
and “ought” questions.    However, the 
distinctions on which NOMA and similar 
ideas depend are, at best, simplistic and 
dubious. NOMA is probably a false account 
of the distinction between science and 
religion, and is, at the least, highly 
controversial. Although it may have some 
political value as a way of smoothing 
passionate disagreements, it is an inadequate 
solution to the perennial conflict between 
religion and science. 
 
 
Dr. Tamas Pataki, University of 
Melbourne 
Religion and mental illness 
In a recent book ‘Against Religion’ I argued that 
some kinds of religious belief or constitution, 
particularly but not exclusively at the 
fundamentalist end of the Abrahamic spectrum, 
are akin to mental illness. In this paper I clarify 
and elaborate the main threads of the argument. 
Mr. Guncel Onkal, Middle East Technical 
University 
The Fundamentals of Philosophizing God in the 
Argument from Design 
In recent years there is an increasing interest in the 
argument from design. This interest stems from 
the current discussions on the struggle between 
Darwinians and Intelligent Design supporters. 
William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802) 
performed to change the classical path of proofs 
and the arguments for the existence of God. The 
method of Paley is a breaking point since it is 
based on the collection of the facts of biology, 
physics and paleontology for the sake of proving 
the existence of a metaphysically given concept 
namely God. By that, Paley used empiricism and 
biological science in order to solve the problems 
of metaphysics and religion. Design, order and 
contrivance are considered as the inseparable 
characteristics of nature and intelligence in his 
explanations.    The aim of this paper is to examine 
philosophical value of the Paley’s argument from 
design. Some of the main questions can be 
addressed as such: Is Paley’s argument from design 
only an inference to the best explanation or a weak 
analogy according to Humean criticism?  Can 
Paley’s arguments have more explanatory power 
on nature comparing to Darwinian natural 
selection? What sort of scientific attitudes are 
hidden beyond the Natural Theology and 
Intelligent Design Theory? Can Intelligent Design 
still be defensible, and why? What sort of 
ideological and philosophical implications can be 
found in argument from design? What do 
contemporary ID theoreticians (especially 
Dembski and Behe) suggest and which religious 
values do they serve for? What is the philosophical 
status of new God concept as Intelligent Designer? 
Can be a design conceivable without a designer? 
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Philosophy of Science 
Dr Jeremy Butterfield, Trinity 
College, University of Cambridge, 
UK 
On Discerning Quantum Particles 
In several papers, Saunders, Muller and 
Seevinck have recently argued that quantum 
particles---both bosons and fermions---obey 
the principle of the identity of indiscernibles 
(contrary to most previous authors). Their 
position depends on two key ideas. (1): Two 
objects can be discerned without differing in 
their intrinsic properties, or in their relations 
to yet other objects, merely by a symmetric 
irreflexive relation between them. (This idea 
goes back to Hilbert, Bernays and Quine.) 
(2): Appropriate symmetric irreflexive 
relations can be found in the formalism of 
quantum theory. This paper assesses their 
position: in part developing it, and in part 
criticizing it---and so allowing objects, in 
particular quantum particles, to be merely 
numerically distinct. (This is joint work with 
Adam Caulton, of Cambridge.) 
Dr. Marshall Abrams, University of 
Alabama at Birmingham 
Borrowing Laplacean Children’s Toys: On the 
Utility of Largely Unknowable Models 
Using examples from evolutionary biology, I 
discuss ways in which it is useful to assume 
the existence of what I’ll call “ideal models”, 
hypothetical models which can reasonably 
be thought to exist in principle, but which 
are too complex for analysis, or simulation, 
or empirical testing, or even formulation. I’ll 
argue that reference to such ideal models 
can and does play a useful role in science, 
and that ideal models, if they do exist, may 
often be literally true of systems in the 
world.  I’ll also argue that the notion of an 
ideal model can help us understand the 
relationship between commonplace models: 
Commonplace models approximate an ideal 
model, which is literally true of the world. 
 
 
 
Dr Grzegorz Bugajak, Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszynski University in Warsaw and 
Medical University of Lodz 
On the types of observability and a ‘criterion’ of 
existence 
Old definitions of materiality, formulated in 
various philosophical schools, were usually given 
in the form of a list of properties, which all 
material objects, and only such objects, should 
share. It can be shown that in the light of now 
well-established concepts in physics, nearly none 
of these properties can be rightly attributed to all 
material objects. What seems to be left from these 
lists is an epistemological property of ‘being 
observable’, or ‘observability’.   What is material 
has to be — in a wide sense — observable. But 
what does it mean to be observable? For example, 
atoms are not observable in the same sense as are 
tennis balls. Or are they? When the notion of 
‘atom’ appeared in modern chemistry some 200 
years ago it was just a conventional ‘invention’ 
which made it possible to explain certain 
phenomenological laws. Subsequent development 
in physics proved it to be a very useful notion 
indeed. But were atoms observable in the times of 
Dalton or Rutherford? Until fairly recently, when 
nanotechnology enabled us to manipulate single 
atoms, their observability was certainly of a 
different kind than the observability of more 
‘common’ physical objects. Other entities of 
contemporary physics, quarks, are not, and — 
according to quantum chromodynamics — will 
never be subject to similar manipulations. 
However, being material, they have to be 
observable, and if so, it would be yet another type 
of observability.   One of the profound questions 
in the philosophy of nature is the following: under 
what conditions it is justified to say that some 
objects, to which certain theoretical scientific 
notions [seem to] refer, really exist? Perhaps, given 
the above example, one possible answer, a possible 
criterion of existence is this: “to exist” means “to 
be observable”, but in a special way: to be subject 
to manipulation. 
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Ms Sharon Ford, University of 
Queensland 
New Essentialism and the Swinburne Regress 
The New Essentialism advocated by Brian 
Ellis proposes that dispositional and 
categorical properties both exist at the 
fundamental level. The two are combined 
such that fundamental categorical 
properties—termed ‘categorical dimensions’ 
or ‘fundamental structural properties’—
fulfill a causal role in constraining the effects 
of causal powers. In this paper I argue for 
why, at the fundamental level, these 
dimensions should, instead, be considered 
powerful. First, in terms of their identity, the 
causal role required of categorical 
dimensions is inseparable from what the 
dimensions are, weakening the claim for 
their being quiddistic. Second, the laws of 
action and reaction are descriptions or 
specifications of how the categorical 
dimensions change with respect to the 
causal processes. These laws are deemed to 
be necessary. However, necessary laws, 
characterised as descriptions of their relata, 
seem to entail irreducible dispositionality. 
Ellis’s assertion that structure is categorical 
is partly driven by the Swinburne Regress 
argument, which calls for the effects of 
causal processes to be directly observable at 
some point; and which claims that 
categorical properties are required for this to 
occur. However, as Ellis notes, categorical 
dimensions can only be observed in virtue 
of perceiving a pattern of distributed causal 
powers. This implies that categorical 
properties must be either perceived 
indirectly or inferred from the way things 
behave. Thus, arguments for fundamental 
structure given in terms of categorical 
properties fail to discharge the Swinburne 
Regress. Alternately, contra the Swinburne 
Regress, a pure-power account may explain 
the manifestly qualitative world without 
resorting to fundamental categoricity. I 
demonstrate this by describing a possible 
world in which, together with a higher-order 
topology, light-like processes are the 
fundamental entities. Both these 
fundamentals can be comfortably viewed as 
powerful rather than categorical, giving rise 
to the fermions of which the ostensibly qualitative 
world is built. 
Dr James Justus, University of Sydney 
and Florida State University 
The Status of the Fact-Value Distinction in the 
Teleological Sciences 
Ethical values play an important role in sciences 
endeavoring to solve environmental problems. 
Unlike descriptive sciences—which are principally 
concerned with discovering, describing, and 
explaining phenomena—environmental sciences 
pursue more immediate goals, such as providing 
scientific bases for the preservation of biodiversity 
and natural resources. What distinguishes sciences 
of this kind from descriptive science is their 
emphasis on achieving objectives humans consider 
valuable. They can be labeled ‘teleological’ for this 
reason. Recent analyses have suggested teleological 
sciences are value-laden in a strong sense: attempts 
to demarcate the function of facts and values 
within them are misguided and obscure rather than 
illuminate their structure. In fact, the claim that 
values inextricably permeate teleological sciences 
has recently been taken to challenge the view that a 
“gap” exists between facts and values, the gap 
commonly taken to explain why, for example, 
determining what agents should do is distinct from 
studying what they actually do and why they do it. 
Examination of teleological sciences such as 
conservation biology and restoration ecology 
shows these claims are overstated. Teleological 
sciences are better conceptualized as having a 
conditional form where stipulated goals reflecting 
ethical values set much of their general structure 
and methodologies, but in which this influence can 
be demarcated from the factual status of claims 
made within them. The conditional nature of 
teleological sciences makes this demarcation 
possible, and helps clarify the function of values in 
science in general. 
Mr Adrian Currie, Victoria University of 
Wellington 
Towards a Cladistics of Analogy 
Sometimes in Biology, particularly in cases where 
we wish to reconstruct past species, we rely on 
data from a range of other species — a set of 
inferential tools called ‘the comparative method.’ It 
has been suggested that in using analogous cases 
(cases where similarity of biological traits is due to 
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independent evolution as opposed to 
descent) to construct retrodictive models of 
species we ought to constrain our area of 
interest using either homologies (restriction 
to clades) or parallel cases (restriction to 
developmental resources). I will examine the 
motivations behind this and consider 
whether a different approach that relies on 
classifying animals by trait, rather than by 
descent, might have use in the comparative 
method. 
Dr Greg Bamford, The University of 
Queensland 
Design and Designing 
Design may seem to have acquired a new 
found significance in philosophy with the 
recent interest in, on the one hand, 
intelligent design, and on the other, in 
natural design or design in nature, allied with 
the ongoing interest in function. Thinking 
about the world as exhibiting design 
features, however, with or without the 
services of a designer to thank for those 
features, hasn’t led to much thought about 
what it is to design something. Attention has 
focussed largely on artifacts, the objects of 
design, probably because ‘the artifact model’ 
is at the heart of each of these concerns. 
Intelligent design and natural design are 
analogies with design as a human activity or 
practice, so what are the philosophically 
interesting or relevant features of this 
activity, of designing, that cutting to the 
chase might have given us to overlook? I 
consider what it is to design something, like 
the Sydney Opera House or a paperweight 
that appears to be nothing more than a 
found object. And I sketch some features of 
how design is that I think we need to 
recognize or account for, set against 
intuitions about good knives, makeshift 
crowbars, scary stuffed bears, and god-like 
designers. 
Professor Rob Wilson, University of 
Alberta 
Is Kinship an Ethnocentric Projection from the 
West to the Rest? 
This paper re-explores the question of 
whether kinship is, as David Schneider 
famously argued, an ethnocentric projection made 
by Western anthropologists onto their native 
subjects and the cultures that they study.  It does 
so with an eye to advancing contemporary 
discussions of three general issues in cultural 
anthropology and the philosophy of the social 
sciences: the future direction of kinship studies, 
given it’s recent revival; resistance to scientistic, 
reductionist, or biocentric views in the humanities 
and social sciences in general and in the study of 
kinship in particular; and the narrative 
understanding of large-scale changes in kinship 
studies over the past 40-50 years.  A discussion of 
Schneider’s own views of the ethnocentric 
projection thesis clarifies why a reconsideration of 
that thesis is of relevance to these three issues of 
ongoing concern.  The paper will be located 
against the backdrop of a larger project, Kinship 
and Sociality, that I have been working on over the 
last few years. 
Mr Kelvin McQueen, ANU (RSSS) 
Has Quantum Entanglement Falsified 
Microphysicalism? 
Physicalism is a weltanschauung that attempts to 
unify all of nature under one category: ‘the 
physical’. It is advocated by those who want to say 
that the mind is nothing special - the mind is just 
another ‘physical’ phenomenon - like everything 
else - and it won’t be long before we have a 
complete physical theory of the mind. However, 
spelling out what it is to be physical, in a way that 
makes physicalism both theoretically significant, 
and not obviously false, is quite challenging. 
Microphysicalism: the view that to be physical, is 
to be determined, or necessitated by, fundamental 
microscopic particles (and their interactions); is, as 
far as I can tell, the only real response to the 
challenge. However, many philosophers have 
recently argued that microphysicalism is logically 
inconsistent with quantum mechanics: physicalism 
is falsified by the holism & non-locality 
constitutive of so-called ‘entangled states’ (for 
example, two entangled particles can be two feet 
apart, yet neither particle on its own has a definite 
position). I will attempt a response on behalf of 
the microphysicalist, by making a few tweaks in 
the microphysicalist doctrine. 
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Ms Kelly Roe, Australian National 
University 
Kinds of Kinds 
Theorists often distinguish between natural 
kinds, varieties of non-natural kinds such as 
social, institutional, artifactual, and arbitrary 
classes or nominal kinds.  While there is 
debate over what properties a kind must 
have in order to deserve the term ‘natural’ I 
will not take up this issue here.  Instead, I 
will focus on the different kinds of features 
that characterize the different kinds of kinds 
(quite apart from what we choose to call 
them).  I’ll offer a non-essentialist 
continuum between essentialism on the one 
hand and nominalism on the other.  
Different kinds of kinds can be thought of 
as lying on different points on the 
continuum according to the features they 
exemplify.  Once this framework is set up 
we can turn to the issue of what kinds of 
kinds there might be in bio-medicine and 
psychiatry.  Getting clearer on what kinds of 
kinds there are in these fields will have 
implications for the development of 
adequate classification/s. 
Miss Kirsten Walsh, University of 
Melbourne 
Is There A New Demarcation Problem? 
The original demarcation problem is to 
distinguish between science and non-
science.  Philosophers of science have 
worked on this problem for a long time, and 
yet they have failed to agree on a criterion.  
Should we continue to hope for a consensus 
solution?  Larry Laudan draws a more 
skeptical conclusion.  In ‘The Demise of the 
Demarcation Problem’, he claims that it is a 
pseudo-problem, which we ought to replace 
with a better alternative.  This ‘new 
demarcation problem’ is to distinguish 
between well-confirmed and ill-confirmed 
theories.    Laudan argues that we only want 
to know which theories we should believe, 
and we should believe theories iff they are 
well-confirmed.  But, says Laudan, not all 
scientific theories are well-confirmed — and 
conversely, not all well-confirmed theories 
are scientific.  Therefore, we don’t want to 
know which theories are scientific; we only want to 
know which theories are well-confirmed.  I find 
Laudan’s argument unconvincing.  I present 
reasons for thinking that we shouldn’t focus on 
theories to the exclusion of all other aspects of 
knowledge, or on well-confirmedness to the 
exclusion of all other epistemic virtues.  We want 
to know more than what to believe.  Moreover, 
even when we want to know what to believe, it 
turns out that being well-confirmed is closely 
related to being scientific.  So Laudan’s new 
demarcation problem is not really independent of 
the original, and therefore not a viable 
replacement. 
Mr Nicholas Evans, CAPPE, Australian 
National University 
The Importance of Scientific Communicators 
As scientific advancement continues to generate 
controversial and potentially dangerous 
technologies, there will be those who argue for a 
more  socially aware practice of science.  In this 
paper, I present an argument for the fostering of 
what I will call the “Scientific Communicator,” 
that is, individuals whose role it is to mediate 
between scientific enterprise and other fields of 
endeavor.     Science Communicators are often 
seen in education circles, but I believe there is a 
special role to be served by such individuals in a 
wider context.    Science communicators are not 
only valuable in teaching the public about science 
(scientific literacy), but also in helping 
communicate the effects of scientific research and 
synthesise this knowledge with other fields to 
make important policy decisions.  Without these 
individuals, the technologies which necessitate 
policy change may be misunderstood, and we run 
the risk of creating more problems for ourselves.  
In particular, I am interested in the roles of 
individuals such as Leo Szilard (whom I will be 
using as a case study) in influencing not only the 
progression of scientific understanding, but also 
the societal role of science through the early to 
mid 20th century.      Through this paper, I will 
highlight some current issues in which such 
individuals may help, and conclude with some 
statements as to how such efforts to foster such 
individual’s developments may be hindered in the 
modern world. 
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Mr Erik Nyberg, University of 
Melbourne 
Duplicate Paths 
Causal Bayesian networks are graphs that 
show which variables causally influence 
others, and they are proving useful in both 
Science and Philosophy.  One outstanding 
problem, however, is how to measure the 
causal influence of C on E via one causal 
path, when there are other causal paths 
between them.  This question makes 
intuitive sense, but can it always be 
answered?    We consider two possible 
approaches in which the other paths are 
‘blocked’ by specifying probability 
distributions for some variables: through 
either observation or intervention.  But both 
these approaches have serious shortcomings.  
We advocate a third, more ontologically 
radical approach: the path of interest should 
be duplicated, leaving the other paths 
unblocked.  We can then measure how 
much an intervention upon the duplicate C 
affects the duplicate E.  This has a plausible 
theoretical interpretation, conserves 
accepted results, and can be extended 
routinely to the complex cases that other 
methods cannot handle. 
Mr. Peter Takacs, Florida State 
University (Philosophy & HPS) 
Can Biological Fitness Be Etiologically Inert 
and Explanatorily Efficacious? 
Mohan Matthen and AndrÃ© Ariew (2002), 
Dennis Walsh, Tim Lewens, and AndrÃ© 
Ariew (2002),  AndrÃ© Ariew and Richard 
Lewontin (2004), and AndrÃ© Ariew and 
Zachary Ernst (2006) have recently argued 
that the propensity interpretation of 
biological fitness is fundamentally flawed 
because it commits one to a conception of 
natural selection as a causally efficacious 
mechanism or “independent dynamical 
force” when it is nothing other than an 
emergent statistical trend instantiated by 
underlying subpopulation-level causal 
processes. This cadre of authors suggests 
that the propensity interpretation of fitness 
and its corresponding conception of natural 
selection as a dynamical force allegedly (1) 
fails to explain why present populations exhibit the 
particular frequency distributions for genotypes 
and phenotypes that they do, (2) cannot realize the 
necessary independence condition for component 
causation required by a statistical relevance model 
for explanation, and (3) gives no guidance 
whatsoever as to how natural selection would 
affect the net force of combined evolutionary 
factors were it somehow distinguishable as an 
independent evolutionary force. In this paper, I 
defend the propensity interpretation of fitness and 
the dynamical conception of natural selection 
against these contentions on the grounds that 
there is as of yet no cogent argument which 
compels us to deny the causal efficacy of selection. 
Moreover, I argue that the success of predictive 
modeling in population biology, e.g., Lande-
Arnold multiple regression analysis, lends further 
credence to a conception of fitness as a causally 
efficacious property. 
Prof. Christopher Eliot, Hofstra 
University and University of Sydney 
Do ecological communities need to exist? 
At least two motivations push philosophy of 
ecology to figure out what communities and 
ecosystems are and whether they exist, and if so 
how and in what sense. First, communities and 
ecosystems have been increasingly appealing as 
units for conservation or preservation. Second, 
scientific realism has traditionally tied a discipline’s 
success to the existence of its theoretical entities, 
unobservable ones, and this standard applies 
awkwardly to ecology, if at all. In this paper 
(ignoring ecosystems per se) I respond to the 
recent analyses of ecological communities offered 
by Sterelny, Odenbaugh, and Shrader-
Frechette/McCoy, focusing on the question of 
whether communities need to exist to fulfill the 
demands created by the above motivations. 
Mr Ali Akbar Navabi, Centre for Time 
Knowledge, Influence, and the Third Factor 
In Time and Chance, David Albert connects the 
temporal asymmetry of influence to the temporal 
asymmetry of knowledge by arguing that in the 
initial disequilibrium of the world there lies the 
ultimate justification for record-based knowledge 
of the past. I explicate, in this paper, the puzzle of 
the epistemic temporal asymmetry of the world. 
To set the stage for the exposition of Albert’s 
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thesis, I highlight the philosophical 
significance of the problem of justification 
of record-based knowledge of the past and 
attempt to see if Albert’s thesis is amenable 
to any philosophical rigour. With Mathias 
Frisch, I interpret Albert’s thesis as 
bifurcating into a necessity claim and a 
sufficiency claim. I contend, drawing on the 
Boltzmann-Schuetz Cosmological 
Hypothesis, that the necessity claim is 
arguably false, but whether the sufficiency 
claim is true remains an open question. I 
suggest, furthermore, that if the sufficiency 
claim could be systematically defended, then 
the initial disequilibrium state of the world 
could be considered as the third factor 
which underpins both the epistemic 
temporal asymmetry and the asymmetry of 
influence, statistically characterised. In the 
light of this third-factor proposal, the 
connection of the epistemic temporal 
asymmetry and the temporal asymmetry of 
influence embodied in Albert’s thesis is 
shown to be a spurious one, hence leading 
to a systematic refutation of the thesis. 
Dr. Gerald Doppelt, UC San Diego 
How to Be a Scientific Realist 
This paper seeks to develop a more 
defensible case for scientific realism. I argue 
against two standard assumptions of realists: 
(1) that realism is confirmed if it provides 
the best explanation of theories’ predictive 
success and (2) that the realist claim that 
successful theories are true, by itself, provide 
the best explanation of their success. On the 
positive side, I argue that the confirmation 
of realism requires that it provides an 
explanation of theories’ explanatory success, 
not just predictive success. I then show how 
realism can explain theories’ explanatory 
success. I propose a richer realist model for 
explaining theories’ success, which includes 
an account of their epistemic virtues (e.g. 
simplicity and unification) and standards of 
success. This realist model is further 
confirmed; it can explain the success of 
theories in gaining adherents.  Finally, I 
argue that my version of inference to the 
best explanation realism provides a plausible 
rebuttal of the pessimistic meta-induction 
from the many past successful-but-false 
theories to the likelihood that our best current 
theories are likewise false.   On my model, the 
realist can explain the success of past falsified 
theories without assuming that they or any 
components of them were true.  My model of 
realism explains the success of best current 
theories in meeting the highest standards of 
confirmation by embracing the scientific realist 
claim that they meet the highest standards; they are 
true or approximately true.  This version of 
scientific realism defeats the pessimistic meta-
induction by establishing that there is a crucial 
difference between the success of predecessor 
theories and the success of our best current 
theories.  My argument involves the realist in 
trumping the pessimistic inductive inference by 
favoring realist inference to the best explanation.  
Thus, scientific realism for our best current 
theories is confirmed by inference to the best 
explanation. 
Dr Philip Catton, University of Canterbury 
Relationship, symbol, science 
In the human use of symbolic forms just as in the 
human adventure of an interpersonal relationship, 
there is an open-texturedness, an incapability of 
any individual to be in total control, and a 
potentiality for returns well beyond or well below 
what parties purposed at the outset the symbol or 
the relationship to produce.  Whether a symbolism 
that persons use, or the interpersonal relationships 
to which those persons are assimilated, truly 
contribute to flourishing, depends upon continual 
creative endeavour to which multiple persons 
contribute and of which no individual person is all 
that fully in control.  We might be pressed into 
thinking of the one set of creative demands 
epistemically and of the other morally, but the 
connection between the two is nevertheless 
complete.  In this paper I explore KantÂ¹s 
understanding of these points and address in this 
light the possibility of science. 
Dr Ben Jeffares, Victoria University of 
Wellington 
Composite Models and the Historical Sciences 
We expect the sciences to provide us with insights 
into the way the world works. Its ‘product’ is 
representations— models, of regularities that can 
then be re-deployed to make predictions, and 
explain the world. The product of the historical 
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sciences —historical geology, archaeology, 
evolutionary biology and so forth— is 
historiographies: narratives of the past. This 
paper examines narratives and outlines how 
they utilise regularities. It does so by 
integrating David Hull’s (1975) view of 
narratives with recent work on scientific 
models. I argue that we can understand 
historical narratives as composite models. 
Dr Jessica Pfeifer, University of 
Maryland, Baltimore County 
Fitness, the Environment, and Between 
Generation Variance 
Fitness is always relative to an environment. 
I develop an account of which features of 
the environment are relevant for fitness and 
how these environmental features ought to 
be factored in to determine fitness values. I 
use this account to resolve a problem raised 
by Gillespie for the propensity account’s use 
of the expected number of offspring to 
define fitness. In particular, I argue that, 
given the account of the environment 
developed in this paper, between generation 
variance does not create a problem for the 
propensity account of fitness. Thus, we 
might not need to revise our metaphysical 
understanding of fitness, in contrast to what 
a number of philosophers have recently 
argued. 
Mr Ali Akbar Navabi, Centre for 
Time, University of Sydney 
Knowledge, Influence, and the Third Factor 
In Time and Chance, David Albert connects 
the temporal asymmetry of influence to the 
temporal asymmetry of knowledge by 
arguing that in the initial disequilibrium of 
the world there lies the ultimate justification 
for record-based knowledge of the past. I 
explicate, in this paper, the puzzle of the 
epistemic temporal asymmetry of the world. 
To set the stage for the exposition of 
Albert’s thesis, I highlight the philosophical 
significance of the problem of justification 
of record-based knowledge of the past and 
attempt to see if Albert’s thesis is amenable 
to any philosophical rigour. With Mathias 
Frisch, I interpret Albert’s thesis as 
bifurcating into a necessity claim and a 
sufficiency claim. I contend, drawing on the 
Boltzmann-Schuetz Cosmological Hypothesis, that 
the necessity claim is arguably false, but whether 
the sufficiency claim is true remains an open 
question. I suggest, furthermore, that if the 
sufficiency claim could be systematically defended, 
then the initial disequilibrium state of the world 
could be considered as the third factor which 
underpins both the epistemic temporal asymmetry 
and the asymmetry of influence, statistically 
characterised. In the light of this third-factor 
proposal, the connection of the epistemic temporal 
asymmetry and the temporal asymmetry of 
influence embodied in Albert’s thesis is shown to 
be a spurious one, hence leading to a systematic 
refutation of the thesis. 
 
Political Philosophy 
Dr. Paula Keating, UNSW 
The idea of the reasonable in John Rawls’ Political 
Philosophy 
What is the status of the reasonable in Rawls’ 
mature account of Political Liberalism? Rawls’ 
corrections to his political philosophy seem to end 
in a flurry of the reasonable as qualifying adjective. 
Hence he writes of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, a reasonable overlapping consensus, a 
reasonable pluralism, a reasonable political 
conception of justice, and even more speculatively, 
reasonable hope. Is the idea of the reasonable 
created as a type of reflective equilibrium? Is it the 
one and the same as public reason? Or are we to 
still understand it as in the sense of the reasonable 
person? This paper will attempt to interpret an 
understanding of Rawls’ idea of the reasonable for 
his own political philosophy and hopefully then 
how this idea may, as a part of practical political 
philosophy, work in a live society. 
Ms Suzy Killmister, University of 
Melbourne 
Jusitifying Group Rights 
The rights claims that groups make with regard to 
language are highly varied, and pull in seemingly 
incongruous directions.  While some groups 
demand official status for their language, others 
focus on the need for translations in key social 
services.  While some request bi-lingual education, 
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others attempt to restrict the spread of 
alternative languages within their territory.  
Which of these rights claims are legitimate, 
and how do they interrelate?  I explore these 
questions by first positing a general model 
for understanding group rights claims, and 
then demonstrating how the various strands 
of language rights claims map onto it. 
Mr Hugh Breakey, University of 
Queensland 
Two Concepts of Property: Ownership of 
Things. Property in Activities. 
All current theoretical understandings of the 
concept ‘property’ are flawed, and all for the 
same reason. They are flawed because they 
hold that property is (at least in the limit 
case) a determinate ethico-political relation 
to some thing. Such ownership-of-things is, 
indeed, one of the two important senses of 
the concept ‘property’. But there is another 
sense, conceptually and normatively distinct: 
property-in-activities. In this sense the 
concept ‘property’ describes a determinate 
ethico-political relation to some activity — a 
relation that may (but equally may not) 
subsequently effect a wide variety of 
relations to some thing. In such cases the 
relation with the activity is essential, fixed 
and primary, and the ensuing relations with 
tangible or intangible things are contingent, 
variable and derivative. Appreciation of 
property-in-activities illuminates much of 
the substance of communal, intellectual and 
resource property rights as well as the more 
obvious cases of customary, recreation, 
riparian, hunting and easement property 
rights. Further, it allows us increased 
understanding of important philosophical 
applications of the concept ‘property’: 
ranging from Locke’s property in life and 
labour to recent analyses of the hacker 
ethos. And historically, property-in-activities 
bridges the conceptual gap between the 
‘propriety’ that was a perennial normative 
concern up to the seventeenth century and 
the full-blown ownership-of-things that had 
achieved dominance by the end of the 
eighteenth. I argue that while intuitive, legal 
and philosophical use of property-in-
activities remains widespread, serious 
misunderstandings and flawed policy arise 
from interpreting such use as referring to 
ownership-of-things. 
Dr David Lea, American University of 
Sharjah 
A Freedom based defense of the implementation of 
Private ownership rights in the 
Third world or so called developing countries 
frequently utilize informal systems of ownership 
which tend to be communally based, and in the 
case of land, unregistered. The Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto’s argues  that property rights in 
the developing world are the principal obstacle to 
prosperity and participation in the wealth 
generating activities of the global economic 
market.  However, the thrust of de Soto’s 
argument basically rests on the issue of economic 
efficiency, which is to say integration into the 
economic market with its global reach can only be 
efficiently achieved through the adoption of a 
system of formalized principles of private 
ownership. This form of ownership has been 
critiqued from a number of aspects. One author 
mentions three critiques, the “anti-
commodification critique”, which alleges the 
commodification of the natural environment, the 
“critique of expropriation”, which points to the 
closing off of the commons, and the “ productive 
organization critique”, which associates private 
ownership with the implementation of hierarchical 
relations of production.  The issue, which this 
paper addresses, is whether these critiques can be 
answered in part through reference to Sen’s 
analysis of the relation between modern ownership 
and freedom. Amartya Sen believes that the 
relation between freedom and market mechanisms 
needs exploration  and especially  the links 
between welfare achievements and freedom 
achievements,  as the successes and failures of 
economic markets have tended to be judged 
entirely by achievements of individual welfare ( for 
example, in terms of utility based Pareto 
optimality). 
Ms. Joanne Lau, RSSS, Australian 
National University 
Political Obligation and the Civil Dead 
There seems to be a general conception that the 
members of any given democratic population 
should be treated equally. We tend to address this 
in terms of the obligations of political obligations 
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and benefits that are distributed amongst the 
polity. Additionally, it is assumed that there 
is some sort of rough balance between the 
benefits distributed by the state and the 
obligations that individuals have towards 
that state. However, there are several — 
some well-documented — cases where this 
is not so. In particular, there are clearly 
identifiable groups that are not endowed 
with the same benefits as others. If this is so, 
why should people who are paying the same 
costs be under the same political obligations, 
if they are not receiving the same benefits?    
I propose a method by which we can 
resurrect Hart’s theory of fair play to take 
into account the particular disparities in the 
distribution of political benefit. In particular, 
I explore the assumption of a balance in the 
amount of benefits and obligations we 
receive and how this relates to game theory, 
the particular predicaments of the 
disenfranchised citizen and the non-
enfranchised foreign national and the 
availability of alternate benefit schemes. 
Finally, I consider the notions of fairness 
and enfranchisement across different classes 
of individuals before offering some potential 
remedies to address the disparity in political 
benefit whilst maintaining a theory of 
fairness. 
Mr Macintosh Stewart, University of 
Otago 
Rawls and Future Generations 
John Rawls’ theory has a problem in dealing 
with future generations.  How do we 
account for obligations of justice we have 
towards those who will come after us?  I 
discuss Rawls’s solution to this problem 
from A Theory of Justice, and argue that it 
fails.  Instead, I will claim that there is 
actually no problem of justice here at all.  
Justice simply is not the sort of thing that 
takes place between non-contemporaries.  
Rawls would have done better to 
acknowledge the problem as being outside 
the scope of his project, as he does for 
several other significant ethical problems. 
 
 
Mr Jan-Willem Burgers, ANU (RSSS) 
A Reason for Weighted Probabilistic Allocation 
Probabilistic allocation is frequently defended as 
being the best mechanism for allocating goods in 
some contexts. Those who advertise the virtues of 
this practice, however, almost exclusively tend to 
extol equiprobabilistic allocation. Rarely are the 
virtues of weighted probabilistic allocation 
discussed. Are there any virtues to the lat-ter, and, 
if so, what are they?      This paper investigates the 
virtues of weighted probabilistic allocation from 
the perspective of one important general 
justification for probabilistic allocation: its (net) 
positive behavioural effects. Specifically, I address 
the following question: do behavioural effects as a 
reason for probabilistic allocation ever warrant 
weighted as opposed to equiprobabilistic 
allocation? I believe there are two necessary 
conditions for behavioral effects to do so: 1) the 
probabilistic allocation must be primarily in-tended 
to address the possible disadvantageous 
behavioural responses of potential re-cipients, as 
resulting from their predictive capacities; and 2) 
the recipients must vary in the amount of ‘harm’ 
they can potentially cause through their behaviour.       
The paper proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I 
briefly attempt to justify the claim that, from the 
argument for probabilistic allocation due to (net) 
positive behav-ioural effects, weighted 
probabilistic allocation is only warranted if the 
purpose is to address the predictive opportunities 
of the potential recipients. In Part II, I attempt to 
illustrate how weighted probabilistic allocation can 
address these with my case of a Tax Authority’s 
Monitoring Policy. I first lay out the ideal 
conditions for weighted probabilistic allocation, 
and then speculate on the actual importance of this 
under more realistic empirical conditions. 
Although this case shows well why weighted 
probabilistic allocation should, in principle, be an 
important consideration, I contend in Part III that 
this case is rare and we should not often expect the 
right conditions for weighting to arise in practice. 
Prof Paul Patton, UNSW 
Postcolonial political liberalism: Rawls and the 
legitimacy of colonial States 
Political Liberalism appears well suited to 
determining the conditions of democratic 
government in a society established by 
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colonization. Not only does it not 
presuppose agreement on any particular 
comprehensive moral view, but its point of 
departure is the fact of ‘conflicting and even 
incommensurable religious, philosophical 
and moral doctrines.’ It offers a clear 
principle of democratic legitimacy after the 
fact of colonization, namely when political 
power is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the governing principles of 
which would now be accepted by all 
reasonable parties. At the same time, there 
are reasons to suppose that Rawls’s ideal 
theory cannot simply be applied to the case 
of colonial societies. After considering these 
objections and arguing that Political 
Liberalism leaves it open to apply the 
criterion of legitimacy to societies 
established by colonisation, this paper asks 
what this might tell us about the conditions 
under which a postcolonial government 
would be legitimate and whether the present 
Australian constitution meets these 
conditions. 
Ms Sibel Kibar, Middle East 
Technical University 
Searching for Materialist Grounds of Justice 
The concept of justice has been built on 
divine grounds. Justice was thought as an 
expectation from a divine judge even the 
legal laws and decisions were measured with 
reference to the natural law until the 19th 
century, the death of God was declared. 
However, neither God nor the natural law 
has a binding force on today’s notion of 
justice. A foundation lying under the 
concept of justice is still needed today in 
order to come to a mutual understanding 
and an agreement, I believe. This foundation 
must be a materialistic (earthly) one in a way 
that mirrors our age.  To a certain extent, I 
oppose anti-foundationalist approaches. I do 
not totally admit that the law is nothing but 
the order of the legal authority or the system 
as claimed by the legal positivists. I agree 
with that justice, laws, and moral concepts 
are partly the result of the legal system, but 
they have also social and historical bases, 
which look like more permanent than the 
legal ones. Those unwritten bases are not 
fixed, either. But they represent the existing 
conditions of the society at that time. So in this 
sense, they construct reality from the existing 
conditions. And with a reference to that reality, we 
build our moral, juridical and legal concepts. This 
attitude seems contradictory with the 
foundationalist standpoints as well. Although I 
defend the importance of revealing or building 
foundations, I do not advocate fixed grounds.   
The duality between foundationalism and anti-
foundationalism can be surpassed by another 
duality between realism and anti-realism. Speaking 
of unstable foundations is related with an 
understanding of unstable reality. This does not 
mean that there is no reality; there is a constructed 
reality within its robust conditions. Thus, my aim 
is to reveal those conditions that justice can be 
grounded on. 
Mr Moises Vaca Paniagua, University 
College London 
The Concept of Justice, Constructivism, and Political 
Liberalism 
It is by no means clear that the late Rawls is a 
constructivist about principles of justice. In, fact, 
there seems to be abundant evidence to the 
contrary in his Political Liberalism. This has been 
recently obscured by G.A. Cohen’s (Rescuing 
Justice and Equality, HUP, 2008, ch. 7) critique to 
Rawls concept of justice. In light of such a critique 
we need to distinguish the following dichotomies: 
(1) a concept of impure justice vs a concept of 
pure justice; (2) a constitutive view of the 
correctness of principles vs an indicative view of 
the correctness of principles; and (3) a 
comprehensive conception of justice vs a political 
conception of justice. These dichotomies are 
logically independent. Whatever position we take 
regarding each of them does not imply taking a 
specific position regarding the others. I will argue, 
first, that G.A. Cohen is mistaken in thinking that 
his critique of Ralws’s definition of the concept of 
justice is a critique of constructivism. Second, 
following Sharon Street (“Constructivism about 
Reasons”, Oxford Studies of Metaethics, III), I will 
argue that only views stating that the correctness 
of normative principles is constituted by their 
being the result of a specified procedure must be 
considered constructivist views (and views stating 
that being the result of a procedure indicates 
correctness must not). Third, I will argue against 
Street’s claim that even when for Rawls’s political 
liberalism the standard of correctness of principles 
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of justice is not truth but reasonableness, 
justice-as-fairness still expresses a 
constructivist view. I hold that justice-as-
fairness, in order to serve the purposes of 
political liberalism, is better interpreted as 
not making the claim that reasonableness of 
the principles of justice is constituted by 
their being the result of the original position. 
Mr. Cavit Hacihamdioglu, Australian 
National University, Philosophy 
David Miller, Global Justice and Duties to 
Non-Nationals 
David Miller makes a distinction between 
duties of distributive justice towards co-
nationals and those towards non-nationals. 
The recipients of the first type of duty, he 
claims, are morally more significant because 
of co-nationals’ moral and political 
association with each other. It is each 
nation’s own responsibility to address issues 
of (social) justice ‘primarily’ within its own 
jurisdiction. This is because, Miller derives 
practical principles of justice from modes of 
human interaction taking place within 
family, community and nation, the latter 
having the broadest scope of human 
association and primary moral relevance. 
The duty of global justice (i.e. duties to 
distant needy) has a weaker moral weight, 
having only secondary moral importance. 
Wealthy nations, nevertheless, have a 
minimal duty of global justice to address 
inequalities and injustices in poor nations to 
ensure standards of i) basic human rights 
and ii) fair terms of international 
cooperation. However, Miller denies 
universalist claims that the duty of equal 
consideration or distributive equality applies 
globally because there is i) no 
single/universal concept of justice and ii) no 
single global community to apply such 
universalistic claims. In order to critically 
appraise Miller’s arguments on duties to co-
nationals, they need to be weighed against 
cosmopolitan/universalist positions that 
demand global equality in discharging duties 
of distributive global justice. I suggest a 
middle way position between the ethical 
priority and significance of our duties 
towards co-nationals (Miller’s partialism) 
and the equal duties toward all humans 
(Singer’s impartialism). In doing so, I hope to 
answer possible objections to both approaches. 
That is, while Singer’s impartialist view is morally 
over-demanding, Miller’s partialist duty is morally 
under-demanding. I propose that we need a more 
qualified approach in forming our duties of justice 
that gives balanced weight to the duties we have 
towards co-nationals and non-nationals. 
Mr. Andy Lamey, University of Western 
Australia 
A Liberal Theory of Asylum 
Hannah Arendt argued that refugees pose a major 
problem for liberalism. Most liberal theorists 
endorse the idea of human rights. At the same 
time, liberalism takes the existence of sovereign 
states for granted. When large numbers of people 
petition a liberal state for asylum, Arendt argued, 
these two commitments will come into conflict. 
An unwavering respect for human rights would 
mean that no refugee is ever turned away. Being 
sovereign, however, allows states to control their 
borders. States supposedly committed to human 
rights will thus often violate the rights of refugees 
by denying them entry. In this presentation I 
attempt to defend liberalism from Arendt’s 
criticism by outlining a rights-based model of 
asylum that is enforceable by sovereign states. 
Central to my argument is a distinction between 
the place where a person is recognized as a rights-
bearing agent, and the potentially different place 
where he or she exercises those rights. 
Mr Eray Yaganak, Middle East Technical 
University 
Human Nature and Politics in Hobbes 
The central question of political philosophy 
concerns the nature of the authority of the state. 
The concept of such authority generates a 
philosophical puzzlement: on the one hand it 
seems to involve a power to override the will of 
the individual citizen, while on the other hand its 
existence seems in a certain sense to depend on 
the wills of the individuals who are subject to it. 
The relationship between power which means 
sovereignty and will in a political context is the 
main debatable problem of any political body. One 
of the preeminent figures in the history of political 
thought Hobbes deals with the problem of human 
nature in order to explain a political body. My 
claim is that his liberalist politics depends on his 
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account of human nature. That is, while 
defining what human nature is, he tries to 
legitimate his political and economical 
understandings in accordance with human 
nature. He describes the human being in two 
different ways. One is the description of 
man who lives in the state of nature and the 
other is that of a civil person or a citizen 
who lives in a society. In the state of nature, 
“natural man is a man considered as if he 
were simply an animal, not modified in any 
way by education or discipline.” Every man 
has a right to all things. However, this 
freedom is also the cause of war between 
men. Since the human’s desires are 
determined by his natural instincts, and since 
there is no social or ethical limitation, men 
act without considering others. “Men having 
equal rights to same things are bound to be 
in competition for them, and this leads to 
war.” Therefore, “every man is a potential 
enemy of every other.” 
Associate Professor Stan van Hooft, 
Deakin University 
Political Patriotism 
As evidenced by the reactions to Martha 
Nussbaum’s famous essay of 1996, 
patriotism is a contested notion in moral 
debate. This paper explores the suggestion 
made by Stephen Nathanson that patriotism 
might be understood as “love of one’s 
country”, and suggests that this phrase is 
misleading. It suggests that patriotism, like 
love, is not rational, and it fails to distinguish 
two kinds of object for that love: one’s 
cultural community and one’s political 
community. Accordingly, this phrase can 
lead to a kind of nationalism which involves 
chauvinism and militarism and that is, 
therefore, morally objectionable. The 
problem arises from ambiguities in the 
notion of “country” which is said to be the 
object of such love. Moreover, “love” is not 
the appropriate term for a relationship 
whose central psychological function is that 
of establishing an individual’s identity as a 
citizen. I suggest that the proper mode of 
attachment involved in patriotism is 
identification with one’s political 
community, and that the proper object of a 
patriot’s allegiance is the political 
community thought of without the emotional, 
nationalistic and moralistic connotations that often 
accompany the concept of community. The 
“political patriotism” that arises from such an 
attitude is sceptical of the “national interest” and 
does not accept that our moral responsibilities to 
others stop at national borders. In this way 
political patriotism is consistent with a 
cosmopolitan stance towards human rights and 
global justice. 
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SOCIAL EVENTS 
 
Opening Reception 
Sunday, 5 July 2009  (8.30 - 10.00 pm) 
Foyer, Economics and Commerce Building (Building 148), University of 
Melbourne 
See Univeristy of Melbourne campus map (p. 6) 
 
Conference Dinner   
Buffet 
Wednesday, 8 July 2009  (8.00 - 11.00 pm) 
Mesh, Crown Promenade Hotel, 8 Whiteman Street, Southbank 3006 
Telephone: 1800 776 612 
Menu 
Seafood 
Tasmania oyster 
Tasmania mussel 
King prawn 
Fresh Water Crab 
Teppanyaki 
Beef skewer 
Kangaroo 
Blue eye cod 
Roast 
Lamb 
Mixed vegetables 
Cold Dishes 
Bean salad 
Pasta salad 
Tabouleh 
Smoked ocean trout 
Smoked chicken 
Make your own salad 
Grilled red pepper 
Grilled pumpkin 
Hot Dishes 
Pumpkin soup 
Vegetable tom yum soup 
Indian chickpea curry 
Garlic potato 
Steamed broccoli 
Chicken cacciatore 
Bass fillets 
Spinach cannelloni 
Steamed vegetarian 
dumpling 
Coconut rice 
Steamed basmati rice 
Bread 
Multi-grain roll 
White dinner roll 
Olive bread 
Rye bread 
Plain naan 
Garlic naan 
Cheese & Nuts 
Blue stilton 
Cheddar 
Brie 
Mixed dried fruits 
Walnuts 
Water crackers 
Desserts 
Dark chocolate fountain 
Pistachio mini cake 
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Fresh cut fruits 
Dark chocolate dome 
Strawberry mouse 
dome 
Fruit flan 
Real fruit sauces 
Meringue tartlets 
Lemon & lime cake 
Mango cheese cake 
Hot apple pudding with 
custard 
Selection of Ice-creams 
Drinks 
2 glasses of house 
wine/beer/fruit juice 
Tea, coffee, still water 
 
Getting there 
 Take any tram going from Melbourne University (Stop 1) along 
Swanston St towards the city centre  
 Alight at Federation Square / Flinders St Station (Tram stop no. 13). 
 Keep heading in the same direction and cross the bridge. 
 Once across the bridge, turn RIGHT. You will find yourself near the 
Arts Centre complex. 
 Take the stairs or ramp down to the promenade level (there are 
three levels you need the intermediate one). 
 Walk along the river until you get to Queensbridge St (this will take 
you roughly 10 minutes). 
 Turn LEFT. In front of you, you will see the Crown Casino complex 
and the light sign “Crown” indicating the main entrance to the 
casino.  
 “Mesh” is in the Crown Promenade Hotel building which is on 
Whiteman St, directly opposite the main entrance of the casino. (If 
you find it difficult to locate the restaurant, you can approach the 
concierge staff at the casino entrance and they will be able to show 
you where to go). 
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University of Melbourne to Mesh, Crown Promenade Hotel 
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Farewell Lunch    
Friday, 10 July 2009  (1.30 - 3.00 pm) 
East Imperial, 323 Rathdowne St, Carlton 3053 VIC  
Telephone: 9347 3322 
Menu 
Premium Chinese Tea 
Wasabi Prawn, Green Spinach Dumpling 
Scallop Dumpling, Stuffed Eggplant 
King Prawn Dumpling, Vegetarian Dumpling 
Crab Meat & Prawn Dumpling, Shanghai Little 
Dragon Bun, Chicken Sticky Rice 
Egg Custard Tart 
 
History of Yum Cha 
Originally a Cantonese custom, the Chinese tradition of yum cha literally 
means “drinking tea”. The kind of food served at yum cha is dim sum, which 
literally means “touch the heart” or “order to your heart’s content”. The 
tradition of yum cha dates back to the tenth century and the beginning of 
the Sung dynasty. Both street vendors in the huge city market and 
established tea houses served dim sum. Tea houses became very popular in 
Southern China during the Sung dynasty and a large tea house could boast 
of more than 1,000 dim sum varieties. Dim sum is usually served during the 
day from mid morning to mid afternoon. 
Getting there 
 From the University, follow Swanston St until you come to Faraday 
St. 
 Turn onto Faraday St and keep going until you come to Rathdowne 
St.  
 Turn RIGHT.  
 The restaurant is on your right at the corner of Moton Place and 
Rathdowne St. 
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OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION 
 
Doctors 
University of Melbourne 
Health Service 
138-146 Cardigan Street, Carlton, 
VIC 3053 
Tel: (03) 8344 6904 or (03) 8344 
6905 
Opening hours: 8.45am - 
5:00pm Monday to Friday 
 
QV Medical Centre 
Corner Swanston Street & 
Londsdale Street 
Melbourne VIC 3000, Australia 
Tel: (03) 9662 2256 
 
Pharmacies 
University of Melbourne 
Pharmacy 
Ground Floor, Student Union 
Building (Bldg. 130) 
Tel: (+61 3) 8344 6965 
Pulse Pharmacy 
279 Lygon St 
Carlton VIC 3053 
Tel: (03) 9349 1067 
Pickford Pharmacy 
177-179 Elgin St 
Carlton, VIC 3053 
Tel: (03) 9347 2505 
 
ATMs 
Commonwealth Bank, University of 
Melbourne 
The bank is on the north side of the 
Architecture Building (133), directly 
east of Union House, across the plaza. 
Other ATM machines are located near 
Union House and on Lygon Street. 
 
Post office 
University of Melbourne Post Office 
South side of the Architecture Building 
(133), ddirectly east of Union House, 
across the plaza. 
 
Photocopying 
Photocopying facilities are available 
in the Baillieu Library (Building 
177, just south of Economics & 
Commerce the main conference 
locale). 
Internet 
E1 Networks Internet Cafe 
62 Pelham Street 
Carlton, VIC 3053   
Hours: Monday - Thursday: 10am - 
5pm. 
Saturday: 10am - 5pm          (Prior 
booking needed). 
Tel: (03) 9077 0927 
Internet access is available if you are 
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staying at Ormond College. 
There are also several internet 
cafés on Lygon Street. 
 
Cafés 
Student Union Food Court 
There are lots of quick lunch 
options in Union House, the 
student union (Building 130),  
just North of Old Arts. 
Animal Orchestra 
163 Grattan Street 
Carlton 3053 VIC 
 
There are also lots of nice cafés 
on Lygon street. 
 
Pubs 
Prince Alfred Hotel 
191 Grattan St 
Carlton VIC 3053 
 
 
 
The Clyde 
Cnr. Elgin St. & Cardigan St.  
Carlton VIC 3053 
The Corkman  
160 Leicester St (cnr Pelham St) 
Carlton VIC 3053 
 
University House, the staff club, 
offers members of the faculty clubs of 
other universities temporary 
membership. Temporary membership 
is free, but for licensing purposes you 
need to register at the entrance desk 
or contact their membership director 
Michele Caneva 
(mcaneva@unimelb.edu.au).  
University House is located just North 
of the conference venue, along 
Professors' Walk in building 112. 
 
Restaurants 
There is a wide variety of restaurants 
on Lygon street, within walking 
distance of the University of 
Melbourne; Italian, Chinese, Thai, 
Malaysian, Indian  ... 
 
